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THE REAL SITUATION
IN RUSSIA

Leon Trotsky

THE REAL SITUATION
IN RUSSIA *translated by*

MAX EASTMAN



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INTRODUCTION

THE CONFUSION ABOUT RUSSIA

An unusual confusion reigns among thinking people the world over as to the issues in conflict between Trotsky and Stalin. The international business men and the capitalist press are pretty well agreed that, as a choice between evils, Stalin is their man. According to a despatch in the *New York Times*, stocks in the concession-industries, and even bonds of the old régime, rose on the London market at the news of Trotsky's deportation. The Communist officials, on the other hand, and their press, continue to assert in every corner of the earth that Trotsky is the leader of a petty bourgeois or social-democratic "deviation"—even that he is a counter-revolutionist—and that Stalin is the true Bolshevik. An intermediate group, composed of liberal sympathizers and intellectual tourists into Russia, or into communism, imagine that there is no political issue whatever. It is a mere personal struggle for power. Trotsky got beaten and refused to behave. Or Trotsky does not understand party discipline. Some of the more naïve and recent of these tourists actually believe that Trotsky, Rakovsky, Radek, Preobrazhensky, and thirty to fifty

more of the fighting leaders of the October Revolution have been sent away to Siberia, like children to the nursery, because they insisted on talking at the wrong time. They wanted to hold a discussion when all the adult and serious Communists thought only of getting to work "building socialism in one country."

This blissfully innocent idea, and also the confusion underlying it, disappear quickly when you read the actual platform of Trotsky and the Opposition, suppressed and outlawed by the Stalin régime. In this platform—which I have entitled "The Real Situation in Russia and The Tasks of the Communist Party"—it is clear what the Opposition is fighting for and against whom. They are fighting for the life-interests of the "lower" classes, the rank-and-file industrial workers, the farm hands, and the poorer peasants; for forms of organization which will permit those interests to dominate politically over others; and for honest scientific thinking about the problem of fulfilling those interests, and the ultimate interests of mankind, in a communist society.

Marxian socialism used to be defined as a union of science with the proletariat. Bolshevism might be defined as a union of science with the proletariat through the mediation of certain forms of party, soviet, and trade-union organization. It is one of these three things—scientific thinking, or the proletariat, or the Bolshevik forms of organization—that Trotsky and the Opposition are defending in every

sentence of this platform. They are defending the proletariat against the indubitable encroachment of three anti-proletarian elements—the Nepmen or new capitalists, the Kulaks or rich peasants, and the gradually crystallizing class of political, industrial, and trade-union bureaucrats, who inevitably fall more and more under the influence of the Nepmen and Kulaks. They are defending the Bolshevik forms of organization as conceived by Lenin against Stalin's perversion of them in the direction of bureaucracy, clique-rule, and personal dictatorship. And they are defending scientific thinking against dishonest political big-talk, demagogism, juggling of statistics, Jesuitry, and a deliberately adopted campaign of "all-Russian and international lying."

These three things are not unrelated to each other, as every one familiar with the labor struggle knows. The situation in the Russian Communist party is in its essence both typical and familiar. It is the old fight of the clear-headed, honest, and thorough-going revolutionist standing for the real interests of the rank-and-file workers and of the proletariat as a class, against the solidifying machine—against the disguised reactionary policy, the consciously and unconsciously hypocritical talk, the organizational trickery and brutality, of the proletarian politician, the professional labor leader, the foggy-minded socialist, joined together in a perfect union with the innumerable host of those who call it "practical" to

keep still while things go wrong. Nothing new in the history of the labor movement, nothing in its essence obscure or unintelligible, or even unexpected by those who gave some thought to the future of the Russian revolution.

But there are certain unusual features in the present situation which obscure its nature, and make it difficult even for those long familiar with such situations to perceive clearly. Heretofore all proletarian organizations have been struggling for power in a capitalist society. The Russian Communist party has captured the power, and controls the entire industrial and political life of the nation. This gives to the conflict between the reactionary machine and the thorough-going proletarian revolutionists in that party an unfamiliar aspect. In the first place the machine is far more revolutionary than it would be in a capitalist country. Not only is it so instinctively, but it has to be. It is neither subject to the influence, nor equipped with the support, of a capitalist state, a powerful bourgeoisie, and an anti-proletarian public opinion. It is proletarian in sentiment, and is compelled either to dupe or to conciliate the toiling masses at every backward step it takes. This accounts for the "zigzag" course traced by Stalin in a reactionary direction. Since he presides over the organizations of a victorious revolutionary working-class, such a deceptive—and most likely also self-deceptive—course is the only one he could trace in a reac-

tionary direction. This fact is easily forgotten, especially by spectators in other countries, and to them Stalin appears to be offering revolutionary leadership when he is giving a quite unavoidable expression to the will of a revolutionary proletariat. His bureaucracy is actually doing just what every crystallized labor-bureaucracy does—balancing itself in power between the proletarian and bourgeois class forces. But the proletarian force is so much stronger in Russia than elsewhere in the world, that to a casual observer this bureaucracy appears to be throwing its full weight on the side of the proletariat.

Besides thus actually standing far to the left of the labor-bureaucrats we were familiar with, Stalin talks a language opposite to theirs. They popularize their policies in the name of decency, regularity, law and order, patriotism, etc. And they denounce their opponents in the rank and file as “Reds,” revolutionaries, Bolsheviks. Whatever policy Stalin wants to popularize, he is compelled to advance in the name of “revolution,” “Bolshevism,” “Leninism.” Whatever agitator in the rank and file he wants to put out of the way, he is compelled to arraign as a “counter-revolutionist,” a “bourgeois,” a “Menshevik.” This is an absolute necessity of his position, entirely regardless of the facts. “Revolution,” “Bolshevism,” “Leninism” are the names of the established order in Russia. If that order solidifies gradually, accommodating itself to a growing system of capitalist class-

rule, it will carry these words with it. They will become respectable words. They will lend their sanction to whatever measures the ruling powers find expedient. Stalin will lead the Russian workers back to capitalism with the red flag flying. This ought to be intelligible to us in America, where the worst depredations of the exploiting oligarchy are always undertaken in the name of "liberty" and "democracy," and where the "Daughters of the American Revolution" are the most fervid anti-revolutionary body in the country.

But this change in the meaning of words accomplishes itself by shifts of emphasis so slight as to be almost imperceptible. The essential weight of the word Leninism, for instance, has already passed to the side of discipline, centralized authority, obedience within the party, and practical craftiness, skillful maneuvering, "realism" on the political field. All of these things characterized Lenin or his policies; none of them distinguished him from hundreds of leaders. His gigantic revolutionary will—inflexible, audacious, intolerant of false compromise and opportunism, always at the incredible extreme of what was possible—distinguished him. Impatient honesty distinguished him, undeluded confrontation of every fact. Revolt against all pious nonsense, ritual, hypocritical, or ignorant, distinguished him. Lenin was the greatest rebel in history. That fact is slipping out of thought altogether—slipping out of the connotation

of the term *Leninism*. Words always behave this way when historic changes are gradual. The process is familiar in the past, but hard to detect in the present, and this further confuses our perception of an essentially simple situation.

Besides being more revolutionary and talking a more revolutionary language than any labor-bureaucracy heretofore dreamed of, the Stalin bureaucracy is infinitely more powerful. Its members are labor leaders and proletarian politicians, but they are also captains of a gigantic industry. They control the wealth of all Russia. Their power of patronage and intimidation, and their power over the glamorous emotions of the dreamers-for-hire and sentimental careerists who compose so large a part of the "intellectual" branch of the human race, is unlimited. They have used this power ruthlessly. They have surrounded themselves with an army of obedient servants and enthusiastic "heelers," ranging all the way from the eager idealist converted by the delights of a tour through the land of Soviets, to the tired Bolshevik who put all his heart in the old struggle and asks only a place to rest. In the words of Karl Marx, they have "created beside the real classes of society an artificial class for whom the preservation of the existing régime is a bread-and-butter question." Marx was talking about the bourgeois-reactionary régime of Louis Bonaparte, and it is to such régimes that this artificial class has here-

tofore given its aid of pious emotion and intellectual confusion and hard logical dirty-work. It has never before given these spontaneous aids to a labor-bureaucrat called revolutionary. That, too, makes it difficult to see the situation as it is.

Another source of confusion is the feeling in our own hearts that we can best serve the revolution by not seeing the facts, or by not stating them, or by not stating them publicly. This mistaken feeling is carefully cherished by the Stalinists, who continually play up the war-danger, and persuade many critical minds to silence in the name of international working-class unity in defense of the Soviet Union. The true way to unite the working-class around the Soviet Union is to talk reality to them, and tell them the real elements of the socialist problem as Lenin did. There is an immense scorn of the masses in the idea that you can unite them around a system of political lies repellent to the natural instincts of all healthy men. There is a complete failure to understand the dynamics of political struggle in the idea that you can serve the revolution by keeping still while its clearest voices are silenced and put out of the way.

Almost every one who has watched Russian politics the last years is aware that Stalin "steals the thunder" of the Opposition. Having whipped them personally, he adopts the measures they advocated and attempts to carry them through when it is too

late. The present "campaign against bureaucratism," conducted (in the Don Basin!) by completely victorious bureaucrats who have jailed or exiled all those who had long demanded an attack on bureaucratism, is merely the latest example of a process that has been continual since 1924. The recent unsuccessful attempt to collect grain from the Kulaks after indulging them too long is another example of belated adoption of the Opposition's program. This is not a purely intellectual process. It is not that Trotsky thinks up a bright idea and Stalin is astute enough to seize it. The process is dynamic. Stalin's essential power derives from the working-classes. That is still the fundamental fact, and the fundamental source of hope. When the Opposition formulates a proletarian policy, and gets it into circulation among the working-classes, Stalin has to adopt it. That is the manner in which, to some extent, the hope is realized. Aside altogether from the prospect of victory for the Opposition, therefore, the great chance of holding the bureaucracy back in its inevitable drift to the right, lies in defending the prestige of the Opposition, defending their access to avenues of publicity, defending their lives. Every communist and every sympathizer with the Bolshevik revolution in every part of the earth can add something to this effort. He has only to see the truth and tell it.

There are two other sources of obscurity in the

conflict between Stalin and the Opposition. One is the fact that in certain circles of the Opposition itself an illusion has prevailed that the differences were not entirely fundamental, that the party could be restored to its militant proletarian course without sharp struggle. In consequence the Opposition, while holding firmly to their principles, have been changeful and indecisive in their tactics. And this, although it can be understood when you consider how complex and unprecedented the tactical problems were, has confused both the heads and the hearts of many who might otherwise have seen clear.

The tactic of forthright speech and uncompromising struggle represented in the documents printed in this book will probably be permanent. There are three reasons to believe that it will. The counter-revolutionary policies of Stalin in the Chinese revolution were overt and flagrant, and left no weakness of doubt in the mind of any man who really knows Marxism or the policies of Lenin. Stalin's resort to violence in his conflict with the Opposition is an equally flagrant violation of Lenin's organizational principles, and indeed of the principles dictated by common sense to any man who sincerely and really desires to produce a communist society. And with their Marxian critics silenced by the police and the prison bars, all pretense at scientific thinking is disappearing from the counsels of the ruling clique. The world-wide vulgarization of Marxism, its trans-

formation into a system of catch-words for keeping up political lies and official optimisms, holding the bottoms of bureaucrats in their firm seats, and covering up from the masses of mankind the real truth of history and their future, will soon be complete. No man of intellectual ardor and integrity can reconcile himself to this process of debasement.

To the indecisive tactics of the Opposition must be added the ruthless trickery of Stalin and his experienced talent for political intrigue, in order to explain fully the obscurity surrounding the Russian situation. Although "rude" and "disloyal," and also by comparison with the past standards of his party an ignoramus, Stalin is a man of shrewd force. He has armed control of every word printed in Russia, and complete organizational control of every word printed in the official communist press throughout the world. So perfect a world-wide political press-bureau has never been known in the past. And Stalin has used it with sly skill and without scruple of honesty, in order to facilitate the identification of Lenin's name and revolutionary terminology with his bureaucratic usurpation of power. Stalin's political lying is a deliberate and fundamental policy upon which he relies in much the same way in which Lenin relied upon an honest definition of facts. Anybody who is squeamish about recognizing this and plainly stating it, will never find his way through the fog surrounding the Russian situation.

Hence the importance of the document printed in Part II of this volume, which I have entitled, borrowing the words from Trotsky's text, "Stalin Falsifies History." Here is documentary proof of a truly gigantic enterprise of falsification undertaken by Stalin and his literary henchmen and carried through with brilliant success. They have convinced a major part of the reading public of the entire world that there is something the matter with Trotsky—that he is incapable of comprehending the principles of a movement which he led—that there was some quarrel or profound political divergence between him and Lenin in their leadership of the Russian revolution—and that Stalin, on the contrary, played a significant rôle as an associate of Lenin in the great days of the struggle.

The facts are simply and exactly opposite to this. At the news of the February revolution, Lenin in Geneva and Trotsky in New York formulated the same attitude, and from the moment of their meeting in Russia they worked hand in hand to a degree astonishing in two men of strong will and intellect. Their disagreements were the inevitable disagreements of thinking men. Their debates were conducted with an unfailing sense of the firmness of their union. There was never the hint of a split between them. The popular opinion which linked their names together from the first days of the revolution was entirely correct.

Indeed the facts outrun the popular opinion as to the closeness of their coöperation. Trotsky reveals in this book that during the most critical hours of the struggle Lenin gave him a sheet of paper at the bottom of which he had placed a blanket-endorsement with his own signature of any orders which Trotsky might see fit to inscribe above it. Trotsky was then commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the nation. It would be impossible to imagine a more wholesale expression of solidarity and confidence.

Towards the end of his life, Lenin gave Trotsky other tokens of their solidarity more significant in a political sense, because they were given in the face of an opposition within Lenin's own party. The head and center of that opposition was Stalin. It will come as a surprise to many that the first man to propose a bloc to resist the bureaucratic intrigues of Stalin within the Russian Communist party was Lenin, and that he made this proposal to Trotsky. Lenin's last political act was to dictate a letter to Stalin breaking off all "comradely relations" with him—an act which meant, as every one acquainted with Lenin's character knows, that he regarded Stalin as a political foe.

The process by which, in spite of these facts, Trotsky's prestige as a revolutionary intelligence is being destroyed, and Stalin set up as the true friend of Lenin and guide of the Bolshevik revolution, has its parallels in American history. By a similar proc-

ess Tom Paine came down to us as a "dirty little atheist," and George Washington as a great revolutionary leader of the masses. By a process still more similar, Andrew Johnson arrived in our textbooks as a contemptibly unworthy successor to Abraham Lincoln, a crazy and obscene blot on our history. According to the recent study of Robert W. Winston, Andrew Johnson was a courageous man of the people, who, because he unexpectedly adhered to the policies of Lincoln, was beaten down and disgraced by the very forces that were plotting against Lincoln before his death.

We are continually learning from our "radical" historians that the record of some past period has come down to us in a completely distorted form—the facts having been represented as opposite to what they were by the self-interest of a class that was striving for power. We think when we read these modern books that we are very sophisticated, and the record we hand to posterity will contain no such gross distortions of truth. And yet how many of us—even the disciples of Marx, who first tore off the false garments of history—how many of us have stood against the fast-weaving web of the legend exposed and exploded in this book? How many will stand against it now? (The mass of mankind is endowed with a genius for discovering virtues in those who possess power.) Few will have the force to see, and fewer to say, that Trotsky and his friends have

been arrested, violently dragged out of their homes, shipped into the desert under police guard, and are there held isolated and in danger of a worse fate at the hands of a dictator, simply because they defended too ardently and with clear heads the original science, class policy, and organizational hope of the October Revolution. The facts are here, but while knowledge means action the courage is lacking to know them.

MAX EASTMAN

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The exposition of Trotsky's thoughts which I have called *The Real Situation in Russia* was introduced into the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist party by its thirteen Opposition members in September 1927. It was their "project" of a platform for the party, and is now generally described as the "Opposition Platform." According to the constitution of the party, their project should have been published for the information of the party members and should have become a topic of free discussion in the special meetings for that purpose preceding the elections to the recent fifteenth party congress. The party itself—according to its constitution—should have decided in what degree this treatise represents the true state of affairs, and in what degree the practical proposals of the Opposition should be adopted.

But Stalin and his majority in the Central Committee, knowing that this exposure of their fundamental political course before the general mass of working-class members might be disastrous to their own domination, decided to get rid of the platform. They did it in the "rude" and "disloyal" way which Stalin, with the help of Lenin's Testament, has made famous. In violation not only of the party con-

stitution, but of the very basis of principle upon which Lenin built up his method for achieving and perpetuating a proletarian revolution, they declared that the platform was "against the party" and therefore unpublishable. This did not mean merely that the platform would not be published, but that it was an outlawed document.

Having thus got rid of the true opinions of the Opposition, Stalin and his associates redoubled and multiplied tenfold their campaign of daily slander against them. By means of fragmentary quotations torn from their context and adduced in a false connection, and by means also of direct lies and distortions, they made it appear that this platform really was an attack on the party. The period which should have been devoted to free discussion of published platforms was devoted to fantastic falsification and insults against a platform which they dared not publish.

In view of this violation of their party rights, the Opposition took steps to bring the genuine text of their platform before the party members. At first they printed a comparatively small number of copies with a typewriter and a multigraph machine. Their work was discovered by the G.P.U., and the machines and copies of the platform confiscated. This was the famous "underground printing press," whose discovery was permitted to make such a stir in the newspapers throughout the world.

In order to justify his use of the State Police in a struggle against the minority of the Central Committee—and in order to hasten by one more step the day of “physical destruction” of the Opposition toward which he is moving—Stalin employed an *agent provocateur*. He sent an agent of the G.P.U., supposed to have been an officer in the counter-revolutionary army of Baron Wrangel, to offer assistance to certain members of the Opposition. He thus managed to “discover” a connection—although confessedly as yet a rather remote one—between the Opposition leaders and the spies of the White Guard operating in Russia. The Opposition leaders exposed this trick and tore it to contemptible shreds before the Central Committee, but it was, of course, never exposed or denied in the press. It played a great part in making possible so soon the arrest and forcible deportation of all those revolutionists who were offering an understanding resistance to Stalin’s dictatorship.

The Opposition continued in their determination to bring their platform before the membership of the party. Three proletarian Communists undertook to set up the platform and print it. They succeeded in the undertaking, and it is from the pamphlet they printed, conveyed to me by one of the leaders of the French Communist movement, that the following translation was made. They were arrested almost immediately, however, and the greater number of the

pamphlets confiscated. They are in prison now in Moscow, denied the privilege of seeing relatives or friends. For their courageous effort to defend Lenin's ideas, to defend the interests of the workers, the hired men, and "the peasant poor in alliance with the middle peasants," they are treated as common criminals and thieves.

As an introduction to the platform and Trotsky's letter to the Bureau of Party History, I have translated the speech which he made, or attempted to make, before the Central Committee that expelled him in October. He was howled down by the members of the committee. His defense, or defiance, was never heard. Unconnected and meaningless bits of this interrupted speech, without the interjections that interrupted it, have been published in the international Communist press—in New York in the *Daily Worker*—promoting the opinion that Trotsky's mind is weak or incoherent. The actual speech, as he prepared and attempted to deliver it over the uproar, will give the foreign reader at least a glimmer of a sense of what is really taking place in the Russian Communist party.

M. E.

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PART I

THE FEAR OF OUR PLATFORM

THE FEAR OF OUR PLATFORM

Trotsky's Speech on the Proposal to Expel Him from the Central Committee, Oct. 23, 1927.

My motion to consider independently the question of the officer of Wrangel and the military plot was voted down. I raised, essentially, the question why, how, and by whom the party was deceived when it was told that Communists allied with the Opposition participated in a counter-revolutionary organization. In order to show once more what you mean by a discussion, you decreed that my short speech on the imitation-officer of Wrangel should be expunged from the record—that is, hidden from the party. Bukharin has presented us here with the philosophy of a Thermidorian amalgam on the basis of these documents of the G.P.U., which have no relation whatever either to the printing-press or the Opposition. What we want is not Bukharin's cheap philosophies, but facts. There are no facts. Therefore the insertion of this whole question into the discussion about the Opposition was a trick. Rudeness and disloyalty have grown to the size of criminal betrayal. All the documents read by Menzhinsky¹ speak unequivocally against the present political course—it is only necessary to illumine them with a Marxian analysis. But I have not time for that. I can only

¹ The head of the G.P.U. (State Police).—*Tr.*

raise the fundamental question: How and why the present ruling faction found it necessary to deceive the party, giving out an agent of the G.P.U. for an officer of Wrangel, and snatching up these fragments of an unfinished investigation, in order to alarm the party with a false communication as to the participation of Oppositionists in a counter-revolutionary organization. Whence does this come? Whither does it lead? Only that question has political meaning. The rest is of second- and tenth-rate importance.

First, however, two words as to the so-called "Trotskyism." Every opportunist is trying to cover his shame with that word. The falsification factory is working night and day under two shifts to manufacture "Trotskyism." I wrote a letter on this theme not long ago to the Bureau of Party History, containing about fifty quotations and documents convicting the now ruling theoretical and historical school of fabrications, distortions, hiding of facts and documents, perversions of Lenin—all for the purpose of the so-called struggle against "Trotskyism." I demanded that my letter be sent to the members of the united plenum. This was not done, although the letter consists almost entirely of documents and citations. I will send it to the "Discussion Leaflet" of *Pravda*. I think they will hide this also from the party, for the facts and documents I adduce are too deadly to the Stalin school.

In our July declaration of last year we predicted

with complete accuracy all the stages through which the destruction of the Leninist leadership of the party would go, and its temporary replacement by a Stalinist leadership. I say *temporary* replacement, because the more "victories" the present ruling group wins, the weaker it will be. Our July prediction of last year we can now supplement with the following conclusion: the present organizational victory of Stalin precedes his political shipwreck. It is absolutely unavoidable, and—in correlation with the Stalin régime—will begin at once. The basic task of the Opposition will be to see that the consequences of the ruinous policies of the present leadership bring as little loss as possible to the party and its connections with the mass.

You want to expel us from the Central Committee. We agree that this step is in full accord with the present policy at the present stage of its development, or, rather, of its degeneration. This ruling faction which is expelling from the party hundreds and thousands of its best members, its unwavering worker-Bolsheviks—this bureaucratic clique which dares to expel such Bolsheviks as Mrachkovsky, Serebriakov, Preobrazhensky, Sharov, and Sarkis, comrades who could alone create a party Secretariat infinitely more authoritative, more able, infinitely more Leninist, than our present Secretariat—this Stalin-Bukharin clique who have locked up in the inner prison of the G.P.U. devoted and admirable

men like Nechaev, Shtikhold, Vasiliev, Schmidt, Fischelev, and many others—this group of officials, holding its place on top of the party by violence, by strangulation of the party's thought, by disorganization of the proletarian vanguard not only in Russia but throughout the world—this through-and-through opportunistic faction at whose tail are marching these late years Chang Kai-shek, Feng Yu-hsiang, Wan Tin-wei, Purcell, Hicks, Ben Tillett, the Kusinens, the Shmerals, the Peppers, the Heinz-Neumans, the Rafeses, the Martinovs, the Kondratievs and Ustrialovs—this faction cannot endure our presence in the Central Committee even one month before the party congress. We understand this.

Rudeness and disloyalty go hand in hand with cowardice. You have hidden our platform—rather, you have tried to hide it. What does fear of a platform mean? Everybody knows: fear of a platform is fear of the mass.

We announced to you on the eighth of September that in spite of all decrees to the contrary, we would bring our platform to the attention of the party. We have undertaken this, and we will carry the work through to the end. Comrades Mrachkovsky, Fischelev, and all the others who printed and distributed our platform, have acted and are acting in full solidarity with us. As oppositional members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Com-

mittee, we take full responsibility, both political and organizational, for their acts.

The rudeness and disloyalty of which Lenin wrote are no longer mere personal characteristics. They have become the character of the ruling faction, both of its political policy and its organizational régime. It is no longer a question of external manners. The fundamental character of our present leadership is its belief in the omnipotence of methods of violence—even in dealing with its own party. From the October Revolution our party inherited a mighty apparatus of compulsion, without which the dictatorship of the proletariat is unthinkable. The focal point of this dictatorship was the Central Committee of our party. In Lenin's time—with a Leninist Central Committee—the organizational apparatus of the party was subordinate to a revolutionary class-policy of international scope. It is true that Stalin inspired Lenin with dread from the very day of his election as General Secretary. "This cook will serve us a peppery dish"—so Lenin spoke to his close comrades at the time of the Tenth Congress. But with Lenin's leadership, with a Leninist staff in the Politburo, the General Secretariat played a completely subordinate rôle. The situation began to change from the hour that Lenin fell sick. The selection of people through the Secretariat, the grouping of Stalinists in official positions, became an independent operation entirely unrelated to our political

policy. That is why Lenin, weighing the prospect of his departure, gave the party his last counsel: Remove Stalin, who may carry the party to a split and to ruin.

The party did not know about this counsel in time. A selected officialdom concealed his letter. We now see the consequences in their full stature. The ruling faction thinks that with the help of violence it can accomplish everything. That is a profound mistake. Violence can play an enormous revolutionary rôle, but only under one condition—that it is subordinated to a true class-policy. The violence of the Bolsheviks against the bourgeoisie, against the Mensheviks, against the Social Revolutionaries, employed under definite historical conditions, gave gigantic results. The violences of Kerensky and Tzeretelli against the Bolsheviks only hastened the defeat of the compromisers' régime. Banishing, and arresting, and depriving of employment, the ruling faction is employing both knife and bribe against its own party. The worker-member is afraid to say what he thinks in his own local. He is afraid to vote according to his conscience. A dictatorship of the officialdom is terrorizing our party, which is supposed to be the highest expression of the proletarian dictatorship. In terrorizing the party, you are diminishing its ability to hold in fear the enemies of the proletariat.

But an organizational régime does not live an independent life. In the party régime, the whole

political course of the party finds its expression. This political course has swerved of late years—its class core and momentum have swerved from left to right, from the proletarian to the petty bourgeois, from the worker to the specialist, from the rank-and-file party member to the functionary, from the farm hand and the poor peasant to the Kulak, from the Shanghai worker to Chiang Kai-shek, from the Chinese peasant to the bourgeois generals, from the English proletarian to Purcell, Hicks, and the General Council—ad infinitum. In that lies the essence of Stalinism.

At first glance it seems as if the Stalin course were completely victorious. The Stalin faction seems to deal its blows to the left (in Moscow and Leningrad) and to the right (in the Northern Caucasus). As a matter of fact the whole policy of this Centrist faction is itself going forward under the blows of two whips—one from the right and one from the left. This bureaucratic Centrist faction, lacking all class basis, staggers between two class lines, systematically sliding away from the proletarian to the petty-bourgeois course. It does not slide away in a direct line, but in sharp zig-zags. We have had plenty of these zig-zags in the past. Especially sharp and memorable was the broadening of elective rights under pressure from the Kulak (a blow of the whip from the right) and then the annulment of these instructions under pressure from the Opposition (a

whip from the left). We have had plenty of these zig-zags in the sphere of workers' legislation, wage policy, tax policy, policy toward the private capitalist, etc., etc. But the general course has been steadily shifting to the right. The recent manifesto is an unquestionable zig-zag to the left. But we are not going to shut our eyes for one minute to the fact that this zig-zag does not in the least change the general course of the policy, and that it will, as a matter of fact—and that in the very near future—hasten the drift of the ruling center towards the right.

Today's shouting about a "forced attack" on the Kulak—that same Kulak to whom yesterday they were shouting, "Get rich!"—cannot change the general line. Anniversary jubilee surprises, in the way of a seven-hour working day, cannot change it either. The political line of the present leadership is not defined by these individual adventuristic gestures, but by the social support which this leadership has gathered around itself in its struggle against the Opposition. Through the Stalin apparatus, through the Stalinist régime, the forces that are pressing down on the proletarian vanguard are the bureaucrat, the labor faker, the administrator, the industrial manager, the new private capitalist, the privileged intelligentsia of the town and country—all these elements who are beginning to point out the Kulak to the working man, and say, "Remember, this isn't 1918, my boy!"

It is not the left gesture that decides, but the fundamental political course. The selection of your colleagues decides. The governing staff decides. The social support. You cannot strangle the working man's local, and at the same time attack the Kulak. The two things are incompatible. Your left anniversary zig-zag, as soon as it goes to be carried out, will run into ruthless opposition in the ranks of your own majority. Today, "Get rich!" and tomorrow, "Away with the Kulak!" That is easy for Bukharin. He picks with his pen, and is ready. He has nothing to lose. But the Kulak, the manager, the powerful bureaucrat, the specialist—they see it differently. These people have no taste for sudden jumps at anniversaries. They will say their word.

Comrade Tomsy, who is tied up in a worse situation than anybody else, rose in opposition to the present jubilee zig-zag. Tomsy has a foreboding of what the workers will ask in the trade-unions. He will be the one to answer. Tomorrow the workers are going to demand from Tomsy that he at least really stop the drift to the right, seeing that the manifesto announces a course to the left. This is the cause of the inevitable struggle within the ruling bloc. In our right wing there is an industrial manager's tendency and a trade-unionist tendency. They work together for a time as has often happened in the history of the workers' movement. But this anniversary zig-zag to the left is driving a wedge between the managers

and the trade-unionists. The professional bureaucrat, balancing between them, will lose his support.

This jubilee zig-zag is, upon the one hand, a most indubitable and solemn recognition of the rightness of the Opposition's views upon all the fundamental problems of our life, both in the city and the country. On the other hand, it is a political disavowal of themselves on the part of the ruling faction, a confession of their own bankruptcy. It is a confession in words from those impotent to show anything in deeds. This jubilee zig-zag will not retard, but hasten, the political bankruptcy of the present course.

The régime of party repression flows inevitably from the whole policy of the leadership. Behind the backs of the extreme bureaucrats stand the awakening interior bourgeoisie. Behind their backs, the world bourgeoisie. All these forces press down on the proletarian vanguard, preventing it from lifting its head or opening its mouth. The more the policy of the Central Committee departs from the proletarian class channel, the more it becomes necessary to force that policy upon the proletarian vanguard by methods of compulsion from above. That is the root cause of the present intolerable régime in the party.

When Martinovs, Schmerals, Rafeses, and Peppers play the lead in the Chinese revolution, and Mrachkovsky, Serebriakov, Preobrazhensky, Sharov, and Sarkis are expelled from the party for printing and distributing a Bolshevik platform for the coming

congress, these facts are not of a mere inner-party character. By no means. These facts are the expression of a changing relative influence of classes in our politics. The *interior* bourgeoisie brings its pressure, of course, less impudently than the world bourgeoisie against the dictatorship of the proletariat and its proletarian vanguard. But these two pressures are closely united and are simultaneously brought to bear. Those elements of the working class and our party who first felt this advancing danger and first spoke of it—that is, the more revolutionary, more stoical, more far-sighted, more uncompromising representatives of the working-class struggle—those elements now constitute the ranks of the Opposition. These ranks are growing both within our party and throughout the International. Facts and events of enormous moment are confirming the position we took. Your repressions are strengthening our ranks, gathering to us the best “old men” of the party, tempering the young, and grouping around the Opposition the genuine Bolsheviks among them. The Oppositionists you have excluded from the party are *the best members* of the party. Those who are expelling and arresting them—although still unconscious of it and uncomprehending—are the instruments through which other classes are pressing back the proletariat. In trying to tramp our platform into the mud, the ruling faction is fulfilling the social com-

mand of Ustrialov ²—of the reviving petty and middle bourgeoisie. In contrast to the politicians of the dying, *old*, emigrant bourgeoisie, Ustrialov, the clever far-seeing politician of the *new* bourgeoisie, does not aspire to counter-revolution or to any disturbance. He does not want to “jump over the steps.” The present step for Ustrialov is the Stalin course. Ustrialov is openly staking his game on Stalin. Ustrialov is demanding of Stalin that he put the Opposition out of the way. In expelling and arresting the Oppositionists, in advancing against us this perfectly Thermidorian accusation in regard to an officer of Wrangel and a military plot, Stalin is fulfilling the social orders of Ustrialov.

The immediate task that Stalin has set for himself is to split the party, to cut off the Opposition, to accustom the party to the method of physical destruction. Fascist gangs of whistlers,³ fist work,

² Ustrialov is a jurist, formerly a minister in Kolchak's government, now living at Harbin. He is one of the *Smienomekhovtzi*, those who “changed their sign-posts” after the civil war, and came over as belated sympathizers, or at least tolerators, to the Soviet régime. He is the ablest of a considerable group of Russian thinkers and writers who greeted the New Economic Policy as a step toward the gradual restoration of capitalism. He advocated the elimination of Trotsky as a step in the same direction.—*Tr.*

³ “The bureaucrats of the Russian party have formed all over the country gangs of whistlers. Every time a party worker belonging to the Opposition is to take the floor, they post around the hall a veritable framework of men armed with police whistles. With the first words of the Opposition speaker, the whistles begin. The charivari lasts until the Opposition speaker yields the floor to another.”—From the French Communist paper, *Contre le Courant*.

throwing of books and stones, the prison bars—here for a moment the Stalin régime has paused in its course. But the road is predestined. Why should the Yaroslavskies, Shverniks, Goloshchokins, and others argue with the Opposition about government statistics, when they can let fly a heavy volume of these statistics at the head of an Oppositionist. Stalinism finds in this act its most unrestrained expression, going to the point of open Hooliganism. And we repeat: These Fascist methods are nothing but a blind and unconscious fulfillment of the social commands of other classes. The goal: to cut off the Opposition and physically destroy it. Voices are already to be heard: “We will expel a thousand, and shoot a hundred, and have peace in the party.” These are the voices of pitiable, frightened, and yet also diabolic blind men. This is the voice of Thermidor. The worst elements, perverted with power, blinded with bureaucratic hatred, are preparing the Thermidor with all their might. They need, for this, two parties. But their violence will break to pieces against a true political course. In devotion to that course the revolutionary courage of the Opposition ranks is standing firm. Stalin will not create two parties. We openly say to the party: The dictatorship of the proletariat is in danger. And we firmly believe that the party, its proletarian nucleus, will hear, will understand, will meet this danger. The

party is already deeply stirred. Tomorrow it will be stirred to the bottom.

Behind the few thousand men in the actual ranks of the Opposition, comes a second and a third layer of those who are loyal to the Opposition, and behind them a still broader layer of worker members who have already begun to listen attentively to our voice and are moving to our side. This process cannot be turned back. The non-party workers have not believed your lies and slanders against us. Their legitimate dissatisfaction at the growth of bureaucratism and suppression was expressed by the working-class of Leningrad in its unmistakable demonstration of October 17.⁴ The proletariat is for the Soviet power, unwaveringly, but it wants a different policy. All these processes are irresistible. The apparatus is powerless against them. The more brutal

⁴ This demonstration was described by the French Opposition paper, *Contre le Courant*, in its column of suppressed news items from Russia, as follows: "At the opening session of the Executive Committee of the Soviet Union, a great demonstration in the streets was organized. Two hundred and fifty thousand workers marched past the different tribunes containing the leaders of the party. One of these tribunes was occupied by the leaders of the Opposition. An entirely spontaneous manifestation—and one totally unexpected by the party officials—occurred. When the columns of workers arrived before the tribune of the Opposition leaders, they paused and marked time, shouting their acclamations, then continued their march and passed without pausing and without shouting before the official tribunes. This continued during four hours. In order to conceal the manifestation, the party officials finally came and installed themselves in the Opposition tribune."—*Tr.*

your repressions, the stronger becomes the authority of the Opposition in the eyes of the rank-and-file party member and the working-class in general. The expulsion of every hundred Oppositionists from the party means a new thousand Oppositionists within the party. The expelled Oppositionist feels himself a party member and remains one. You can tear the party ticket by violence out of the hands of the real Bolshevik Leninist. You can deprive him for a time of his party rights. But he will never renounce his duties to the party. When Yanson asked Comrade Mrachkovsky, at the session of the Central Control Committee, what he would do when he was expelled from the party, Comrade Mrachkovsky answered, "I will turn the helm and carry on." Every Oppositionist will say the same thing. No matter whence he is expelled, from the Central Committee of the Comintern, from the Central Committee of the party, or from the party. Every one of us is saying with Mrachkovsky, "I will turn the helm and carry on." We stand at the helm of Bolshevism. You will not tear us away from it. We are going to hold it true. You will not cut us off from the party. You will not cut us off from the working-class. We are familiar with repressions. We are accustomed to blows. We will not surrender the October Revolution to the politics of Stalin—the entire essence of which is contained in these few words: Repression of the

proletarian nucleus, fraternization with the compromisers of all countries, capitulation before the world bourgeoisie.

You expel us from the Central Committee one month before the party congress, which you have already converted into a narrow executive organ of the Stalin faction. The Fifteenth Congress will seem to be the supreme triumph of your bureaucratic mechanics. In reality it will be the sign of your complete political shipwreck. The *victories* of the Stalin faction are the victories of alien class forces over the proletarian vanguard. The *defeats* of the party led by Stalin are defeats of the proletarian dictatorship. The party feels this already. We will help it to understand. *The platform of the Opposition is on the table of the party.* After the Fifteenth Congress the Opposition will become immeasurably stronger within the party than now. The calendar of the working-class and the calendar of the party do not chime with the secretarial calendar of Stalin. The proletariat thinks slowly, but it thinks strong. Our platform will hasten this process. The decision lies in the last account with the political course, and not with the bureaucrat's fist. The Opposition is unconquerable. Expel us today from the Central Committee, as yesterday you expelled Serebriakov and Preobrazhensky from the party, as you arrested Fischelev and others. Our platform will find its way. The workers of the whole world will ask themselves in deep alarm, "For

what reason, on the tenth anniversary of October, are they expelling and arresting the best fighters of the October Revolution? Whose hand is here? The hand of what class? The class which conquered in October? Or the class which is edging out and digging under the victory of October?"

Even the most backward workers of all countries, aroused by your repressions, will take our platform in their hands, in order to test the truth of your vile slander about the officer of Wrangel and the military plot. Your persecutions, expulsions, arrests, will make our platform the most popular and the closest and dearest documents of the international workers' movement. Expel us. You will not stop the victory of the Opposition—the victory of the revolutionary unity of our party and the Communist International.

PART II

THE REAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA
AND THE
TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

In his speech at the last party congress he attended, Lenin said: "Here we have lived a year, with the state in our hands, and under the New Economic Policy has it operated our way? No. We don't like to acknowledge this, but it hasn't. And how has it operated? The machine isn't going where we guide it, but where some illegal, or lawless, or God-knows-whence-derived speculators or private capitalistic businessmen, either the one or the other, are guiding it. A machine doesn't always travel just exactly the way, and it often travels just exactly not the way, that the man imagines who sits at the wheel."

In those words was given the criterion by which we ought to judge the fundamental problems of our politics. In what direction is the machine traveling? The state? The power? Is it traveling in the direction that we, Communists, expressing the interests and will of the workers and the enormous mass of the peasants, desire? Or not in that direction? Or "not exactly" in that direction?

In these years since the death of Lenin, we have more than once tried to bring the attention of the

central organs of our party, and afterward the party as a whole, to the fact that, thanks to incorrect leadership, the danger indicated by Lenin has greatly increased. The machine is not going in the direction demanded by the interests of the workers and peasants. On the eve of the new congress we consider it our duty, notwithstanding all the persecution we have suffered, to call the party's attention with redoubled energy to this fact. For we are sure that the situation can be corrected. It can be corrected by the party itself.

When Lenin said that the machine often goes where it is directed by forces hostile to us, he called our attention to two facts of supreme importance. First, that there exist in our society these forces hostile to our cause—the Kulak, the Nepman, the bureaucrat—availing themselves of our backwardness and our political mistakes, and relying upon the support of international capitalism. Second, the fact that these forces are so strong that they can push our governmental and economic machine in the wrong direction, and ultimately even attempt—at first in a concealed manner—to seize the wheel of the machine.

Lenin's words laid upon us all the following obligations:

- (1) To watch vigilantly the growth of these hostile forces—Kulak, Nepman, and bureaucrat;
- (2) To remember that in proportion to the gen-

eral revival of the country, these forces will strive to unite, introduce their own "amendments" into our plans, exercise an increasing pressure upon our policy, and satisfy their interests through our apparatus;

(3) To take all possible measures to weaken the growth, unity, and pressure of these hostile forces, preventing them from creating that actual, although invisible, *two-power system* toward which they aspire;

(4) To tell candidly the whole truth about these processes to all the toiling masses. In this now consists the fundamental problem as to a "Thermidorian" danger and the struggle against it.

Since Lenin uttered his warning, many things have improved with us, but many also have grown worse. The influence of the state apparatus is growing, but with it also the bureaucratic distortion of the workers' state. The absolute and relative growth of capitalism in the country and its absolute growth in the cities are beginning to produce a political self-consciousness in the bourgeois elements of our country. These elements are trying to demoralize—not always unsuccessfully—that part of the Communists with whom they come in contact at work and in social intercourse. The slogan given by Stalin at the fourteenth congress, "Fire to the left!" cannot but produce a demoralization of the right elements in the party and a strengthening of the Ustrialov elements in the country.

The question, "Who beats whom?" will be decided in a continuous struggle of classes on all sectors of the economic, political, and cultural fronts—a struggle for a socialist or a capitalist course of development, for a distribution of the national income corresponding to one or the other of these two courses, for a solid political power of the proletariat or a division of this power with the new bourgeoisie. In a country with an overwhelming majority of small and very small peasants, and small proprietors in general, the most important processes will frequently carry themselves out in a fragmentary and underground manner, only to burst "unexpectedly" to the surface.

The capitalist element finds its primary expression in a class differentiation in the country, and in a multiplication of private capitalists in the city. The upper levels in the country and the bourgeois elements in the city are interweaving themselves more and more closely with the various links of our state-economic apparatus. And this apparatus not infrequently helps the new bourgeoisie to conceal under a statistical fog its successful effort to increase its share in the national income.

The trade apparatus—state, coöperative, and private—devours an enormous share of the national income, more than one tenth of the total production. On the other hand, *private* its capacity as commercial middleman in recent years considerably more than

whole trade—in absolute figures, more than five billions a year. Up to now, the general consumer has received more than 50 per cent of the products he needs from the hands of the private capitalists. For the private capitalist this is the fundamental source of profit and accumulation. The disparity between agricultural and industrial prices, between wholesale and retail prices, the difference between prices in the different branches of rural economy in the different regions and seasons, and finally the difference between domestic and world prices (contraband), are a constant source of private gain.

Private capital is collecting usurious interest on loans and is making money on government bonds.

The rôle of the private capitalist in industry is also very considerable. Even though it has decreased relatively in the recent period, still it has grown absolutely. *Registered* private capitalistic industry shows a gross production of 400 millions a year. Small, home, and handicraft industries show more than 1,800 millions. Altogether, the production of the non-state industries constitutes more than a fifth of the whole production of goods, and about 40 per cent of the commodities in the general market. The preponderant mass of this industry is bound up one way or another with private capital. The various, open or concealed, forms of exploitation of the mass of handicraft workers by commercial and home-enterprise capital is an extremely important and,

moreover, a growing source of accumulation for the new bourgeoisie.

Taxes, wages, prices, and credit are the chief instruments of distribution of the national income, strengthening certain classes and weakening others.

The agricultural tax in the village is imposed, as a general rule, in an inverse progression: heavy upon the weak, lighter upon the strong and upon the Kulak. According to approximate calculations, 34 per cent of the poor peasant proprietors of the Soviet Union (even omitting provinces with a highly developed class differentiation, such as the Ukraine, Northern Caucasus, and Siberia) receive 18 per cent of the net income. Exactly the same total income, 18 per cent, is received by the highest group, constituting only 7.5 per cent of the proprietors. Moreover, both these groups pay approximately the same amount, 20 per cent of the total tax. It is evident from this that on each individual poor man's property the tax lays a much heavier burden than on the Kulak, or the "strong" proprietor in general. Contrary to the fears of the leaders of the Fourteenth Congress, our tax-policy by no means "strips" the Kulak. It does not hinder him in the least from concentrating in his hands a continually greater accumulation of money and goods.

The rôle of the indirect taxes in our budget is growing alarmingly at the expense of the direct. By that alone the tax-burden automatically moves from

the wealthier to the poorer levels. The taxation of the workers in 1925-1926 was twice as high as in the preceding year, while the taxation of the rest of the city population diminished by 6 per cent.¹ The liquor tax falls, with more and more unbearable heaviness, exactly upon the industrial sections. The growth of income per person for 1926 as compared with 1925—according to certain approximate calculations—constituted, for the peasants, 19 per cent; for the workers, 26 per cent; for the merchant and industrialist, 46 per cent. If you divide the “peasants” into three fundamental groups, it will appear beyond a doubt that the income of the Kulak increased incomparably more than that of the worker. The income of the merchants and industrialists, calculated on the basis of the tax data, is undoubtedly represented as less than it is. However, even these somewhat colored figures clearly testify to a growth of class differences.

The “scissors,” representing the disparity of agricultural and industrial prices, have drawn still farther apart during the last year and a half. The peasant received for his product not more than one and a quarter times the pre-war price, and he paid for industrial products not less than two and two-tenths times as much as before the war. This overpayment by the peasants, and again *predominantly* by the lower level of the peasants, constituting in the past year a sum of about a billion rubles, not only in-

¹ *Viestnik Finansov*, 1927, No. 2, p. 52.

creases the conflict between agriculture and industry, but greatly sharpens the class-differentiation in the country.

On the disparity between wholesale and retail prices, the state industry loses, and also the consumer, which means that there is a third party who gains. It is the private capitalist who gains, and consequently capitalism.

Real wages in 1927 stood, at the best, on the same level as in the autumn of 1925. Yet it is indubitable that during the two years intervening the country grew richer, the general national income increased, the Kulak levels in the country enlarged their stores with enormous rapidity, and the accumulations of the private capitalist, the merchant, the speculator grew by leaps and bounds. It is clear that the share of the working-class in the general income of the country has fallen, at the same time that the share of other classes has grown. This fact is of supreme importance in appraising our whole situation.

Only a person who believes at the bottom of his heart that our working-class and our party is not able to cope with its difficulties and dangers, could affirm that a frank indication of these contradictions in our development, and of the growth of these hostile forces, is *panic* or *pessimism*. We do not accept this view. It is necessary to see the dangers clearly. We point them out accurately, exactly in order to struggle with them in the right way and overcome them.

A certain growth of the hostile forces, the Kulak, the Nepman, and the bureaucrat, is unavoidable under the New Economic Policy. You cannot destroy these forces by mere administrative order or by simple economic pressure. In introducing the NEP and carrying it through, we ourselves created a certain place for capitalistic relations in our country, and for a prolonged period to come we have to recognize them as inevitable. Lenin merely reminded us of a naked truth which the workers have to know, when he said: "While we continue to be a small peasant country, there is a more solid basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism. That we must remember. . . . We have not torn out capitalism by the roots, and we have not undermined the foundation and groundwork of the interior enemy."²

The supremely important social fact here indicated by Lenin cannot, as we said, be simply destroyed, but we can overcome it, struggle against it, by way of a correct, planful, and systematic working-class policy, relying upon the peasant poor and a union with the middle peasant. This policy is organically included in a world-wide strengthening of all the social positions of the proletariat, in the swiftest possible elevation of the commanding centers of socialism, working on the preparation and development of the world proletarian revolution.

A correct Leninist policy also includes maneuver-

² Vol. XVII, p. 488.

ing. In struggling against the forces of capitalism, Lenin often employed a method of partial concession in order to outwit the enemy, temporary retreat in order afterwards to move more successfully forward. Maneuvering is also necessary now. But in dodging and maneuvering against an enemy that could not be overthrown by direct attack, Lenin invariably remained upon the line of the proletarian revolution. Under him the party always knew the causes of each maneuver, its meaning, its limits, the line beyond which it ought not to go, and the position at which the proletarian advance should begin again. In those days, under Lenin, a retreat was called a retreat—a concession, a concession. Thanks to that, the maneuvering proletarian army always preserved its unity, its fighting spirit, its clear consciousness of the goal.

In the recent period there has been a decisive departure on the part of leaders from these Leninist ways. The Stalin group is leading the party blindfold. Concealing the forces of the enemy, creating everywhere and in everything an *official appearance* of success, this group gives the proletariat no perspective—or, what is worse, a wrong perspective. It moves in zig-zags, accommodating itself to, and ingratiating itself with, hostile elements. It weakens and confuses the forces of the proletarian army. It promotes the growth of passivity, distrust of leadership and lack of confidence in the power of the revolution. It disguises, with references to Leninist

maneuvering, an unprincipled jumping from one side to the other, always unexpected by the party, incomprehensible to it, weakening its strength. The only result is that the enemy, having gained time, moves forward. The "classical" examples of this kind of maneuver on the part of Stalin, Bukharin, Rykov, is their Chinese policy and their policy with the Anglo-Russian committee, on the international field, and within the country, their policy toward the Kulak. On all these questions, the party and the working-class found out the truth, or a part of the truth, only after the heavy consequences of a policy that was false to the bottom had crashed over their heads.

At the end of these two years³ in which the Stalin group has really determined the policies of the central institutions of our party, we may consider it fully proven that this group has been powerless to prevent: (1) An immoderate growth of those forces which desire to turn the development of our country into capitalistic channels; (2) a weakening of the position of the working-class and the poorest peasants against the growing strength of the Kulak, the Nepman, and the bureaucrat; (3) a weakening of the general position of the workers' state in the struggle with world capitalism, a lowering of the international position of the Soviet Union.

The direct fault of the Stalin group is that instead

³ Actually four years. See footnote, p. 181.

of telling the party, the working-class, and the peasants the whole truth about the situation, it has concealed the facts, minimized the growth of the hostile forces, and shut the mouths of those who demanded the truth and laid it bare.

The concentration of *fire to the left*, at a time when the whole situation indicates danger on the right, the crudely mechanical suppression of every criticism expressing the legitimate alarm of the proletariat for the fate of the proletarian revolution, the outright connivance with a deviation to the right, the sapping of the influence of the proletarian and old-Bolshevik nucleus of the party—all these things are weakening and disarming the working-class at a moment which demands above all activity of the proletariat, vigilance and unity of the party, faithfulness to its real inheritance of Leninism.

The party leaders distort Lenin, improve upon him, explain him, supplement him, according as it is necessary to conceal each successive mistake that they make. Since Lenin's death a whole series of new theories has been invented, whose meaning is solely this: that they give theoretical justification to the departure of the Stalin group from the course of the international proletarian revolution. The Mensheviks, the Smienoviekhovtzi [belated sympathizers], and finally the capitalistic press see and welcome in the policies and new theories of Stalin-Bukharin-Martinov a movement "forward from

Lenin" (Ustrialov), "statesmanlike reasoning," "realism," a renunciation of the "utopias" of revolutionary Bolshevism. In the cutting off from party leadership of a troop of Bolsheviks—the fighting companions of Lenin—they see and openly welcome a practical step towards changing the fundamental course of the party.

Meanwhile the elementary processes of the NEP, not restrained and corrected by a firm class policy, are preparing further dangers of the same kind.

Twenty-five million small farms constitute the fundamental source of the capitalist tendencies in Russia. The Kulak caste, gradually emerging from this mass, is repeating the process of primitive accumulation of capital, digging a broad mine under the socialist position. The further destiny of this process depends ultimately upon the relation between the growth of the state enterprises and the private. The slow pace of our industries vastly increases the tempo of class-differentiation among the peasants and the political dangers arising from it.

"In the history of other countries," wrote Lenin, "the Kulaks have more than once restored the power to landlords, czars, priests, and capitalists. It has been so in all previous European revolutions, where, in consequence of the weakness of the workers, the Kulaks have succeeded in reverting from a republic to monarchy, from the rulership of the toiling masses to the omnipotence of the exploiters, the rich, the

parasites. . . . You can reconcile the Kulak with the landlord, the czar, and the priest easily enough, even though they've had a quarrel, but with the working-class, never." ⁴

Whoever fails to understand this, whoever believes in "the Kulak's growing into socialism," is good for just one thing—to wreck the revolution on a reef.

There exist in this country two mutually exclusive fundamental positions. One, the position of the proletariat building socialism, the other, the position of the bourgeoisie aspiring to switch our development to the capitalist rails.

The camp of the bourgeoisie and those layers of the petty bourgeoisie who trail after it are placing all their hopes upon private initiative and the personal interest of the manufacturer. This camp is staking its play on the "strong peasant," aiming to make the coöperatives, the industries, and our foreign trade serve this peasant's interest. This camp believes that the socialist industry ought not to count upon a state budget, that its development ought not to be rapid enough to injure the interest of the farmer capitalist. The struggle for an increased productivity of labor means to the strengthening petty bourgeois a pressure on the muscles and nerves of the workers. The struggle for lower prices means to him a cutting down of the accumulation of the

⁴ *Comrade Workers, Let us Join in the Final and Decisive Battle*, publications of the Lenin Institute, pp. 1-2.

socialist industries in the interest of commercial capital. The struggle with bureaucratism means to him a disorganization of industry, a weakening of the planning centers. It means a pushing into the background of the heavy industries—that is, again, an adjustment in favor of the strong peasant, with the near prospect of an abandonment of the monopoly of foreign trade. That is the course of the Ustrialovs. The name of that course is *capitalism on the installment plan*. It is a strong tendency in this country, and exercises an influence upon certain circles of our party.

The proletarian course was described by Lenin in the following words:

“We can consider the victory of socialism over capitalism, and its permanence, guaranteed, only when the proletarian state power, having conclusively suppressed the resistance of the exploiters and assured itself of their complete subjection and its complete solidity, reorganizes the whole industry on the basis of large-scale collective production and the newest technique (based on electrification of the entire economy). Only this will make possible such a radical, technical, and social assistance rendered by the cities to the backward and undifferentiated country, as will create the material basis for an immense increase of the productiveness of agricultural and rural labor, impelling the small land proprietors, by the strength of example and their own

interest, to pass over to a large-scale collective, machine agriculture.”⁵

The whole policy of our party ought to be built up upon this principle—budget, taxes, industry, agriculture, domestic and foreign trade, everything. That is the fundamental stand of the Opposition. *That is the road to socialism.*

Between these two positions—every day drawing nearer to the first—the Stalinists are tracing a line consisting of short zig-zags to the left and deep ones to the right. The Leninist course is a socialist development of the productive forces in continual struggle with the capitalist element. The Ustrialov course is a development of the productive forces on a capitalist basis by way of a gradual eating away of the conquests of October. The Stalin course leads, in objective reality, to a retarding of the development of the productive forces, to a lowering of the relative weight of the socialist element, and thus prepares for the final victory of the Ustrialov course. The Stalin course is the more dangerous and ruinous, in that it conceals a real departure from socialism under the mask of familiar socialist words and phrases. A completion of our reconstruction process would bring forward the whole fundamental question of our economic development and thus undermine the politics of Stalin, which is completely inadequate to meet

⁵ Resolution of the Second Congress of the Communist International.

great problems—whether of the revolution in China or the reconstruction of basic capital in the Soviet Union.

Notwithstanding the tensivity of the situation, heightened in the extreme by the crude mistakes of the present leadership, the thing can be corrected. But it is necessary to change the line of the party leadership, and change it sharply, in the direction indicated by Lenin.

CHAPTER II

THE SITUATION OF THE WORKING-CLASS AND THE TRADE-UNIONS

The October Revolution, for the first time in history, transformed a proletariat into the ruling class of an immense state. Our nationalization of the means of production was a decisive step toward the socialist reconstruction of that whole social system which is founded upon the exploitation of man by man. Our introduction of the eight-hour day was the first step towards a complete and all-sided change in the material and cultural conditions of existence of the working-class. In spite of the poverty of the country, our labor laws established for the workers—even the most backward who were deprived in the past of every group-defense—legal guarantees such as the richest capitalist state never gave, and never will give. The trade-unions, raised to the status of supremely important social instruments in the hands of a ruling class, were given the opportunity, on the one hand to organize masses completely inaccessible in other circumstances, and on the other, directly to influence the whole political course of the workers' state.

The problem of the party is to guarantee the

further development of these supreme historical conquests—that is, the filling of them with a genuinely socialist content. Our success upon this road will be determined by objective conditions, domestic and international, and also by the correctness of our course and the practical skill of our leadership.

The decisive factor in appraising the movement of our country forward along the road of socialist construction, must be the growth of our productive forces and the dominance of the socialist elements over the capitalist—*together with an improvement of all the conditions of existence of the working-class*. This improvement ought to be evident in the material sphere (number of workers employed in industry, elevation of real wages, character of the worker's budget, living conditions, medical aid, etc.), in the political sphere (party, trade-unions, soviets, communist youth organizations), and finally in the cultural sphere (schools, books, newspapers, theaters). The effort to push the essential concrete interests of the worker into the background and under the contemptuous epithet of "guild socialism" contrast them with the general historic interest of the working-class, is theoretically wrong and politically dangerous.

The appropriation of surplus value by a workers' state is not, of course, exploitation. But in the first place, we have a workers' state with bureaucratic distortions. The swollen and privileged administra-

tive apparatus devours a very considerable part of our surplus value. In the second place, the growing bourgeoisie, by means of trade and gambling on the abnormal disparity of prices, appropriates a part of the surplus value created by our state industry.

In general during this period of reconstruction, the number of the workers and the conditions of their existence have risen, not only absolutely but also relatively—that is, in comparison with the growth of other classes. However, in the recent period there has occurred a sharp change. The numerical growth of the working-class and the improvement of its situation has almost stopped, while the growth of its enemies continues, and continues at an accelerated pace. This inevitably leads, not only to a lowering of the condition of the factory workers, but to a lowering of the relative weight of the proletariat in the Soviet society.

The Mensheviks, agents of the bourgeoisie among the workers, point triumphantly to the material wretchedness of our workers. They are trying to rouse the proletariat against the Soviet state, to induce our workers to accept the bourgeois-Menshevik slogan, “Back to capitalism.” The complacent official who sees “Menshevism” in the Opposition’s insistence upon improving the material condition of the workers, is performing the best possible service to Menshevism. He is pushing the workers under its yellow banner.

In order to conquer difficulties, it is necessary to know them. It is necessary justly and honestly to test our success and failure by the actual condition of the toiling masses.

THE CONDITION OF THE WORKERS

Our period of reconstruction gave a sufficiently rapid increase of wages up to the autumn of 1925. But the considerable decrease of real wages which began in 1926 was overcome only at the beginning of 1927. Monthly wages in the first two quarters of the fiscal year 1926-1927 amounted on the average in the big industries, in Moscow rubles, to 30 rubles, 67 kopeks, and, 30 rubles, 33 kopeks—as against 29 rubles, 68 kopeks in the autumn of 1925. In the third quarter—according to preliminary calculations—the wage amounted to 31 rubles, 62 kopeks. Thus real wages for the present year have stood still, approximately at the level of the autumn of 1925.

Of course the wages and the general material level of special categories of workers, and special regions—above all, Moscow and Leningrad—are undoubtedly higher than this average level. But on the other hand, the material level of other very broad working-class layers is considerably below these average figures.

Moreover, all the data testify that the growth of wages is lagging behind the growth of the produc-

tivity of labor. The intensity of labor increases—the bad conditions of labor remain the same.

The raising of wages is being more and more conditioned upon a demand for an increased *intensity* of labor. This new tendency, inconsistent with a socialist course of development, was reënforced by the Central Committee in its famous resolution on rationalization.¹ The Fourth Congress of the Soviets adopted this same resolution. Such a policy would mean that the increase of social wealth due to a developing technique (increased productivity of labor) does not *in itself* lead to an increase of wages.

The small numerical growth of the workers means a lowering of the number of working members in each family. In real rubles, the *expense-budget of the worker's family* has decreased since 1924-1925. The increase in the cost of living-quarters has compelled the worker to rent out a part of his space. The unemployed, directly or indirectly, burden the budget of the worker. The swiftly growing consumption of alcoholic liquors burdens his budget. In the sum total we have an obvious lowering of his *standard of life*. The *rationalization of production* now being introduced will inevitably lower still more the condition of the working-class, unless it is accompanied by an expansion of industry and transport sufficient to take in the discharged workers. In practice, "rationalization" often comes down to "throwing out"

¹ *Pravda*, March 25, 1927.

some workers and lowering the material conditions of others. This inevitably fills the working mass with a distrust of rationalization itself.

Under a lowering of the conditions of labor, it is always the weakest group who suffer the most: unskilled workers, seasonal workers, women, and adolescents.

In 1926 there was an obvious lowering of the wages of women as compared to those of men, in almost all branches of industry. Among the unskilled in three different branches of industry, the earnings of women in March 1926, were 51.8 per cent, 61.7 per cent, and 83 per cent, of the earnings of men. Necessary measures have not been taken for improving the conditions of women's work in such branches as the peat industry, loading and unloading, etc. The average earnings of adolescents, in comparison with the earnings of all the workers, is steadily declining. In 1923, it was 47.1 per cent, in 1924, 45 per cent, in 1925, 43.4 per cent, in 1926, 40.5 per cent, in 1927, 39.5 per cent.²

In March 1926, 49.5 per cent of the adolescents received less than 20 rubles.³ The abolition of the regulation providing for the employment of a certain number of adolescents to every given number of workers in an industrial establishment has been a

² Review of the Economic Situation of the Youth in 1924-1925 and in 1925-1926.

³ Central Bureau of Labor Statistics.

heavy blow to the working youth and to the worker's family. The number of unemployed adolescents is greatly increasing.

FARM LABOR

Of the approximate three and a half million wage-workers in the country, one million 600 thousand are farm-hands, men and women. Only 20 per cent of these farm-hands are organized in unions. The registration of wage-contracts, often so low as to mean practical slavery, is barely beginning. The wages of farm-hands are customarily below the legal minimum—and this often even in the Soviet estates. Real wages on the average are not over 63 per cent of the pre-war level. The working day is rarely less than ten hours. In the majority of cases it is, as a matter of fact, unlimited. Wages are irregularly paid, and paid after intolerable delays. This miserable situation of the hired laborer is not only a result of the difficulties of socialist construction in a backward, peasant country. It is also, and indubitably, a result of the false course which in practice—in the reality of life—gives predominant attention to the upper levels and not the lower levels of the village. We must have an all-sided, systematic defense of the hired laborer, not only against the Kulak, but also against the so-called “strong” middle peasant.

THE HOUSING QUESTION

The normal dwelling-space for the workers is, as a rule, considerably lower than the average space for the whole city population. The workers of the great industrial cities are in this respect the least favored part of the population. The distribution of dwelling-space according to social groups, in a series of investigated cities, was as follows:

Per industrial worker, 5.6 square meters; per clerical worker, 6.9; per artisan, 7.6; per professional, 10.9; and for the non-working element, 7.1. The workers occupy the last place. Moreover, the dimension of the workers' living-space is narrowing from year to year; that of the non-proletarian elements is widening. The general situation in the matter of dwelling-house construction threatens the further development of industry. In spite of this fact, the five-year plan of the Commission on State Planning offers a prospect in dwelling-house construction according to which the housing situation at the end of five years will be worse than it is now. This, according to the confession of the Commission itself. From 11.3 square arshines ⁴ at the end of 1926, the average norm will be lowered by the end of 1931, according to the five-year plan, to 10.6.

⁴ An arshine is about 28 inches.—*Tr.*

UNEMPLOYMENT

The slow growth of industrialization nowhere reveals itself so morbidly as in the unemployment which has attacked the fundamental ranks of the industrial proletariat. The official number of registered unemployed in April 1927 was 1,478,000.⁵ The actual number of unemployed was about 2 million. The number of unemployed is growing incomparably faster than the general number of employed workers. According to the five-year plan of the State Planning Commission, our industries will absorb during the whole five years a little more than 400,000 steadily employed workers. This means, with the continual influx of workers from the country, that the number of unemployed by the end of 1931 will have grown to no less than 3 million men and women. The consequence of that state of affairs will be a growth of the numbers of shelterless children, the beggars and prostitutes. The small unemployment insurance paid to those out of work is causing justifiable resentment. The average benefit is 11.9 rubles—that is, about 5 pre-war rubles. The trade-union benefits average 6.5 to 7 rubles. And these benefits are paid, approximately, to only 20 per cent of the unemployed members of the union.

The Code of Labor Laws has undergone so many interpretations that these exceed by many times the

⁵ *Trud*, Aug. 27, 1927.

number of points in the Code. And they actually annul many of its provisions. Especially have the legal defenses of temporary and seasonal workers been broken down.

The recent campaign of collective bargaining was characterized by an almost universal lowering of legal restrictions, and a downward pressure on standards and wage-scales. Giving the economic management the right of compulsory arbitration has reduced to nothing the collective contract itself, changing it from a two-sided act of agreement to an administrative order.⁶ The contributions of industry toward workmen's compensation are wholly inadequate. In 1925-1926, according to the data of the People's Commissariat of Labor, there were 97.6 accidents resulting in disability, for every thousand workers. Every tenth worker is injured every year.

The past years have been characterized by a sharp increase of labor conflicts, most of them being settled by compulsory rather than by conciliatory measures.

The régime within the shops has deteriorated. The administrative organs are striving more and more to establish their unlimited authority. The hiring and discharge of workers is actually in the sole hands of the administration. Pre-revolutionary relations between master and workmen are not rarely to be found.

The production conferences are gradually being

⁶ *Trud*, Aug. 4, 1927.

reduced to nothing. A majority of the practical proposals adopted by the workers are never carried out. Among many of the workers a distaste for these production conferences is nourished by the fact that the improvements which they do succeed in introducing often result in a reduction in the number of workers. As a result the production conferences are scantily attended.

In the cultural sphere, it is necessary to emphasize the problem of the schools. It is becoming harder and harder for the worker to give his children even an elementary education, to say nothing of vocational training. In almost all the working-class districts there is a continually increasing shortage of schools. The fees demanded of parents for school supplies are practically destroying the freedom of education. The shortage of schools and the inadequate provision of kindergartens, are driving a considerable part of the worker's children into the streets.

THE TRADE-UNIONS AND THE WORKERS

That "conflict of interests on the question of conditions of labor in the factory," noted in a resolution of the Eleventh Congress of the party, has grown very considerably of late years. Nevertheless, the entire recent party policy in relation to the trade-union movement, and the practices of the trade-union leaders, have had such an effect on the unions that,

as the Fourteenth Congress confesses, "The trade-unions often could not handle their work, showing one-sidedness, at times pushing into the background their principal and most important task—to defend the economic interests of the masses organized by them and to raise in every possible way their material and spiritual level." The situation after the Fourteenth Congress did not become better, but worse. The bureaucratization of the trade-unions took a further forward step.

In the staff of the elective executive organs of ten industrial unions, the percentage of workers from the shops and non-party militant workers is extremely small (12 to 13 per cent). The immense majority of the delegates to the trade-union conferences are people entirely disassociated from industry.⁷ Never before have the trade-unions and the working mass stood so far from the management of the socialist industry as now. The self-activity of the mass of workers organized in the trade-unions is being replaced by agreements between the secretaries of locals, the factory directors, and the presidents of the factory and shop committees (the "Triangle"). The attitude of the workers to the factory and shop committees is one of distrust. Attendance at the general meetings is low.

The dissatisfaction of the worker, finding no outlet in the trade-union, is driven under ground. "We

⁷ *Pravda*, July 23, 1927.

mustn't be too active—if you want a bite of bread, don't talk so much." Such sayings are very common.⁸ In these circumstances, attempts on the part of the workers to better their situation by action outside the trade-union organization inevitably become more frequent. This alone imperatively dictates a radical change in the present trade-union régime.

THE MOST IMPORTANT PRACTICAL PROPOSALS

A. In the Sphere of Material Conditions

(1) Cut off at the root every inclination to lengthen the eight-hour day. Permit overtime only when absolutely unavoidable. Allow no abuse in the employment of occasional workers, no treating of full-time workers as "seasonal." Annul every lengthening of the work day in unhealthy trades where it has been introduced in violation of earlier rules.

(2) The most immediate problem is the raising of wages at least to correspond to the achieved increase in the productivity of labor. The future course should be a systematic elevation of real wages to correspond with every growth in the productivity of labor. It is necessary to achieve an increasing equalization in the wages of different groups of workers, by way of a

⁸ See material of the Moscow Committee. Reports of the General Workers' Conferences, *Informational Review*, p. 30, etc.

systematic raising of the lower-paid groups, in no case by a lowering of the higher paid.

(3) We must cut off all bureaucratic abuse of rationalization measures. Rationalization ought to be closely bound up with a corresponding development of industry, with a planned distribution of labor power, and with a struggle against waste of the productive forces of the working-class—particularly waste of the skilled workers.

(4) To relieve the evil effects of unemployment:

- (a) Unemployment benefits must be adjusted in correspondence with the average wage in a given locality.
- (b) In view of the duration of the unemployment, the benefit period must be extended from one year to one and a half.
- (c) No further reduction in the dues for social insurance must be tolerated, and a real fight must be waged against the actual non-payment of them.
- (d) The spending of insurance funds upon measures of general public health and sanitation must be stopped.
- (e) We must energetically combat the disposition to make "economies on the insured."
- (f) We must annul all regulations that under various pretenses deprive really unemployed workers of their right to benefits and to registration at the employment bureaus.
- (g) The course must be towards an increase of the benefits of the unemployed, beginning with the industrial workers. We must have broadly conceived and carefully worked-out plans for long-time social enterprises,

upon which the unemployed can be used with the greatest advantage to the economic and cultural growth of the country.

(5) A systematic improvement of living conditions for the workers. Firm carrying out of a class policy in all housing questions. No betterment of the dwelling conditions of non-proletarian elements at the expense of the workers. No eviction of discharged workers and workers on reduced time.

Energetic measures must be taken for the healthier development of the coöperative homes. They must be made accessible to the lower-paid workers. Upper levels of the clerical workers must not be permitted to preëempt the apartments intended for industrial workers.

The housing plan of the State Planning Commission must be rejected as baldly opposed to a socialist policy. Business enterprises must be obliged to increase their housing expenditures and their budget allotments and credits for this purpose sufficiently so that the next five years will see a definite improvement in workmen's homes.

(6) Collective contracts should be made after real and not fictitious discussion at workers' meetings. The coming party congress should annul the decision of the Fourteenth Congress, giving factory managements the right to compulsory arbitration. The Labor Code must be looked upon as the minimum and not the maximum of what labor has a right to de-

mand. Collective contracts must contain guarantees against cutting down the number of workers and clerks throughout the duration of the contracts (permissible exceptions to be expressly provided for). Standards of production must be calculated on the basis of the average, not the exceptional, worker and for the whole duration of the wage contract. At any rate, all changes in the contracts which lower the standards of the worker in comparison with previous contracts should be declared unpermissible.

(7) The Bureau of Wages and Standards must be brought under more effective control of the workers and the trade-unions, and the constant shifting of wages and standards must be stopped.

(8) Appropriations for safety appliances and better factory conditions must be increased. Greater penalties must be imposed for failure to carry out regulations for the protection of labor.

(9) All interpretations of the Labor Code must be reëxamined and those which resulted in a lowering of the conditions of labor annulled.

(10) For the women workers, "Equal pay for equal work." A higher classification of women's work in general.

(11) Unpaid apprentice work shall be forbidden. Likewise the attempt to reduce the wages of adolescents. Measures must be taken to improve the conditions of their work.

(12) The régime of economy must in no case be

carried out at the expense of the life-interests of the worker. We must restore to the workers the "trifles" which have been taken from them (day nurseries, trolley tickets, longer vacations, etc.).

(13) The trade-unions must pay increased attention to the problem of seasonal employment.

(14) Medical aid for the worker in the factory must be increased (ambulances, first-aid departments, hospitals, etc.).

(15) Schools for children in the working-class districts must be increased in number.

(16) A series of state measures must be adopted to strengthen the workers' coöperatives.

B. In the Trade-Unions

(1) The work of the trade-unions should be judged primarily by the degree in which it defends the economic and cultural interests of the workers, under the existing industrial limitations.

(2) The party organizations, in deciding about measures touching the economic and cultural interests of the working mass, must take into serious consideration the findings of the Communist factions in the trade-unions.

(3) Real elections, publicity, accountability to the membership, must be the foundation of the trade-union work.

(4) All the administrative organs should be formed in real and not fictitious agreement with the corresponding trade-union organ.

(5) At every trade-union congress (including the all-Union congress) and in all the elective organs of the trade-unions (including the All-Russian Council of Trade-Unions), there must be a majority of workers directly engaged in industry. The percentage of non-party workers in these organs must be raised to at least one third.

At regular intervals, a certain number of the officials of the trade-union apparatus must be drafted for industrial work.

More utilization of voluntary work in trade-union activities, a broader application of the principle of volunteer work, more encouragement to the workers in the shops to engage in it.

(6) The removal of elected Communist members of trade-unions because of inner-party disagreements shall not be permitted.

(7) The absolute independence of the shop committee and local committees from the organs of management must be guaranteed. The employment and discharge of workers and the transfer of workers from one kind of work to another, for periods exceeding two weeks—all this must be carried out only after the shop committee has been informed. The shop committee, in struggling against abuses in this

sphere, shall employ its right of appeal from the decisions of the management to the corresponding trade-union and to the grievance commissions.

(8) The rights of the workers' press correspondents must be protected, and those who persecute the correspondents for making exposures must be strictly punished.

An article should be introduced into the Criminal Code punishing as a serious crime against the state every direct or indirect, overt or concealed persecution of a worker for criticizing, for making independent proposals, and for voting.

(9) The functions of the Control Commission of the production councils must be extended to include supervising the execution of their decisions and investigating their success in protecting the workers' interests.

(10) On the question of strikes in the state industries, the decision of the eleventh party congress, adopted under Lenin, remains in force.

In case of strikes in the concession industries, the latter shall be regarded as private industries.

(11) A reëxamination of the whole system of labor statistics, which in its present form gives a false and obviously colored view of the economic and cultural situation of the working-class, and thus greatly hinders any work in defense of its economic and cultural interests.

The hard situation of the working-class upon the

Tenth Anniversary of the October Revolution, is of course explained in the last analysis by the poverty of the country, the results of intervention and blockade, the unceasing struggle of the capitalist environment against the first proletarian state. That situation cannot be changed at a single blow. But it can and must be changed by a correct policy. The task of Bolsheviks is not to draw complacent pictures of their achievements—which of course are very real—but to raise firmly and clearly the question of what remains to be done, of what must be done, and what can be done with the correct policy.

CHAPTER III

THE AGRARIAN QUESTION AND THE SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

“Small-scale production gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie constantly, daily, hourly, elementally, and in vast proportions.”¹ Either the proletarian state, relying upon the high development and the electrification of industry, will be able to overcome the technical backwardness of millions of small and tiny industries, organizing them on the basis of large units and collectivism, or capitalism, recruiting its strength in the country, will undermine the foundations of socialism in the city.

From the point of view of Leninism, the peasantry—that is, the fundamental peasant mass which does not exploit labor—is that ally upon a correct association with whom depends the security of the proletarian dictatorship, and so the fate of the socialist revolution. For the stage we are living through, Lenin most accurately formulated our task with regard to the peasants in the following words: “To succeed in achieving an alliance with the middle peasants—without for one minute renouncing the strug-

¹ Lenin, 1920, Vol. XVII, p. 118.

gle against the Kulak, and always solidly supporting ourselves on the poor peasant.”²

The revision of Lenin on the peasant question, being carried through by the Stalin-Bukharin group, may be summed up in the following eight principal points:

(1) Abandonment of the fundamental principle of Marxism, that only a powerful socialized industry can help the peasants transform agriculture along collectivist lines.

(2) Underestimation of hired labor and the peasant poor as the social basis in the country districts of the proletarian dictatorship.

(3) Basing our hopes in agricultural industry upon the so-called “strong” peasant—that is, in the essence of the matter, the Kulak.

(4) Ignoring or openly denying the petty-bourgeois character of peasant property and peasant industry—a departure from the Marxian position toward the theories of the Social Revolutionaries.

(5) Underestimation of the capitalist elements in the present development of the country, and hushing up of the class differentiations that are taking place among the peasants.

(6) The creation of disintegrating theories to the effect that, “The Kulak and the Kulak organizations will have no chance anyway, because the general frame of evolution in our country is predeter-

² Vol. XV, p. 564.

mined by the structure of the proletarian dictatorship.”³

(7) Encouragement of the “grafting into our system of Kulak coöperative nuclei.”⁴ “The problem may be expressed thus, that it is necessary to set free the economic possibilities of the well-off peasant, the economic possibilities of the Kulak.”⁵

(8) The attempt to oppose Lenin’s “coöperative plan” to his plan of electrification. According to Lenin himself, only these two plans in combination could guarantee a transition to socialism.

Relying on these revisionist tendencies of the official group, the representatives of the new bourgeoisie, having got into association with certain links of our state apparatus, are openly aspiring to switch our whole policy in the country over to the capitalist rails. And, by the way, the Kulaks and their ideological defenders, hide all their ambitions under a pretense of worrying about the development of the productive forces, about increasing the volume of commodity production “in general,” etc. As a matter of fact, a Kulak development of the productive forces, a Kulak increase of commodity production, represses and checks the development of the productive forces of the entire remaining mass of the peasant industry.

³ Bukharin: *The Way to Socialism and the Worker-and-Peasant Union*, p. 49.

⁴ Bukharin, *idem*, p. 49.

⁵ *Pravda*, April 24, 1925.

In spite of our comparatively swift reconstruction process in agriculture, the commodity production of the peasant industries is very low. In 1925-1926, the total volume of goods sent to the market was 64 per cent of the pre-war level, the volume exported only 24 per cent of the export in 1913. The cause of this, aside from the increasing general consumption in the village itself,⁶ lies in the disparity between agricultural and industrial prices and in the rapid accumulation of food stuffs by the Kulaks. Even the five-year plan is compelled to recognize that "the lack of industrial products in general places a definite limit to the equivalent exchange of goods between city and country, lowering the possible volume of agricultural products brought to the market."⁷ Thus the lagging of industry retards the growth of agriculture and in particular the growth of agricultural commodity production. It undermines the union of city and country and leads to a swift class differentiation among the peasants.

The views of the Opposition on debated questions of peasant policy have been confirmed wholly and absolutely. The partial corrections introduced into our general line, under pressure of sharp criticism from the Opposition, have not checked the continuing deviation of the official group to the side of the

⁶ Due to the growth of population and the splitting up of properties. Thirty-eight per cent of the peasant estates in the grain-producing areas buy additional grain.

⁷ P. 177.

“strong peasant.” To prove this, it is sufficient to recall that the Fourteenth Congress of the Soviets, according to the report of Kalinin, had not one single word to say about class differentiation in the country or the growth of the Kulak.

There can be but one result of such a policy: we shall lose the poor peasants and fail to win the middle ones.

CLASS DIFFERENTIATION AMONG THE PEASANTS

In recent years the rural districts have gone far in the direction of capitalistic class differentiation.

The landless and land-poor groups have diminished, during the last four years, 35 to 45 per cent. The group possessing from 6 to 10 desiatins [17 to 28 acres] increased at the same time 100 to 120 per cent. The group with 10 desiatins and more increased 150 to 200 per cent. The diminishing percentage of landless and land-poor groups is due very largely to their ruin and dissolution. Thus, in Siberia, during one year, 15.8 per cent of the landless families, and 3.8 per cent of those having less than 2 desiatins, dissolved and disappeared. In the northern Caucasus, 14.1 per cent of the landless dissolved, and 3.8 per cent of those having less than 2 desiatins.

The advancement of horseless and toolless farm properties into the class of the lower middle peasant is going on extremely slowly. At the present date,

there remain in the entire Union 30 to 40 per cent of horseless and toolless properties, and the fundamental mass of these fall into the group of the land-poor.

The distribution of the essential means of production in the northern Caucasus is as follows: To 50 per cent of the weakest proprietors, belong 15 per cent of the means of production. To the middle group, constituting 35 per cent of the proprietors, belong 35 per cent of the essential means of production. And to the highest group, constituting 15 per cent of the proprietors, belong 50 per cent of the means of production. The same picture of the distribution of the means of production is to be observed in other provinces (Siberia, the Ukraine, etc.).

This record of inequality in the distribution of land and the means of production is confirmed by an unequal distribution of the reserves of grain among the different groups of peasant proprietors. On April 1, 1926, 58 per cent of all the superfluous grain in the country was in the hands of 6 per cent of the peasant proprietors.⁸

The renting of land assumes larger and larger proportions every year. The renting proprietors are, in the majority of cases, the large landholders possessing the means of production. In the immense majority of cases, the fact that the land is rented is concealed in order to avoid the payment of the tax.

⁸ *Statistical Review*, 1927, No. 4, p. 15.

The land-poor proprietors, lacking tools and animals, work the land for the most part with hired tools and hired animals. The conditions, both of land rent and of the renting of tools and animals, amount almost to slavery. Along with this material slavery, financial usury is growing.

The current splitting up of peasant properties does not weaken, but strengthens the process of class differentiation. The machines and credits, instead of serving as levers for the socialization of agriculture, frequently fall into the hands of the Kulak and the well-off and thus help in the exploitation of the farm hands, the poor peasants, and the weaker middle peasants.

Besides this concentration of land and instruments in the hands of the highest groups, the latter are employing hired labor to a steadily increasing degree.

On the other hand, the lower and, in part, the middle group of peasant proprietors are throwing out, either by way of complete ruin and dissolution, or by way of the sending off of individual members of the family, a continually increasing number of "farm-hands." These surplus hands fall into servitude to the Kulak or to the "powerful" middle peasant, or go away to the cities, or in considerable numbers find no employment whatever.

In spite of these processes, which have gone very far, and which lead to a reduction of the relative economic weight of the middle peasant, the middle

peasant continues to be numerically the largest agricultural group. To bring this middle peasant over to the side of the socialistic policy in agriculture is one of the chief problems of the proletarian dictatorship. Basing our hope on the so-called "strong peasant" means, in reality, basing it on the further disintegration of this middle layer.

Only a suitable attention to the hired hand, only a course based on the poor peasant and his union with the middle peasant, only a decisive struggle against the Kulak, only a course towards industrialization, only a course towards class coöperatives and a class-credit system in the country, will make it possible to draw the middle peasant into the work towards socialist reconstruction of agriculture.

PRACTICAL PROPOSALS

In the class struggle now going on in the country, the party must stand, not in words but in deeds, at the head of the farm-hands, the poor peasants, and the basic mass of the middle peasants, and organize them against the exploitative aspirations of the Kulak.

To strengthen and reënforce the class position of the agricultural proletariat—which is a part of the working-class—that series of measures is necessary which we indicated in the section on the condition of the working-class.

Agricultural credits must cease to be for the most part a privilege of the well-off circles of the village. We must put an end to the present situation, which permits the savings of the poor, insignificant enough already, to be spent, not for their intended purpose, but in the service of the well-off and middle groups.

The growth of private proprietorship in the country must be offset by a more rapid development of collective farming. It is necessary systematically and from year to year to subsidize the efforts of the poor peasants to organize in collectives.

At the same time, we must give a more systematic help to poor proprietors not included in the collectives, by freeing them entirely from taxation, by a corresponding land policy, by credits for agricultural implements, and by bringing them into the agricultural coöperatives. Instead of the slogan, "Create non-party peasant active centers by revivifying the soviets" (Stalin-Molotov), a slogan deprived of all class content and which will in reality strengthen the dominant rôle of the upper levels in the villages, we must adopt the following slogan: *Create non-party active centers composed of hired hands, poor peasants, and middle peasants who stand near them.*

We must have a real planful, universal, and durable organization of the poor, centered upon actual political and economic problems of life, such as elections, tax campaigns, influence upon the dis-

tribution of credit, machines, etc., land division and land utilization, the creation of coöperatives, the poor man's cash realization from coöperation, etc.

The party ought to promote by all means the economic advancement of the middle peasant—by a wise policy of prices for grain, by the organization of credits and coöperatives accessible to him, by the systematic and gradual introduction of that most numerous peasant group to the benefits of the large-scale, machine, collective industry.

The task of the party in relation to the growing Kulak class ought to consist in the all-sided limitation of their efforts at exploitation. We must permit no more departures from that article in our constitution depriving the exploiting class of elective rights in the soviets. The following measures are necessary: A sharply progressive tax system; state legislative measures for the defense of hired labor and the regulation of the wages of agricultural workers; a correct class policy in the matter of land-division and land-utilization; the same thing in the matter of supplying the country with tractors and other implements of production.

The growing system of land rental in the country, the existing method of land-utilization, according to which land communities—standing outside of all Soviet leadership and control and falling more and more under the influence of the Kulak—dispose of the land, the resolution adopted by the Fourteenth

Congress of the Soviets for "indemnification" at the time of the annual land distribution—all this is undermining the foundations of the nationalization of the land.

One of the essential measures for reënforcing the nationalization of the land is the subordination of these land communities to the local organs of the state and the establishment of a firm control upon the part of the local soviets, purified of Kulak elements, over the regulation of all questions of the division and utilization of the land. The purpose of this control should be a maximum defense of the interests of the poor and the weak small peasants from the excessive numbers of the Kulaks. It is necessary to work out on the basis of our present experience a series of supplementary measures to avoid an excessive proportion of Kulaks in the land communities. It is necessary in particular that the Kulak, as the renter of land, should be wholly and absolutely, and not in words but in fact, subject to supervision and control from the organs of the Soviet power in the country.

The party ought to oppose a shattering resistance to all tendencies directed towards annulling or undermining the nationalization of the land—one of the foundation pillars of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The existing system of universal agricultural tax ought to be changed in the direction of freeing alto-

gether from taxation 40 to 50 per cent of the poorest peasant families, without making up for it by any additional tax upon the fundamental mass of the middle peasants. The dates of tax collection should be accommodated to the interests of the lower groups of taxpayers.

A much larger sum ought to be appropriated for the creation of Soviet and collective farms. Maximum indulgences must be accorded to the newly organized collective farms and other forms of collectivism. People deprived of elective rights cannot be members of the collective estates. The whole work of the coöperatives ought to be penetrated with a sense of the problem of transforming small-scale production into large-scale collective production. A firm class policy must be pursued in the sphere of machine supply and an especial struggle waged against the fake machine companies.

The work of land distribution must be carried on wholly at the expense of the state, and the first thing to be taken care of must be the collective estates and the estates of the poor, with a maximum protection of their interests.

The prices of grain and other agricultural products ought to guarantee to the poor and the basic mass of the middle peasants the possibility, at the very least, of maintaining their economy at the present level and gradually improving it. Measures should be taken to abolish the disparity between

autumn and spring grain prices. For this disparity counts heavily against the rural poor and gives all the advantage to the upper levels.

It is necessary not only to increase considerably the appropriation to the poor fund, but also radically to change the whole direction of agricultural credits towards assuring to the poor and the weak middle peasant cheap and long-term credits, and towards abolishing the existing system of guarantees and endorsements.

COÖPERATION

The problem of socialist construction in the country is to reform agriculture on the basis of large-scale, machine, collective industry. For the fundamental mass of the peasants the simplest road to this end is coöperation, as Lenin described it in his work *On Coöperation*. This is the enormous advantage which the proletarian dictatorship and the Soviet system as a whole gives to the peasant. Only a process of growing industrialization in agriculture can create the broad basis for this socialistic coöperation (or collectivism). Without a technical revolution in the very manner of production—that is to say, without agricultural machinery, without the rotation of crops, without artificial fertilization, etc.—no successful and broad work in the direction of a real collectivization of agriculture is possible.

Coöperative provisioning and selling will be a road to socialism only in case: (1) this process takes place under the immediate economic and political influence of the socialist elements, especially the big industries and the trade-unions; and (2) this process of making the trade functions of agriculture coöperative gradually leads to the collectivization of the industry itself. The class character of the agricultural co-operatives will be determined not only by the numerical weight of the different groups of the co-operating peasantry, but more particularly by their relative economic weight. The task of the party is to see that agricultural coöperation constitutes a real union of the poor and middle groups of the peasants, and is a weapon in the struggle of those elements against the growing economic power of the Kulak. We must systematically and insisently bring the agricultural proletariat into the task of building the coöperatives.

A successful coöperative structure is conceivable only upon condition of a maximum independence of the coöperating population. A true union of the co-operatives with the great industries and the proletarian state assumes a normal régime in the coöperative organizations, excluding bureaucratic methods of regulation.

In view of the obvious departure of the party leadership from the fundamental Bolshevik course in the country, their tendency to seek the support

of the well-off peasant and the Kulak; in view of the concealment of this departure by anti-proletarian speeches about "poor man's illusions," "sponging," and "do-nothingism," and about the alleged small value of the poor peasant in the defense of the Soviet Union—in view of these things, it is more than ever necessary to remember the words of our party program. After unequivocally asserting the decisive importance for us of a union with the middle peasant, our program clearly and succinctly states: "In all its work in the country, the Russian Communist party supports itself as before upon the proletarian and semi-proletarian peasant forces. It organizes them above all into independent forces, creating party nuclei in the villages, organizations of the poor, a special type of trade-union for the proletarian and semi-proletarian rural elements, etc.; associating them by every possible means with the city proletariat; and attracting them away from the influence of the rural bourgeoisie and the small-property interests."

CHAPTER IV

STATE INDUSTRY AND THE BUILDING OF SOCIALISM

THE TEMPO OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY

“The sole material basis for socialism is a vast machine industry, capable of reorganizing agriculture.”¹

The basic condition for a socialist development in the present preliminary stage and in the given historical situation—capitalist encirclement and a retardation of the world revolution—is a rate of industrialization sufficiently rapid to guarantee, in the near future, a solution of at least the following problems:

(1) The material position of the proletariat within the country must be strengthened both absolutely and relatively (growth in the number of employed workers, reduction of the number of unemployed, improvement in the material level of the working-class, and especially an enlargement of its dwelling space to meet sanitary standards).

(2) The work in industry, transport, and the electric stations must grow at least at an equal

¹ Lenin, Vol. XVIII, Chapter I, p. 316.

pace with the growing demands and resources of the country as a whole.

(3) Agriculture must find it possible to pass over, by degrees, to a higher technical basis, and guarantee to the industries a broadening source of raw material.

(4) In the matter of developing the productive forces, in the matter of technique, and in the matter of improving the material conditions of the working-class and the toiling masses, the Soviet Union must not fall farther behind the capitalist countries, but in the near future must overtake them.

(5) Industrialization must be sufficient to guarantee the defense of the country and in particular an adequate growth of the war industries.

(6) The socialist, state, and coöperative elements must increase systematically, crowding out some and subordinating and transforming others of the pre-socialist economic elements (capitalist and pre-capitalist).

In spite of our considerable success in the sphere of industry, electrification, and transport, industrialization is far from having attained that development which is necessary and possible. The present tempo of industrialization and the tempo indicated for the coming years are obviously inadequate.

There is not, and of course cannot be, a policy which would permit us to solve all our difficulties at a stroke, or leap over a prolonged period of sys-

tematic promotion of our industry and culture. But our very backwardness in industry and culture demands an exceptional intensity of effort and means, a true and timely mobilization of all our wealth, a correct utilization of every resource to attain the quickest possible industrialization of the country. The chronic lagging of industry, and also of transport, electrification, and building, behind the demands and needs of the population, of public economy and the social system as a whole, holds as in a vise the entire business circulation of the country. It cuts down the realization of the commodity part of agricultural production and its export. It confines import in extremely narrow limits, drives prices and costs of production upward, causes the instability of the Chervonetz, and retards the development of the productive forces. It delays all improvement of the material condition of the proletariat and the peasant mass, produces an alarming growth of unemployment, and a deterioration of living conditions. It undermines the union of industry with agriculture and weakens the capacity of the country for self-defense.

The inadequate tempo of development in industry leads in turn to a retardation of the growth of agriculture. At the same time, no industrialization is possible without a decisive increase of the productive forces of agriculture and the quantity of commodities produced.

PRICES

The necessary acceleration of industrialization is impossible without a systematic and determined lowering of the costs of production and of wholesale and retail prices on industrial goods, and their equalization with world prices. In that lies real progress, both in the matter of advancing our work to a higher technical basis and in the matter of better satisfying the demands of the toiling masses.

It is time to put an end to the meaningless and indecent hullabaloo to the effect that the Opposition wants to raise prices. The party is absolutely unanimous in the desire to lower prices. But the desire alone is not enough. Policies should be judged not by intention, but by result. The results of the present struggle to lower prices have compelled even important members of the ruling group to raise the question: Aren't we losing with this policy some large sum of money? "Where did the billion go?" Bukharin was inquiring in January of this year. "What becomes of the difference between wholesale and retail prices?" asked Rudzutak, speaking after him on the same theme.² With a chronic lack of goods, a sweeping and awkwardly bureaucratic lowering of wholesale prices, since it does not in the majority of cases reach down to the worker and the peasant, entails a loss to the state industry of hundreds of millions of

² *Report of the Politburo*, March 3, 1927, pp. 20-21.

rubles. The resulting disparity between wholesale and retail prices, especially in the hands of the private trader, is so enormous that it quite justifies the idea of retaining a part of this trade profit in the hands of the state industry. The irrefutable conclusion from the whole economic experience of the past years is a demand for a quicker overcoming of disproportions, an increase of the mass of industrial commodities, an acceleration of the rate of development of industry. That is the only road to a real lowering of wholesale and retail prices and above all to a lowering of the cost of production, which has revealed during the last year an upward rather than a downward tendency.

THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN OF THE STATE PLANNING COMMISSION (1926-1927 TO 1930-1931)

The question of the five-year plan of development of the public economy, on the agenda of the coming Fifteenth Party Congress, ought properly to occupy the center of the party's attention. This five-year plan is not yet officially recognized and will hardly be recognized in its present form. Nevertheless, it gives the fundamental outlook of the present economic leadership in its most systemized and finished aspect.

Capital Investments in Industry will hardly grow at all from year to year, according to this plan

(1,142 millions next year, 1,205 millions in 1931). And in proportion to the general sum invested in the national economy, they will fall from 36.4 per cent to 27.8 per cent. The net investments in industry from the state budget, according to this program, will fall during the same years approximately from 200 millions to 90 millions. Production is supposed to grow from 4 to 9 per cent each year over the year preceding—the rate of growth in capitalistic countries during periods of great progress. The gigantic advantage involved in the nationalization of the land, the means of production, the banks, and the centralized organs of administration—that is, the advantages deriving from the socialist revolution—find almost no expression in the five-year plan.

The Individual Consumption of Industrial Goods, beggarly at the present time, is to grow during the five years only 12 per cent in all. The consumption of cotton fabrics in 1931, which is to be 97 per cent of the pre-war amount, will be five times less than in the United States in 1923. The consumption of coal will be seven times less than in Germany in 1926, seventeen times less than in the United States in 1923. The consumption of pig iron will be something over four times less than in Germany, eleven and a half times less than in the United States. The production of electric energy will be three times less than in Germany, seven times less than in the

United States. The consumption of paper at the end of the five years will be 83 per cent of the pre-war amount. All this, fifteen years after October! To bring forward on the anniversary of the October Revolution such a parsimonious, through-and-through pessimistic plan really means that you are working against socialism. The lowering of retail prices 17 per cent, as projected by the five-year plan, even if it is realized, will hardly have any effect upon the relation between our prices and world prices, which are two and a half to three times lower than ours.

But even with this insignificant price-reduction (and that, too, as yet only a project), the five-year plan figures upon a failure of industrial goods to cover the financially capable demand of the country to the extent of 400 million rubles a year. If you reflect that the present monstrous wholesale prices are to be lowered 22 per cent in the course of five years—a more than modest decrease—that alone would result in a shortage of goods amounting to a whole billion. The *disproportion* is thus preserved inviolate, a perpetual source of increase of retail prices. The five-year plan promises the peasants in 1931 approximately the pre-war amount of industrial goods at prices one and a half times higher. To the worker in the great industries it promises an increase of 33 per cent in the nominal wage at the end of the five years, disregarding the ill-founded hope of

lowering prices. The disproportion between supply and demand is to be overcome, according to the design of the State Planning Commission, by raising the rent paid by the workers two and one half times above the present amount, approximately 400 million rubles a year. Seeing that there is an excess of purchasing power in the well-to-do sections of the population, the officials of the Planning Commission are going to correct that situation by cutting down the real wages of the workers. It is hard to believe that such a method of restoring the equilibrium of the market is proposed by the responsible organs of a workers' state! All this false perspective forcibly impels the consumer to seek a way out along the ruinous course of abolishing the monopoly of foreign trade.

The construction of six to seven thousand versts of new railroad, indicated in the five-year plan—as against fourteen thousand constructed, for example, during the five years from 1895-1900—means a dangerous shortage, not only from the point of view of socialist industrialization, but from that of the most elementary economic demands of the principal provinces.

With deviations to this side or that, such is the real attitude of the state organ actually guiding the development of our economy. That is how the political line of our present leadership really looks.

THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL
CAPITALIST ECONOMY

In the long struggle ahead between two irreconcilably hostile social systems—capitalism and socialism—the outcome will be determined, *in the last analysis*, by the relative productiveness of labor under each system. And this, under market conditions, will be measured by the relation between our domestic prices and world prices. It was this fundamental fact that Lenin had in mind when in one of his last speeches he warned the party of the coming “‘test’ to be applied by the Russian market and the international market, to which we are subordinated, with which we are bound up, and from which we cannot break loose.”³ For that reason the idea of Bukharin that we can go along at any pace, even a “turtle’s pace,” towards socialism, is mere petty-bourgeois trifling.

We cannot hide from the capitalist environment under cover of a nationally exclusive economy. Exactly because of its exclusiveness, such an economy would be compelled to advance at an extremely slow pace, and in consequence would meet, not a weakened, but a strengthened pressure, not only from the capitalist armies and fleets (“intervention”), but above all from cheap capitalist commodities.

³ Lenin, Vol. XVIII, Part II, p. 33.

The monopoly of foreign trade is a weapon necessary to the life of a socialist effort, when the capitalist countries possess a higher technique. But the socialist economy now under construction can defend this monopoly only if it continually approaches the world economy in the matter of technique, cost of production, quality and price of its products. The goal of the economic leadership ought to be, not a shut-in, self-sufficient economy, at the price of an inevitable lowering of its level and rate of advance, but just the opposite—an all-sided increase of our relative weight in the world system, to be achieved by increasing our tempo to the utmost.

For this it is necessary: (1) To understand the gigantic significance of our export, now so dangerously lagging behind the development of our industry as a whole. (The participation of the Soviet Union in the world volume of commercial transactions has diminished from 4.22 per cent in 1913 to 0.97 per cent in 1926.) (2) To change especially our policy toward the Kulak, which makes it possible for him to undermine our socialist export by the usurious hoarding of raw material. (3) To develop our bonds with world economy by means of an all-sided speeding up of industrialization and strengthening of the socialist element, in contrast to the capitalist element, of our own economy; not to scatter our limited accumulations in the near future, but gradually and with deliberate plan to pass over

to a new form of production which will assure us, in the first instance, of a mass output of the most necessary and most available machines; skillfully and thoughtfully to supplement and stimulate our own industry by systematically utilizing the achievements of the world capitalist technique.

Resting our hope upon an isolated socialist development and upon a tempo independent of the world economy distorts the whole perspective. It puts our planning leadership off the track, and offers no guiding threads for a correct regulation of our relations with the world economy. We have no way of deciding what to manufacture ourselves and what to bring in from outside. A definite renunciation of the theory of an isolated socialist economy will mean, in the course of a few years, an incomparably more expeditious use of our resources, a swifter industrialization, a more planful and powerful growth of our own machine construction. It will mean a swifter increase in the number of employed workers and a real lowering of prices—in a word, a genuine strengthening of the Soviet Union in the capitalist environment.

Will not the growth of our bonds with world capitalism involve a danger in case of blockade and war? The answer to this question flows from everything that has been said above:

The preparation for war demands, of course, the creation of a reserve of the foreign raw materials

necessary to us and a prompt establishment of the new industries vitally necessary—as, for instance, the production of aluminum, etc. But the most important thing in case of a prolonged and serious war, is to have a national industry developed to the highest degree and capable both of mass production and of swift transformation from one kind of production to another. The recent past has shown how such a highly industrial country as Germany, bound up by a thousand threads with the world market, could discover a gigantic life-power and power of resistance when war and a blockade cut her off at one blow from the entire world.

If with the incomparable advantages of our social structure we can, during this “peaceful” period, utilize the world markets in order to speed up our industrial development, we shall meet blockade or intervention infinitely better prepared and better armed.

No domestic policy can of itself deliver us from the economic, political, and military danger of the capitalist encirclement. The domestic problem is, by strengthening ourselves with a proper class policy, a proper inter-relation of the working-class with the peasant, to move forward as far as possible on the road of socialist construction. The interior resources of the Soviet Union are enormous and make this entirely possible. In using the world-capitalist market for this purpose, we bind up our fundamental his-

torical calculations with the further development of the world-proletarian revolution. Its victory in certain leading countries will break the ring of the capitalist encirclement, and deliver us from our heavy military burden. It will enormously strengthen us in the sphere of technique, accelerate our entire development in the city and village, in factory and school. It will give us the possibility of really creating socialism—that is, a class-free society, based upon the most advanced technique and upon the real equality of all its members in labor and in utilizing the products of labor.

WHERE TO FIND THE MEANS

To the question where to find the means for a bolder and more revolutionary solution of the problem of real industrialization, and a swifter elevation of the culture of the mass—the two problems upon whose solution depends the fate of the socialist dictatorship—the Opposition answers as follows:

The fundamental source is the redistribution of the national income by means of a correct use of budget, credit, and prices. A supplementary source is a correct utilization of our bonds with the world economy.

(1) According to the five-year plan, the budget, both state and local, will increase in five years, from 6 to 8.9 billion rubles, and will amount in 1931 to

16 per cent of the national income. This will be a smaller part of the national income than the pre-war czarist budget, which was 18 per cent. The budget of a workers' state not only may but should occupy a larger place in the national income than a bourgeois budget. This assumes, of course, that it will be really socialistic, and along with increasing expenditures for popular education will allot incomparably larger sums to the industrialization of the country. The net appropriation from the budget to the needs of industrialization can and should reach 500 to 1,000 million a year in the course of the coming five years.

(2) The tax system is not keeping up with the growth of accumulation among the upper layers of the peasants and the new bourgeoisie in general. It is necessary: (a) to tax all kinds of excess profits from private enterprises to the extent of not less than 150 to 200 million rubles, instead of 5 million as at present; (b) in order to strengthen our export, to assure a collection from the well-off Kulak levels, constituting approximately 10 per cent of the peasant establishments, of no less than 150 million puds of grain. This should be collected in the form of a loan from those stores of grain which reached in 1926-1927 the amount of 800 to 900 million puds, and were concentrated, for the most part, in the hands of these upper levels of the peasantry.

(3) It is necessary to carry out in reality a decisive policy of systematic and determined lowering

of wholesale and retail prices and narrowing of the disparity between them. And this must be done in such a way that the lowering of prices affects primarily objects of wide consumption among the workers and peasants. (It must be done without the adulteration of quality, low enough already, which is being practiced now.) This lowering of prices should not deprive the state industry of its necessary accumulations and should be carried out chiefly by way of an increase of the mass of goods, a lowering of the cost of production, a lessening of "incidental" expenses and a cutting down of the bureaucratic apparatus. A more elastic price-lowering policy, more adapted to the conditions of the market, and more individualized—that is, taking into greater consideration the market condition of each kind of goods—would retain in the hands of the state industry enormous sums which now nourish private capital and commercial parasitism in general.

(4) The régime of economy, which was supposed, according to last year's manifesto of Stalin and Rykov, to yield 300 to 400 million rubles a year, has given as a matter of fact completely insignificant results. A régime of economy is a question of class policy and can be realized only under direct pressure from the mass. The workers must dare to exercise this pressure. It is entirely possible to lower the non-productive expenses by 400 million rubles a year.

(5) A skillful use of such weapons as the

monopoly of foreign trade, foreign credit, concessions, contracts providing for technical aid, etc., will provide supplementary income. It will also greatly increase the expediency of our own expenditures, fertilizing with a new technique and accelerating the whole course of our development, and thus re-enforcing our real socialistic independence of the capitalist environment.

(6) The question of choosing the personnel—from top to bottom—and of the proper relations among them is, to some extent, a financial question. The worse the personnel, the more funds are needed. The bureaucratic régime opposes a good personnel and right relations within it.

(7) The “tail-endism” of our present economic leadership means in practice the loss of many tens of millions. That is the price we pay for lack of foresight, disharmony, picayune narrowness, and lagging.

(8) Tax receipts alone cannot cover the continually growing demand of our public economy. Credits must become a more and more important lever in the distribution of the public income, along the lines of socialist construction, which assumes, above all, a stable *valuta* and a healthy circulation of money.

(9) A firmer class policy in our economy, narrowing the limits of speculation and usury, would make it easier for the governmental and credit institutions

to mobilize private accumulations. It would make possible an incomparably broader financing of industry by way of long-term credits.

(10) The government sale of vodka was originally introduced as an experiment, and with the idea that the chief part of the income from it should go towards industrialization, primarily in the metal industry. In reality industrialization has only lost ground through the state sale of vodka. It is necessary to acknowledge that the experiment is completely unsuccessful. Under the Soviet structure, the state sale of vodka is a disadvantage, not only from the standpoint of private industry—as under czarism—but also and chiefly from the standpoint of the state industry. The multiplication of idle days, careless workmanship, defective products, broken machines, increased industrial accidents, fires, fights, injuries, etc.—these things mount up to hundreds of millions of rubles a year. The state industry loses on vodka no less than the budget receives from vodka, and many times more than the industry itself receives from the budget. The abolition of the state sale of vodka at the nearest possible date (two to three years) will automatically raise the material and spiritual resources of industrialization.

Such is the answer to the question, Where find the means? It is not true that the slow pace of industrialization is immediately due to the absence of

resources. The means are scanty, but they exist. What is wanted is the right policy.

The five-year plan of the State Planning Commission should be categorically rejected and condemned as basically incompatible with the task of "transforming the Russia of the NEP into a socialist Russia." We must carry out in deeds a redistribution of the tax-burden among the classes—loading the Kulak and the Nepman, relieving the workers and the poor.

We must lower the relative importance of the indirect taxes. We must abolish in the near future the state sale of vodka.

We must put in order the finances of the railroad transport service.

We must put in order the finances of the state industry.

We must restore to health the neglected forest industry, which can and should become the source of an immense income.

We must guarantee the unconditional stability of the money unit. The stabilization of the Chervonetz demands a lowering of prices on the one hand, and a budget without deficits on the other. The emission of paper currency to cover a budget deficit must not be permitted.

We must have a strictly purposeful budget, without deficits, harsh, intolerant of everything superfluous or accidental.

In the budget of 1927-1928 we must considerably increase the appropriation for defense (primarily for the war industries), for industry in general, for electrification, for transport, for house-building, for measures leading to the collectivization of agriculture.

We must give decisive resistance to all attempts to tamper with the monopoly of foreign trade.

We must adopt a firm course towards industrialization, electrification, and rationalization, based upon increasing technical power and improving material conditions of the mass.

CHAPTER V

THE SOVIETS

The bureaucratic apparatus of every bourgeois state, no matter what its form, elevates itself above the population, solidifying its rule by cultivating a mutual loyalty in the ruling-class and systematically propagating among the masses fear and subservience to the rulers. The October Revolution, replacing the old state machine by the workers', peasants', and soldiers' soviets, dealt the heaviest blow in history to the old idol of the bureaucratic state.

Our party program says upon this question:

“Waging the most bitter struggle with bureaucratism, the Russian Communist Party advocates for the complete conquering of this evil the following measures: (1) The obligatory introduction of every member of the Soviet into some definite work in the administration of the state. (2) A continual rotation of these tasks so that every member gradually takes part in all branches of the administration. (3) A gradual attraction of the entire laboring population, to the last man, into the work of state administration. A full and all-sided carrying out of these measures—which are a further step on the path first trod by the Paris Commune—a simplifica-

tion of the functions of administration, together with an elevation of the cultural level of the workers, will lead to the annihilation of the state power."

The question of Soviet bureaucratism is not only a question of red tape and swollen official staffs. At bottom it is a question of the class rôle played by the bureaucracy, of its social bonds and sympathies, of its power and privileged position, its relation to the Nepman and the unskilled worker, to the intelligentsia and the illiterate, to the wife of the Soviet "excellency" and the most ignorant peasant woman, etc., etc. On which side does the official stand? That is the fundamental question which is daily being tested in life's experience by millions of the workers.

On the eve of the October Revolution, Lenin, referring to the Marxian analysis of the Paris Commune, strongly emphasized the thought that "under socialism official people will cease to be bureaucrats, to be 'Chinovniks.' They will cease in so far as we introduce not only the elective principle, but also the recall, the principle of payment on the average wage-level of the worker, and also the replacement of parliamentary institutions by working institutions—that is, by institutions which give laws and carry them into effect."

In what direction is the apparatus of the Soviet state developing of late years? In the direction of simplification and lowering of costs? Proletarianization? Drawing near to the toilers of the city and the vil-

lage? Diminishing the gulf between the rulers and the ruled? How do things stand as to the introduction of greater *equality* in the conditions of life, in rights and obligations? Are we going forward in this sphere? It is quite obvious that you cannot give an affirmative answer to any single one of these questions. (It goes without saying, of course, that actual and full equality can be achieved only with the abolition of classes.)

In the epoch of the NEP, the task of equalization is hindered and delayed, but it is not annulled. For us the NEP is not a road to capitalism, but a road to socialism. Therefore the gradual attraction of the whole toiling population, to the last man, into the work of state administration, the systematic struggle for greater equality, remains under the NEP one of the most important tasks of the party. That struggle can be successful only on the basis of a growing industrialization of the country and an increase in the dominance of the proletariat in all branches of material and cultural construction. This struggle for greater equality does not exclude, in the transition period, a higher payment to qualified workers, an elevation of the material level of the work of specialists. It also does not exclude a better payment of teachers than in bourgeois countries, etc.

It is necessary to bear in mind that the army of officials has been growing in number these last years. It is consolidating itself, raising itself above the

general population, and interweaving itself with the wealthier elements of city and country. The "instructions" of 1925, which gave elective rights to innumerable exploiting elements, were only one very clear expression of the fact that the bureaucratic apparatus, to its very top, has become responsive to the importunities of the wealthy, accumulating, prosperous elements of the community. The annulment of these instructions—which were, as a matter of fact, in violation of the Soviet constitution—was a result of criticism from the Opposition. But the first election under the new instructions has already revealed, in a number of localities, an aspiration encouraged from above, to cut down as much as possible the circle of those well-off groups who are disfranchised. The center of the question, however, is not there. Under the continual relative growth of the new bourgeoisie and the Kulak, and their drawing together with the bureaucracy, under the false course of our leadership in general, the Kulak and the Nepman, even when deprived of elective rights, remain able to influence the administrative staff and the policy, at least of the lower Soviet organs, although remaining behind the scenes.

The penetration of the Soviets by the lower Kulak and "semi-Kulak" elements and the city bourgeoisie, which began in 1925 and was partially stopped by the attacks of the Opposition, is a very deep political process, to ignore which or disguise which would

threaten with very dire consequences the proletarian dictatorship.

The city Soviets, the fundamental instrument for introducing the workers and the toiling masses, to the last man, into the task of state administration, have been losing in these recent years all real significance. This is the expression of an indubitable change in the relation of class forces to the disadvantage of the proletariat. Resisting these phenomena by means of a mere administrative "revival" of the Soviets is unthinkable. They can be resisted only by a firm class policy—a decisive opposition to the new exploiters, an increased activity and weight of the proletariat in all the institutions and organs of the Soviet state without exception.

The "theory" of Molotov to the effect that we cannot demand a drawing together of the workers with the state and the state with the workers, because our state is already, in and of itself, a workers' state,¹ is the most malignant imaginable formula of bureaucratic perversion. Any criticism of this anti-Leninist "theory" of Molotov—a "theory" which enjoys the open or silent sympathy of broad circles of the Soviet officialdom—is characterized, under the present leadership, as a Social-Democratic deviation. But a harsh condemnation of this, and of all similar "theories," is an indispensable condition for any real

¹ *Pravda*, Dec. 13, 1925.

struggle against bureaucratic perversions. Such a struggle does not mean merely transforming a certain number of workers into officials. It means a drawing near to the workers and the poorer peasants of the whole state apparatus in all of its daily work.

The present official struggle against bureaucratism, not basing itself on the class activity of the workers, but trying to replace this with the efforts of the apparatus itself, is giving, and can give, no essential results. In many cases it even promotes and reënforces the existing bureaucratism.

In the inner life of the Soviets there is also to be observed of late years a series of entirely reactionary processes. The Soviets are having continually less and less to do with the decision of fundamental political, economic, and cultural questions. They are becoming mere supplements to the executive committees and the praesidia. The work of administration is becoming wholly concentrated in the hands of the latter. The discussion of problems at the full meeting of the Soviets is a mere show discussion. At the same time the period between elections to the Soviet organs is being lengthened, and the independence of the latter from the broad mass of the workers is increasing. All this greatly strengthens the influence of the official elements upon the decision of all questions.

The administration of enormous sections of the city economy often lies in the hands of one or two Communists, who select their own specialists and

their own staff, and often become completely dependent upon them. There is no proper training of the members of the Soviet. They are not drawn into the work from the bottom to the top. Hence a continual complaint as to the lack of skilled workers in the Soviet apparatus. Hence a still further giving over of power to the officialdom.

The elected leaders and administrators in important spheres of the Soviet work are removed at the first conflict with the president of the Soviet. They are removed still more quickly in case of conflict with the secretary of the provincial committee of the party. In consequence of this the elective principle is being reduced to nothing, and responsibility to the electors is losing all meaning.

It is necessary:

(1) To adopt a firm policy of struggle with officialism—to wage this struggle as Lenin would, to make it a real fight to check the exploitative aspirations of the new bourgeoisie and the Kulak, by way of a consistent development of workers' democracy in the party, the trade-unions, and the Soviets.

(2) To adopt the slogan of bringing the worker, the hired man, the poor and the middle peasant—against the Kulak—into close contact with the state, and unconditional servitude of the state apparatus to the essential interests of the toiling masses.

(3) As the basis for reviving the Soviets, to ele-

vate the class activity of the workers, farm-hands, and poor and middle peasants.

(4) To convert the city Soviets into real organs of proletarian power and instruments for introducing the broad mass of the workers into the task of administering the socialist enterprise—to realize, not in words, but in fact, the control of the city Soviets over the work of the provincial executive committees and the organs subject to these committees.

(5) To put a complete stop to the removal of elected Soviet officials, except in case of real and absolute necessity, in which cases the cause should be made clear to the electors.

(6) We must bring it about that the most backward unskilled worker and the most ignorant peasant woman are convinced by experience that in any state institution whatever they will find attention, counsel, and all possible support.

CHAPTER VI

THE NATIONAL QUESTION

The slowing up of the general tempo of socialist development; the growth of the new bourgeoisie in city and country; the strengthening of the bourgeois intelligentsia; the increase of bureaucratism in the state organs; the bad régime in the party; and bound up with all this the growth of a Great-Power chauvinism and a spirit of nationalism in general—all this finds its most morbid expression in the problem of nationalities and of the autonomous republics within the Soviet Union. The difficulties are redoubled by the existence in some of these republics of the remains of a pre-capitalist culture.

Under the New Economic Policy, the rôle of private capital increases with special rapidity in the industrially backward frontiers. Here economic organs often stake their play entirely upon the private capitalist. They fix prices without considering the real situation of the poor and middle-peasant mass. They lower artificially the wages of farm-hands. They extend immoderately the system of private bureaucratic mediation between the industries and the peasants who supply raw material. They guide the coöperatives in the direction of greater service

to the richer layers in the villages. They neglect the interests of that especially backward group, the cattle-breeders and semi-cattle-breeders. The essential problem—to carry out a plan of industrial construction, especially a plan of industrialization in the working over of agricultural raw materials—is kept completely in the background.

Bureaucratism, sustained by the spirit of Great-Power chauvinism, has succeeded in transforming the Soviet centralization into a source of quarrels as to the partition of official positions among the nationalities (the Southern Caucasus Federation). It has spoiled the relation between the center and the frontiers. It has reduced to nothing, as a matter of actual fact, the significance of the Soviet of nationalities. It has carried bureaucratic guardianship over the autonomous republics to the point of depriving the latter of the right to settle land disputes between the local and the Russian population. To the present day this Great-Power chauvinism, especially as it expresses itself through the state apparatus, remains the chief enemy of the drawing together and consolidation of the workers of different nationalities.

A real support to the poor, a drawing together of the general mass of the middle peasants with the poor and the hired hands, an organization of the latter into an independent class force—all this is of special importance in the national territories and

republics. Without a real organization of the farm laborers, without the creation of coöperatives and the organization of the poor, we run the risk of leaving our backward eastern regions in their traditional condition of slavery, and our party locals in these regions deprived entirely of genuinely lower class members.

The task of Communists, in the more backward or just-awakening nationalities, should be to direct the process of national awakening in Soviet-socialist channels. We should attract the laboring mass into the economic and cultural work of construction, particularly by promoting the development of the local language and schools, and the "nationalization" of the Soviet apparatus.

In regions where there is a friction with other nationalities or national minorities, nationalism, accompanying the growth of the bourgeois elements, often becomes clearly aggressive. In these circumstances "nationalization" of the local apparatus takes place at the expense of the national minorities. Boundary questions become a source of national rancor. The atmosphere of the party, Soviet, and trade-union work is poisoned with nationalism.

Ukrainization, Turkification, etc., can proceed properly only after the extinction of bureaucratic and Great-Power habits in the institutions and organs of the Union. It can proceed properly only if the dominant rôle of the proletariat is preserved in

the national republic, only if we support ourselves on the lower classes and carry on a continual and irreconcilable struggle with the Kulak and chauvinist elements.

These questions are especially important in such industrial centers as the Don Basin or Baku, whose proletarian population is in the broad mass of a different nationality from that of the surrounding country. In these cases a correct cultural and political relation between town and country demands: (1) an especially attentive and genuinely fraternal attitude of the cities toward the material and spiritual demands of the alien country; (2) a determined resistance to every bourgeois attempt to drive a wedge between the city and the country—whether by cultivating a bureaucratic arrogance toward the rural districts, or a reactionary Kulak hatred of the town.

Our bureaucratic régime hands over the actual enactment of its superficial show of “nationalization” into the hands of officials, specialists, and petty-bourgeois teachers, who are bound up by innumerable social and cultural bonds with the upper levels of the city and the country. They accommodate their policies to the interests of these upper levels. This repels the local poor from the party and the Soviet power and throws them into the arms of the commercial bourgeoisie, the usurers, the reactionary priests, and feudal-patriarchal elements. At the same

time our bureaucratic régime kicks into the back yard the genuinely Communist elements of the nationality, denouncing them often as "deviators," persecuting them in every possible manner. This happened, for example, to an important group of old Georgian Bolsheviks, who incurred the displeasure of the Stalin group, and were hotly defended by Lenin in the last period of his life.

That elevation of the working masses of the national republics and territories made possible by the October Revolution, is the reason why these masses aspire to an immediate and independent participation in the practical constructive life. Our bureaucratic régime is attempting to paralyze this aspiration by frightening the masses with the cry of local nationalism.

The Twelfth Congress of our party recognized the necessity of a struggle against "the relics of Great-Power chauvinism," against "the economic and cultural inequality of the nationalities within the Soviet Union," against "the relics of nationalism in a whole series of peoples who have endured the heavy yoke of Russian oppression." The fourth conference of the party (1923), with the responsible officials of the national republics and territories, declared that "one of the root problems of the party is the nurture and development of Communist organizations among the proletarian and semi-proletarian elements of the local population in the national republics and terri-

tories." The conference unanimously declared that Communists who go from the center to the backward republics and territories ought to play the rôle "not of pedagogues and nurses, but of helpers."¹ During recent years the whole thing has developed in exactly the opposite direction. The heads of the national party apparatus, appointed by the Secretariat of the Central Committee, take upon themselves the actual decision of all party and Soviet questions. They crowd out the active workers of the nationalities as a kind of second-rate Communists whom one introduces into the business merely to fulfill a formal "representative function" (Crimea, Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, Tartaria, the mountain provinces of Northern Caucasus, etc.). An artificial division from above of all local party workers into "right" and "left" is carried out as a system in order that the secretary named by the central organ can arbitrarily command both groups.

In the sphere of our national policy, just as in other spheres, it is necessary to return to the Leninist position:

(1) To carry out an incomparably more systematic, more principled, more insistent, effort to overcome nationalistic divisions among the workers of different nationality—especially by an attitude of consideration to the newly arrived "national" workers, increasing their skill, and bettering their

¹ Lenin.

living and cultural conditions; to firmly remember that the real lever for introducing the backward national districts into the Soviet work of construction is the creation and development of proletarian nuclei in the local population.

(2) To reconsider the five-year economic plan with a view to increasing the tempo of industrialization in the backward frontiers, and to construct a fifteen-year plan which shall take into consideration the interests of the national republics and territories; to adapt our purchasing policy to the development of special cultures among the poor and middle proprietors (cotton in Central Asia, tobacco in the Crimea, Abkhazia, etc.). The coöperative credit policy and also the policy of amelioration (in Central Asia, Southern Caucasus, etc.) ought to be carried out on strictly class lines and in relation with the fundamental problems of Socialist construction; to give greater attention to the development of cattle-raising coöperatives, to carry out industrialization in the working over of agricultural raw materials in a manner adapted to local conditions. To revise our colonization policy in strict correspondence with the interests of a correct policy on the national question.

(3) To carry out conscientiously the policy of nationalization of the Soviet, and also the party, trade-union and coöperative, apparatus, with genuine consideration of class and inter-nationality relations; to wage a real struggle against the attitude of

colonizers in the activities of the state, coöperative, and other organs; to abolish all bureaucratic mediation between the center and the frontiers; to study the experience of the Southern Caucasian Federation from the standpoint of its promoting or failing to promote the industrial and cultural development of those nationalities.

(4) Systematically to remove every obstacle to the fullest possible union and consolidation of the workers of the different nationalities in the Soviet Union, on the basis of Socialist construction and international revolution; to wage a decisive struggle with the mechanical imposition upon the workers and peasants of other nationalities of the predominant national language. In this matter the laboring masses should have full freedom of choice. The real rights of every national minority within the provinces of every national republic must be guaranteed. In all this work special attention must be given to those exceptional conditions arising between formerly oppressed nationalities and nationalities who were formerly their oppressors.

(5) A consistent carrying out of inner-party democracy in all the national republics and territories; an absolute repudiation of the attitude of command toward non-Russians, of appointment and transfer from above; a repudiation of the policy of compulsory division of the non-Russian Communists into right and left; a most attentive promotion and

instruction of the lower proletarian, semi-proletarian, agricultural proletarian, and (anti-Kulak) peasant party-members.

(6) A repudiation of the Ustrialov tendency, and of all kinds of Great-Power tendencies—especially in the central commissariats and in the state apparatus in general. An educational struggle against local nationalism upon the basis of a clear and consistent class policy on the national question.

(7) Transformation of the nationality-Soviets into actually functioning organs bound up with the life of the national republics and territories, and really capable of defending their interests.

(8) Adequate attention to the national problem in the work of the trade-unions and to the problem of forming national proletarian units. Business in these unions to be transacted in the local tongue, and the interests of all nationalities and national minorities protected.

(9) No franchise under any circumstances for exploiting elements.

(10) The fifth nationality conference to be called on a basis of real representation of the "lower" classes.

(11) Publication in the press of Lenin's letter on the national question, which contains a criticism of Stalin's course upon this question.

CHAPTER VII

THE PARTY

No party in the history of the world ever won such a gigantic victory as our party, which has stood now for ten years at the head of a proletariat and realized its dictatorship. The Russian Communist party is the fundamental instrument of the proletarian revolution. The Russian Communist party is the leading party of the Comintern. No other party ever bore such an international historic responsibility as ours. But exactly for this reason, and because of the power it wields, our party ought fearlessly to criticize its own mistakes. It ought to uncover its own darker sides and clearly visualize the danger of an actual degeneration, in order to take timely measures to prevent it. It was always so in the time of Lenin, who was forever warning us against the danger of our degeneration into a "party of prigs."¹ In giving the following picture of the present condition of our party, with all its darker sides, we, the Opposition, express the firm hope that with a true Leninist policy the party can conquer its weaknesses and rise to the height of its historical task.

(1) The social composition of our party has con-

¹ Lenin, Vol. XVII, p. 112.

tinually deteriorated during recent years. On Jan. 1, 1927, we had in the party in round numbers:

| | |
|---|---------|
| Workers actually occupied in industry and | |
| transport | 430,000 |
| Farm and agricultural workers | 15,700 |
| Peasants (more than half of them now | |
| government officials) | 303,000 |
| Officials (half of whom were formerly | |
| workers) | 462,000 |

Thus on January 1, our party had only one-third workers from the shops (in fact, only 31 per cent), and two-thirds peasants, officials, former workers, and "miscellaneous."

In the last year and a half our party has lost about 100,000 workers from the shops. The "automatic" withdrawals from the party for 1926 amounted to 25,000 rank-and-file Communists, among whom 76.5 per cent were workers in the shops.² The recent so-called "sifting" process which accompanied the new registration of party members, resulted, according to the official data (which indubitably minimize the facts), in the removal from the party of about 80,000 members, the immense majority of them industrial workers. "In relative figures the registration embraced 93.5 per cent of the party membership at the beginning of the present year."³ Thus by the

² *Izvestia*, Nos. 24, 25.

³ *Idem*.

simple process of a new registration, there were "sifted out" 6.5 per cent of the whole party membership (amounting to about 80,000 members). Among those "sifted out," about 50 per cent were skilled, and more than a third semi-skilled, workers. The attempt of the apparatus of the Central Committee to minimize these already sufficiently minimized data was obviously unsuccessful. To counterbalance our "Leninist drive" we have a Stalinist "sifting."

On the other hand, 100,000 peasants have been admitted to the party since the Fourteenth Congress, the majority of them middle peasants. The percentage of farm laborers is wholly insignificant.

(2) The social composition of the directing organs of the party has deteriorated still more. In the Uyesd (small district) committees, 29.5 per cent are peasants (in origin); 24.4 per cent are clerical workers, etc.; 81.8 per cent of the members of these committees are employees in the state institutions. The number of workers from the shops in the staffs of these governing organs of the party is next to nothing. In the Oblast and Gubernia committees, it is 13.2 per cent; in the Uyesd committees, from 9.8 per cent to 16.1 per cent.⁴

In the party itself about one-third of the members are workers in industry, and in those organs of the party which make decisions, only one-tenth are workers in industry. This constitutes a grave

⁴ See the *Statistical Review*, June 10, 1927.

danger to the party. The trade-unions have traveled the same road.⁵ This shows what an enormous slice of the power the "administrators," coming from petty-bourgeois circles, have taken away from us—and also the "labor bureaucrats." This is the surest road to the "deproletarization" of the party.

(3) The rôle of the "ex-es" (Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks) in the party apparatus and the governing posts in general has increased. At the time of the Fourteenth Congress, 38 per cent of those occupying responsible and directing positions in our press were persons who had come to us from other parties.⁶ At present the situation is still worse. The actual direction of the Bolshevik press of the party is either in the hands of the revisionist school of the "young" (Sliepkov, Stietzky, Marietzky and others) or of former members of other parties. About one-fourth of those at the head of our party administration are former Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

(4) Bureaucratism is growing in all spheres, but its growth is especially ruinous in the party. Today's party bureaucrat looks at things in the following manner:

"We have members of the party who still inadequately understand the party itself, just what it is. They think that the party arises from the local—the

⁵ See the chapter on the condition of the workers in the trade-unions.

⁶ Report of the Fourteenth Congress, p. 83.

local is the first brick, then comes the Rayon committee, and so on, higher and higher, until you arrive at the Central Committee. That is not right (!!!). Our party must be looked at from the top down. And this view must be adhered to in all practical relationships and in the entire work of the party.”⁷

The definitions of inner-party democracy given us by more responsible comrades, such as Uglanov, Molotov, Kaganovich, etc.,⁸ come essentially to the same thing.

This “new” conception is dangerous in the extreme. If we really acknowledged that our party “must be looked at from the top down,” that would mean that a Leninist party, a party of the mass of the workers, no longer exists.

(5) The last few years have seen a systematic abolition of inner-party democracy—in violation of the whole tradition of the Bolshevik party, in violation of the direct decisions of a series of party congresses. The genuine election of officials is in actual practice dying out. The organizational principles of Bolshevism are being perverted at every step. The party constitution is being systematically changed, to increase the volume of rights at the top, and diminish the rights of the nuclei at the bottom. The elective terms of the Uyesd, Rayon and Gubernia

⁷ Speech of the Second Secretary of the Northern District Committee of the Russian Communist party, reprinted in *Molot*, May 27, 1927.

⁸ See *Pravda*, June 4, 1926.

committees have been increased by the Central Committee to a year, to two years, and more.

The heads of the Gubernia committees, the Gubernia executive committees, the Gubernia trade-union councils, etc., are, in actual fact, unremovable (for periods from three to five years and longer). The right of each member of the party, of each group of party members, to "appeal its radical differences to the court of the whole party,"⁹ is in actual fact annulled. The congresses and conferences are called without a preliminary free discussion (such as was always held under Lenin) of all questions by the whole party. The demand for such a discussion is treated as a violation of party discipline. The saying of Lenin is completely forgotten that "the Bolshevik 'staff' must be genuinely supported by the honest and conscious will of the army, which follows its staff, but at the same time *directs* its staff."¹⁰

Within the party there is taking place—as a natural accompaniment of the general course—an extremely significant process of pushing out the old party men, who lived through the underground period, or at least through the civil war, and are independent and capable of defending their views. They are being replaced by new elements, distinguished chiefly by their unquestioning obedience.

⁹ Lenin.

¹⁰ Vol. IV, p. 318.

This obedience, cultivated from above under the name of revolutionary discipline, has really nothing whatever to do with revolutionary discipline. Not infrequently new Communists, selected from the number of those workers who were always distinguished by their subservience to the old pre-revolutionary authorities, are now advanced into dominant positions in the working-class locals and in the administration. They curry favor by a demonstrative and sharply hostile attitude to the old worker members, the leaders of the working-class in the hardest moments of its revolution.

The same phenomenon appears in a far uglier form in the state apparatus, where one often meets the perfected figure of the "party" Soviet chinovnik. On solemn occasions he swears by October; he distinguishes himself by a complete indifference to his task; he lives with all his roots in a bourgeois milieu, abuses the boss in private life, and in party meetings "gives it" to the Opposition.

The real rights of one member of the party at the top (above all of the secretary) are many times greater than the real rights of a hundred members at the bottom. This growing replacement of the party by its own apparatus is promoted by a "theory" of Stalin which denies the Leninist principle, inviolable for every Bolshevik, that the dictatorship of the proletariat will and can be realized only through the dictatorship of the party.

The dying out of inner-party democracy leads to a dying out of workers' democracy in general—in the trade-unions, and in all other non-party mass organizations.

Inner-party disagreements are distorted. A vicious polemic is carried on for months and years at a time against the views of Bolsheviks who are denounced as "the Opposition." And these Bolsheviks are not permitted to expound their real views on the pages of the party press. Yesterday's Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, Cadets, Bundists, Zionists, attack and denounce on the pages of *Pravda* documents which have been introduced into the Central Committee by its members. They catch up and distort separate phrases out of these documents. But the documents themselves are never printed. Party locals are compelled to vote "denunciations" of documents totally unknown to them.

The party is compelled to judge our disagreements on the basis of official "interpretations" and cribs, often illiterate as well as false, and nauseating to everybody. The saying of Lenin, "Whoever believes things on a mere say-so is a hopeless idiot," has been replaced by a new formula: "Who does not believe the official say-so, is an Oppositionist." Workers in the industries who incline toward the Opposition are compelled to pay for their opinions with unemployment. The rank-and-file member of the party cannot speak his opinion aloud. Old party workers are de-

prived of the right to express themselves either in the press or at meetings.

Bolsheviks defending the ideas of Lenin are slanderously accused of desiring to create "two parties." This accusation was deliberately invented in order to array against the Opposition the workers, who naturally defend with passion the unity of their party. Every word of criticism against the crude Menshevik mistakes of Stalin (on the problems of the Chinese revolution, the Anglo-Russian committee, etc.) is described as a "struggle against the party." This, although Stalin has never asked the party any preliminary question, either about the policy in China or about any other important problem. This accusation that the Opposition desires to create "two parties" is repeated every day by those whose own purpose is to crowd out of the party the Bolshevik-Leninist members, so that they may have a free hand in carrying out their opportunist policy.

(6) Almost the entire educational work of the party and the entire enterprise of elementary political culture are now reduced to a course in Opposition-baiting. The method of persuasion is not only almost totally displaced by the method of compulsion, but it is also supplemented by the method of deceiving the party. Party education being reduced to mere official propaganda, the general tendency is to evade it. Attendance at meetings, party schools and circles, dedicated as they are to Opposition-

baiting, has fallen off immoderately. The party is employing passive resistance against the present wrong course of its apparatus.

(7) Not only are careerism, bureaucratism, and inequality growing in the party in recent years, but muddy streams from alien and class-hostile sources are flowing into it—for example, anti-Semitism. The mere self-preservation of the party demands a merciless struggle against such defilement.

(8) In spite of these facts, the repressive measures are directed exclusively to the left. It has become entirely customary to expel Oppositionists for speaking at the meetings of their locals, for making sharp exclamations, for attempting to read the Testament of Lenin. In their grade of political understanding and, what is more important, in their devotion to the cause of the party, the expelled frequently stand higher than the expelling. Finding themselves outside the party—for the crime of “distrust” and “pessimism” in regard to Chiang Kai-Shek, Purcell, or their own bureaucrats—these comrades continue to live the life of the party. They serve it far more truly than many of the careerists and Philistines who continue in its membership.

(9) The present hail of repressions and threats, greatly increasing with the approach of the Fifteenth Congress, is designed to frighten the party still more. It testifies to the fact that the united faction of Stalin and Rykov, in order to cover up

its political mistakes, must have recourse to extreme measures. It places the party at every congress and conference before a *fait accompli*.

(10) The political course of the Central Committee (which was laid down at the Fourteenth Congress upon the principle of solidarity with Stalin) is erroneous. Although wavering, the present nucleus of the Central Committee moves continually to the right. The abolition of inner-party democracy is an inevitable result of the fact that the political course is radically wrong. In so far as it reflects the pressure of petty-bourgeois elements, the influence of the non-proletarian layers which envelop our party, it must inevitably be carried through by force from above.

In the theoretical sphere the so-called "School of the Young" has a monopoly. This is a school of revisionists, who are ready at any moment to carry out the literary orders of the apparatus. The best elements of the Bolshevik youth, penetrated with the genuine traditions of the Bolshevik party, are not only crowded out, but actually persecuted.

In the organizational sphere the actual subjection of the Politburo to the Secretariat, and the Secretariat to the General Secretary, is long ago an accomplished fact. The worst fear expressed by Lenin in his Testament—the fear that Stalin would not be sufficiently loyal, would not employ the "immoderate power" which he had "concentrated in his

hands" in a party manner—has been justified.¹¹

At the present time there are three fundamental tendencies in the Central Committee and in the governing organs of the party in general.

The first tendency is a frank and open drift to the right. This tendency, in turn, is composed of two groups. One of them, in its opportunism and pliability, expresses to a considerable degree the "economically powerful" middle peasant. It steers its course by him and is inspired by his ideals. This is the group of Comrades Rykov, A. P. Smirnov, Kalinin, G. Petrovsky, Chubar, Kaminsky, and others. Around them and in their immediate vicinity are working the "non-party" politicians, the Kondratievs, Sadyrins, Chaianovs, and other representatives of the wealthy peasantry, more or less openly preaching the doctrines of Ustrialov. In every Gubernia, and often in every Uyesd, are to be found the little Kondratievs and Sadyrins, enjoying their bit of real power and influence. The other group in this first general tendency is composed of trade-union leaders who represent the better-paid class of workers and clerks. This group is particularly characterized by a desire for closer association with the Amsterdam International. Its leaders are Comrades Tomsky, Melnichansky, Dogadov, and others. Between these two groups there is a certain amount of friction, but they are at one in the desire to swerve

¹¹ Lenin's letters of Dec. 25, 1922, and Jan. 4, 1923.

the course of the party and the Soviet state to the right, in both international and domestic policies. They are both distinguished by their contempt for the theories of Leninism and their inclination to renounce the tactics of the world revolution.

The second tendency is the "centrism" of the official apparatus. The leaders of this tendency are Comrades Stalin, Molotov, Uglanov, Kaganovich, Mikoian, Kirov. It is, in actuality, the present Politburo. Bukharin, wavering between one side and the other, "generalizes" the policies of this group. In itself this centrist-official group least of all expresses the attitude of any broad mass, but it is trying—not without success—to insert itself into the place of the party. The caste of "administrators"—in the party, the trade-unions, the industrial organs, the coöperatives, the state apparatus—now numbers tens of thousands of people. Among these there is no small number of "worker" bureaucrats—former workers, that is, who have lost all connection with the toiling mass.

It is needless to add that in the organs of administration and leadership, so enormously important to the fate of the revolution, there are to be found many thousands of stoical revolutionists, workers who have not broken their bonds with the mass, but are giving themselves heart and soul to the workers' cause. They are doing the real labor of Communism in these institutions.

This does not alter the fact that the degeneration of our political course and our party régime is giving birth to an innumerable caste of genuine bureaucrats.

The actual power of this caste is enormous. It is just this group of "administrators" who insist upon "tranquillity," upon "tending to business"—and above all "no discussion." It is just this group who complacently announce (and even sometimes sincerely believe) that we have already "almost reached socialism," that "nine-tenths of the program" of the socialist revolution is already fulfilled. It is this group who "look from the top down" upon the whole party, and still more from the top down upon the unskilled workers, the unemployed, the hired farmhands. This group sees the principal enemy on the left—that is, among the revolutionary Leninists. This group gives the slogan, "Fire to the left."

For the time being these two tendencies, the right and the "center," are consolidated by their common hostility to the Opposition. To cut off the Opposition would inevitably accelerate the conflict between them.

The third tendency is the so-called Opposition. It is the Leninist wing of the party. The pitiful attempts to pretend that it is an Opposition from the right (a "Social-Democratic deviation," etc.) arise from the desire of the ruling group to hide their own opportunism. The Opposition is for the unity of the party. Stalin propagates his own program—to "cut

off" the Opposition—under the false flag of a pretense that the Opposition wants to create a "second" party. The Opposition answers with its slogan: "Unity of the Leninist Russian Communist Party at all costs." The platform of the Opposition is expounded in the present document. The working-class sections of the party and all genuine Leninist Bolsheviks will be for it.

Personal desertions from the Opposition are unavoidable in the hard circumstances under which it is compelled to struggle for the cause of Lenin. Separate personal regroupings among the leaders of all these three tendencies will occur, but they will not alter the foundation facts of the matter.

(11) All the above facts taken together constitute a party crisis. The inner-party disagreements have deepened continually since the death of Lenin, involving a continually increasing circle of more and more fundamental problems.

The fundamental mood of the party mass is a desire for unity. The present régime prevents the party from understanding the direction from which a danger threatens its unity. The mechanics of Stalin are all designed to place the party membership, upon every sharp or important question that arises, before one single choice: either renounce your own opinion or fall under the accusation of desiring a split.

Our task is to preserve the unity of the party at

all costs, to resist decisively the policy of splits, amputations, exclusions, expulsions, etc.—but at the same time to guarantee to the party its right to a free discussion and decision, within the frame of this unity, of all debated questions.

In exposing the mistakes and abnormalities of the present situation in the party, the Opposition is deeply convinced that the fundamental mass of the working-class section of the party will prove able in spite of everything to bring the party back to the Leninist road. To help in that process, is the fundamental task of the Opposition.

PRACTICAL PROPOSALS

It is necessary:

(1) To prepare for the Fifteenth Congress upon a basis of real inner-party democracy, as we did in Lenin's time. "Every member of the party," wrote Lenin, "should begin to study dispassionately and with the utmost honesty; first, the essence of the disagreements, and second, the course of development of the conflict. . . . It is necessary to study both the one thing and the other, unconditionally demanding that absolutely accurate documents should be printed and open to verification on all sides."¹² The Central Committee should make it possible for every member of the party to study both the essence

¹² Lenin, Vol. XVIII, p. 29.

of the present inner-party disagreements, and the course of development of the present struggle. It should do this by publishing, in the press and in special collections and pamphlets, all the documents which it has up to this time hidden from the party.

Every comrade and every group of comrades ought to have an opportunity to defend his point of view before the party in the press, at meetings, etc. Outlines of the theses (the platform) of the Central Committee, of local organizations, of individual members of the party and groups of members, ought to be published in *Pravda* (or in supplements to *Pravda*) and also in the local party papers, at least two months before the Fifteenth Congress.

The debate ought to be carried on in a businesslike and strictly comradely manner, without personalities and exaggerations. The chief slogan for the whole preparation of the Fifteenth Congress, ought to be unity—not a pretended, but a genuine Leninist unity of the Russian Communist party and the whole Communist International.

(2) It is necessary to adopt immediately a series of measures for the improvement of the social composition of the party and of its governing organs. To that end we must reaffirm the decision of the Thirteenth Congress, that “an immense majority of the party members in the near future ought to consist of workers directly employed in industry.” In the next two or three years we ought to receive into

the party, as a general rule, only and exclusively working men and women from the shops and hired men and women working on the farms. From other social groups we should accept members only upon a basis of strict personal selection: the Red soldiers and sailors only if they are of working-class, or rural proletarian, or poor peasant origin; the poor and weak peasants, only after they have been tested in social-political work for a minimum of two years. The reception of members who come to us from other parties must be stopped.

We must carry out the decision of the Thirteenth Congress—actually annulled by the Fourteenth Congress (against the will of the Opposition)—to the effect that in the staff of the Rayon committees, the Gubernia committees, etc., there should be no less than 50 per cent of workers from the shops. In the industrial centers we must have a firm majority of workers from the shops (no less than three-fourths of the whole staff). In the Uyesd committees, a similar majority of workers, hired men, and poor peasants.

(3) To affirm and carry out in real life the resolution on inner-party democracy adopted by the tenth party congress, reaffirmed by the Central Committee and the Central Control Committee, Dec. 5, 1923, and by the Twelfth and Thirteenth Congresses of the party.

We must assert in the name of the whole party that—contrary to the new anti-Leninist definitions

of inner-party democracy devised and circulated by Uglanov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Zhivov, and others—"Workers' Democracy means freedom of open judgment by all party members of the important questions of party life, free discussion upon them, and also election of the responsible governing personnel and of the collegiums from top to bottom."¹³ We must take punitive measures against every one who violates in practice this fundamental right of every member of the party.

As a rule, the point of view of the party minority upon any question of principle ought to be brought to the attention of all the members through the party papers, etc. Exceptions should be permitted only when the matters under discussion are secret. It goes without saying that after the adoption of a decision it is to be carried out with iron Bolshevik discipline. The network of party discussion clubs should be broadened, and a real criticism of the mistakes of the party leadership made possible in the party organs (by discussion leaflets, printed collections, etc.).

All those changes for the worse that have been introduced into the party constitution since the Fourteenth Congress (pp. 25, 33, 37, 42, 50, etc.) must be annulled.

(4) We must adopt a firm course toward proletarianization of the party apparatus as a whole.

¹³ Thirteenth Congress.

Workers from the shops, advanced party Communists, popular with the party and non-party mass, should constitute a decisive majority of the whole party apparatus. The apparatus should by no means consist entirely of a paid personnel, and it should be regularly renewed from the workers. The budget of the local organizations (not omitting the organizations of the Oblasts and Gubernias) should consist fundamentally of membership dues. The local organizations should render an account of their income and expenses regularly, and in actual fact, to the mass membership of the party. The present swollen budget of the party ought to be cut down vigorously, as also the salaries paid to the apparatus. A considerable part of the party work ought to be carried on gratis by members of the party giving time outside their industrial or other work. One measure toward reviving the party apparatus should be the systematic sending down of a part of the comrades from the apparatus into the industries and other lower-class work. We must struggle against the tendency of secretaries to make themselves unremovable. We must establish definite terms for the occupation of secretarial and other responsible posts. We must struggle ruthlessly against the actual corruption and decay of the uppermost groups, against patronage, "cabinet solidarity," etc. (examples: Syzran, Kherson, Irkutsk, Chita, etc.).

(5) As early as the Tenth Congress, under the

leadership of Lenin, there was adopted a series of resolutions emphasizing the necessity of greater equality within the party and within the toiling masses. As early as the Twelfth Congress the party noticed the danger, under the NEP, of a degeneration of that part of the party workers whose activities bring them in contact with the bourgeoisie. It is necessary "to work out completely adequate practical measures to destroy inequality (in the conditions of life, in wages, etc.) between the specialists and the responsible workers upon the one hand, and the toiling masses on the other, in so far as this inequality destroys democracy and is a source of corruption to the party and lowering of the authority of Communists."¹⁴ In view of the fact that inequality has grown at an extraordinarily swift pace in recent years, we must bring up this question again and solve it as revolutionists.

(6) It is necessary to reorganize the party education along the line of a study of the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, driving out of circulation the false imitations of Marxism and Leninism now being manufactured on a large scale.

(7) It is necessary to restore immediately to party membership the excluded Oppositionists.

(8) It is necessary to reconstruct the Central Control Committee in the real spirit of Lenin's ad-

¹⁴ Resolution of the Tenth Party Conference. p. 18.

vice. Members of the Central Control Committee must be:

- (a) Closely associated with the masses.
- (b) Independent of the apparatus.
- (c) Possessed of authority in the party.

Only thus can a real confidence be restored to the Central Control Committee and its authority be raised to the necessary height.

(9) In selecting the staff of the Central Committee and the Central Control Committee and their organs, we must be guided by the advice of Lenin, as given in his letters of Dec. 25 and 26, 1922, and Jan. 4, 1923 (the Testament). These letters ought to be published for the information of all members of the party. "Of the workers who are members of the Central Committee, the greater part should be workers standing lower in the social scale than that layer who have advanced during the last five years into Soviet positions"—so wrote Lenin in his letter of Dec. 26, 1922—"and they should be associated more closely with the rank-and-file workers and peasants, who, however, do not fall, either directly or indirectly, into the class of exploiters. . . . Workers entering into the Central Committee ought not, in my opinion, to be predominantly those who have had a long period of Soviet employment . . . because these workers have already acquired certain traditions and certain prejudices which are just the ones we want to struggle against."

Those letters were written by Lenin in the period when he gave the party his last and most carefully weighed advice upon the fundamental questions of the revolution.¹⁵

The Fifteenth Congress of our party ought to select its Central Committee from the exact point of view of the above-quoted advice of Lenin.

¹⁵ *Better Less but Better, How to Reorganize the Rabkrin, About Coöperation.*

CHAPTER VIII

THE LEAGUE OF COMMUNIST YOUTH

The wrong political course and the organizational repression is carried over with its full force, and often indeed with increased force, into the League of Communist Youth. The international education of the young workers is being more and more pushed into the background. All critical thinking is being suppressed and persecuted. For positions of leadership in the Communist youth organization, the party apparatus demands first of all "obedience," and readiness to bait the opposition. The proletarian part of the lower organizations, the fundamentally healthy part, is deprived of all individuality by this régime. Here, even more than in the party, the mistaken policy pursued at the top opens the road for petty-bourgeois influences.

Of late years the League of Communist Youth has grown rapidly in membership, but at the cost of a deterioration in its social composition. From the time of the Thirteenth Congress of the party, the proletarian nucleus within this organization has fallen from 40.1 per cent to 34.4 per cent, and the number of young workers employed in the industries from 49.8

per cent to 47 per cent. The political activity of the young workers is also diminishing.

In these circumstances it was an exceedingly crude mistake, capable only of widening the separation between the League and the mass of working-class youth, to adopt that series of recent decisions which lowered still further, and in violation of the resolutions of the Fourteenth Congress, the situation of the young worker (cutting down of the regulations protecting apprentices, of the special wage-scale for apprentices, restriction of the number of apprentices in industrial schools—and here also belongs the attempt to introduce unpaid apprenticeship).

The League of Communist Youth in the country is more and more losing its proletarian and poor peasant support. Its cultural economic work in the country is pushing principally along the line of developing individual undertakings. The relative weight of the poor is systematically falling everywhere—in the general composition of the rural locals, in the active staff, in the nucleus composed of party members. Along with the continual diminishing of the influx of young city workers, the League is filling up in the country with middle and well-off peasant youth.

As in the city, so also in the country the tendency of the petty-bourgeois elements to get hold of the leadership of the League, is growing. The group of clerical workers and “miscellaneous” is playing a

more and more considerable rôle, especially in the rural organizations.

Thirty-six per cent of all our new party members come from the ranks of the League of Communist Youth.¹ However, within the party nucleus of the League from one-fourth to one-third are non-proletarian. In the party nuclei of the rural organizations, the middle peasants are rapidly gaining at the expense of the farm-hands and the poor peasants. (Twenty per cent were middle peasants in 1925, 32.5 per cent in 1927.) Thus the League of Communist Youth is being transformed into one of the sources for the dilution of the party with petty-bourgeois elements. In order to prevent the further weakening of the dominant rôle of the proletarian nucleus and its relegation to the background by newcomers from the intelligentsia, clerical workers, and well-off layers in the country, inevitably entailing a petty-bourgeois degeneration of the League, the following measures are necessary:

(1) To put an immediate stop to the gradual annulment of our revolutionary conquests in the sphere of the labor and education of the young proletarian—to revoke all those recent measures which lower the conditions of his work. That is one of the principal premises for the struggle against morbid tendencies in the League of Communist Youth (drunkenness, hooliganism, etc.).

¹ *Pravda*, July 14, 1927.

(2) In proportion to the growth of the general well-being of the working-class, to elevate, systematically and resolutely, the material and cultural level of the young workers by means of higher wages, broadening of the network of industrial schools and trade courses, etc.

(3) To carry out the decision of previous party and Communist Youth congresses, as to the enrollment in the League of 100 per cent of young city workers and rural proletarians in the course of the next few years.

(4) To intensify the work of attracting into the League the poor peasant youth.

(5) To attract into the League the weak middle peasants, and from the rest of the middle peasants only those who have been tested in social work, and especially in the work of struggling against the Kulak.

(6) To increase the League's defense of the interests of the poor, directing its work toward the creation of a new rural society, not along the path of individual enrichment, but along the path of co-operation and the collectivization of agriculture.

(7) To improve the social composition of the party nucleus, permitting recruitments during the next two years only from workers, farm-hands, and poor peasants.

(8) To make the governing staff of the organs of the Communist youth proletarian, systematically

and resolutely advancing the farm-hands and the poor into positions of leadership. To ordain that in the great proletarian centers, the Gubernia committees and Rayon committees of the League, and the bureaus of these committees, should consist in an overwhelming majority of workers in the shops, and that the latter should be really drawn into the task of leadership.

(9) To wage a serious struggle against bureaucratism in the League. To cut down decisively the paid officialdom, reducing it to the unconditionally necessary minimum. To accomplish at least a half, and in industrial centers three-quarters, of the work of the League through the unpaid efforts of its members, to attract more and more of the rank-and-file members of the constituent parts of the united leagues into the work of the central organization.

(10) The cultural and educational work of the League should be closely bound up with an active daily participation in the general political life of the party, the soviets, the trade-unions and the co-operatives.

(11) Put an end to the rubber-stamp régime, the deadening régime of orders from above, the lying and ignorant régime of cribs and "instructions" for Opposition-baiting. Introduce in its place the serious study of Marxism and Leninism, upon the basis of live judgment, comradely exchange of opinions, and a real, not an imitation, acquisition of knowledge.

(12) Introduce, in deeds and not words, the democratic régime. Do away with the oppression and veritable persecution of those who hold independent opinions about party questions and League questions. Adhere strictly to the dates provided in the constitution for calling Rayon, Uyesd, Gubernia, etc., conferences and congresses.

CHAPTER IX

OUR INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE WAR DANGER

THE SITUATION OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE WORLD ARENA

A war of the imperialists against the Soviet Union is not only probable, but inevitable.

To postpone this danger, to gain as much time as possible for strengthening the Soviet Union and consolidating the international revolutionary proletariat should be one of our chief practical efforts. Only a victorious proletarian revolution in the dominant countries could finally remove this danger.

The danger of a world war is increasing for the following reasons:

(1) These years of struggle on the part of capitalism to strengthen itself, and the partial success obtained in that struggle, have made the question of markets a burning question for all the leading countries.

(2) The imperialist bourgeoisie, convinced of the indubitable growth of the economic power of the Soviet Union, sees also that the proletarian dictatorship, protected by the monopoly of foreign trade,

will never give the capitalists a "free" market in Russia.

(3) The imperialist bourgeoisie is speculating on domestic difficulties in the Soviet Union.

(4) The defeat of the revolution in China, following the defeat of the English general strike, has filled the imperialists with the hope that they may succeed in crushing the Soviet Union.

The rupture of diplomatic relations between England and the Soviet Union was preparing long ago, but the defeat of the Chinese revolution hastened it. In this sense it was a reward for the Central Committee's refusal to adopt a real Bolshevik policy in China. It would be a great mistake to imagine that this matter reduces itself to a mere change in the *form* of trade between England and us. ("We will trade as we trade with America.") It is perfectly clear now that imperial England has a broader plan of activity. She is preparing a war against the Soviet Union, having a "moral mandate" from the bourgeoisie of several other countries, and intending by one means or another to drag into the war against us Poland, Roumania, and the Baltic states, and perhaps also Yugoslavia, Italy, and Hungary.

Poland, it appears, would prefer to have a longer period of preparation for war against us. But it is not impossible that England will compel her to fight sooner than she likes.

In France, the English pressure towards a united

front against the Soviet Union is finding support from an influential part of the bourgeoisie. They are becoming more and more irreconcilable in their demands, and of course, when the convenient moment arrives, they will not hesitate before a diplomatic rupture.

The more Germany's diplomacy wriggles in recent times, the clearer it becomes that its general "orientation" is towards the West. The German bourgeoisie is already openly saying that in a war against the Soviet Union, Germany would perhaps at the beginning remain "neutral" (in the manner of America in 1914). This, with a view to gain as much as possible from the war, and afterward openly sell its neutrality to the Western imperialists at a good price. Nothing could be worse for the fundamental interests of the Soviet Union than to conceal from itself this passing over of the German bourgeoisie to a Western "orientation." An unexpected blow from the German bourgeoisie might well have a decisive significance for us. Only a perfectly open "statement of things as they are," only an awakening of the vigilance of the workers of the Soviet Union and the workers of Germany, can insure us against this blow, or at least make it difficult for the German bourgeoisie to deliver it.

The Japanese bourgeoisie is maneuvering no less skillfully than the Germans in relation to the Soviet

Union. It is very cleverly covering up its tracks, and pretending to be "friendly." It even checked, for a time, the seizure of the Chinese Eastern railroad by Chang Tso-lin. But it is secretly holding the reins in China and may soon throw off the mask in relation to us.

In the near East (Turkey and Persia), we have not, to say the least, achieved a situation which would guarantee a firm neutrality in case the imperialists attack us. It would be wiser to assume that in such a case the governments of these states would incline, under pressure, to do the bidding of the imperialists against the Soviet Union.

In the case of an attack on us, America, having preserved her wholly irreconcilable attitude to the Soviet Union, would play the rôle of the imperialist "rear." The significance of this rôle would be the greater, because she is just the one to guarantee the financing of a war against the Soviet Union.

Summary: If the years 1923-1925 were years of recognition of the Soviet Union by a series of bourgeois states, the period beginning now will be a period of rupture. The recognitions of the preceding period did not necessarily mean that peace was assured, that the breathing space would last. The ruptures of the present period do not necessarily mean that war is unavoidable in the near future. But that we have entered into a new time of extreme tension

in the international situation, containing the possibility of attacks against the Soviet Union, is indubitable.

The contradictions within the capitalist world are very great. To realize, throughout a long period, a united front against us will be extremely difficult for the world bourgeoisie. But a partial union of several bourgeois states against us, for a certain period of time, is entirely possible.

All this taken together ought to impel our party: (1) To recognize that the international situation is dangerous. (2) To bring again into the foreground before the broad masses of the population the problems of international politics. (3) To carry on a most intense and all-sided preparation of the Soviet Union for defense in case of war.

The bourgeois parties, including the official Social Democracy, will try in every way to deceive their people as to the real character of the war which imperialism is preparing against the Soviet Union. Our task is to explain right now to the broadest masses of the people of the whole world that this will be a war of imperialists and exploiters of labor against the first proletarian state and dictatorship—a war of capitalism against socialism. In this war the imperialist bourgeoisie will be fighting essentially to preserve the whole system of capitalistic wage slavery. The Soviet Union will be fighting for the interests of the international proletariat, the colonial

and semi-colonial and enslaved countries, for the international revolution and socialism.

Our whole work ought already to be carried on under these slogans: (1) Down with the war of the imperialists against the workers' state and the proletarian dictatorship. (2) Transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war in all states attacking the Soviet Union. (3) Defeat of all the bourgeois states making war on the Soviet Union. Every honest proletarian of the capitalist countries ought actively to work for the defeat of "his" government. (4) Coming over to the side of the Red Army of every foreign soldier who does not want to help the labor exploiters of "his" country. The Soviet Union is the fatherland of all workers. (5) The slogan, "Defense of the Fatherland," will be a false disguise of the interests of imperialism in all bourgeois countries, except the colonial and semi-colonial countries who are carrying on a national revolutionary war against the imperialists. In the Soviet Union the slogan, "Defense of the Fatherland," will be a true one, because we are defending a socialist fatherland and the foundation of the world-wide labor movement. (6) We are "Defenders of the Fatherland" since Oct. 25, 1917. Our "patriotic" war will be a war "for the Soviet republic, as one regiment in the international army of socialism." "Our 'patriotic' war is not a step towards a bourgeois state, but a step to an international socialist revolution" (Lenin). Our

defense of the fatherland is the defense of the proletarian dictatorship. Our war will be waged by the workers and farm-hands with the support of the poor peasants, and with the alliance of the middle peasants against "their" Kulaks, new bourgeoisie, bureaucrats, specialists of the Ustrialov school, and White emigrants. Our war will be a really just war. Whoever is not a defender of the Soviet Union, is an unconditional traitor to the international proletariat.

THE DEFEAT OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION AND ITS CAUSES

The defeat of the Chinese revolution changed the actual relation of forces to the advantage of imperialism, of course, only temporarily. New revolutionary conflicts, a new revolution, in China, are inevitable. That is guaranteed by the whole situation.

The opportunist leaders are trying to explain their own failure by the so-called "objective relation of forces." They forget that only yesterday they were predicting a speedy socialist revolution in China upon the basis of this same relation of forces.

The deciding cause of the unfortunate outcome of the Chinese revolution at the present stage was the fundamentally mistaken policy of the leadership of the Russian Communist party and the whole International. The net result of this policy was that at the decisive period there existed in China, in actual

fact, no real Bolshevik party. To lay the blame now upon the Chinese Communists alone, is superficial and contemptible.

We had in China a classic experiment in the application of the Menshevik tactic of bourgeois-democratic revolution. That is why the Chinese proletariat not only did not attain to its victorious "1905" (Lenin), but played for the time being essentially the same rôle that the European proletariat played in the revolutions of 1848. The peculiarity of the Chinese revolution in the present international situation is not that there exists in China a so-called "revolutionary" liberal bourgeoisie—upon which Stalin-Martinov-Bukharin rested the hopes of their entire policy. Its peculiarities are as follows:

(1) The Chinese peasantry, more oppressed than the Russians under czarism, groaning under the yoke not only of their own but of foreign oppressors, could rise, and did rise, more powerfully than the Russian peasantry in the revolution of 1905.

(2) The slogan of "Soviets" proposed by Lenin for China as early as 1920 had every possible justification in the conditions existing in 1926-1927. Soviets in China would have offered forms of consolidation for the peasant power, under the leadership of the proletariat. They would have been real organs of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. And that means

organs of real support to the bourgeois Kuomintang, and to the Chinese Cavaignacs emerging from it.

The doctrine of Lenin, that a bourgeois-democratic revolution can be carried through only by a union of the working-class and the peasants (under the leadership of the former) *against the bourgeoisie*, is not only applicable to China, and to similar colonial and semi-colonial countries, but actually indicates the sole road to victory in those countries.

(3) It follows from all this that a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasants, had it crystallized in the form of Soviets in China, in the present period of imperialist wars and proletarian revolutions, modified as it is by the existence of the Soviet Union, would have had every possible chance of a comparatively swift transformation into a socialist revolution.

Apart from this policy there remained only the Menshevik road of union with the liberal bourgeoisie, which leads unavoidably to the defeat of the working-class. That is what actually happened in 1927 in China.

All the decisions made during Lenin's life by the Second and Fourth Congresses of the Communist International—the decision on Soviets in the Orient, on the full independence of workers' Communist parties in countries having a national-revolutionary movement, and on the union of the working-class with the peasants against "their" bourgeoisie and the for-

eign imperialist—all these decisions were completely forgotten.

The resolution of the seventh enlarged plenum of the International (November 1926), not only did not give a true Leninist evaluation of the already powerfully developing events in China, but it wholly and absolutely went over to the Menshevik course advocated by Martinov. In that resolution, unbelievable as it is, not one word was said about the first counter-revolutionary *coup d'état* of Chang Kai-shek in March 1926. Not one word about the shootings of workers and peasants and other repressive measures carried out by the Canton government in a whole series of provinces during the spring and autumn of 1926. Not one word about the measures of compulsory arbitration directed against the working-class. Not one word about the putting down of working-class strikes by the Canton government, about the protection given by the Canton government to the yellow "company unions" of the workers. Not one word about the efforts put forth by the Canton government to strangle the peasants' movement, spit upon it, prevent its spread and development. In the resolution of the seventh plenum, there is no demand for the arming of the workers, no summons to struggle with the counter-revolutionary General Staff. The troops of Chang Kai-shek are described in this resolution as a revolutionary army. No call is given for the creation of a daily Communist press, and it

is not even stated clearly and with a full voice that we must have a genuine and independent Chinese Communist party. To complete it all, the seventh plenum urged the Communists to enter into the national government, a step which under the existing circumstances could only bring the greatest conceivable disaster.

The resolution of the International says: "The apparatus of the national revolutionary government (that is, the government of Chang Kai-shek) offers a very real road to solidarity with the peasants." In the same place it says (this was in November 1926) that "even certain layers of the great bourgeoisie (!) can for a certain time march hand in hand with the revolution."

The resolution of the seventh plenum passed over in silence the fact that the Central Committee of the Chinese party, after March 1926, took an obligation not to criticize Sun Yat-sen-ism, renounced its elementary rights as an independent workers' party, adopted a conservative, liberal, agrarian program, and finally permitted the secretary of its Central Committee, Comrade Chen Du-hsiu, in an open letter dated July 4, 1926, to recognize Sun Yat-sen-ism as the "common belief" of the workers and the bourgeoisie in the national movement.

At approximately the same time the most responsible Russian comrades were giving advice to the effect that the development of a civil war in the

country might weaken the fighting capacity of the Kuomintang. In other words, they officially forbade the development of an agrarian revolution.

On the fifth of April, 1927, when the situation, it might seem, was already sufficiently clear, Comrade Stalin, at a meeting of the Moscow party organization in the Hall of the Columns, announced that Chang Kai-shek was a warrior against imperialism, that Chang Kai-shek submitted to the discipline of the Kuomintang and was therefore our trusted ally. In the middle of May 1927, when the situation had become still more clear, Comrade Stalin announced that the Kuomintang in Wuhan was a "revolutionary Kuomintang," a "revolutionary center purged of right elements."

The eighth enlarged plenum of the International (May 1927) could not find in itself the force to correct these Menshevik mistakes.

The Opposition introduced into this eighth plenum the following statement:

"The plenum would proceed properly if it crossed out the resolution of Bukharin altogether and replaced it with a resolution consisting of the following brief lines: The peasants and workers should not trust the leaders of the left Kuomintang, but should create their own Soviets in union with the soldiers. The Soviets should arm the workers and the vanguard of the peasants. The Communist party should have complete independence, should create a daily

press, and take the lead in the creation of Soviets. The land should be taken from the landlords immediately. The reactionary bureaucracy should be overthrown immediately. Traitor generals, and counter-revolutionists in general, should be dealt with on the spot. The general course should be towards the establishment of a democratic dictatorship through the Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies."

The attempt of the Opposition to warn the party that the Kuomintang in Wuhan was not by any means a revolutionary Kuomintang, was denounced by Stalin and Bukharin as "a struggle against the party," an "attack upon the Chinese revolution," etc.

Dispatches stating the facts as to the real course of the revolution and the counter-revolution in China were concealed and falsified. The business went so far that the central organ of our party¹ announced the disarmament of the workers by the Chinese generals, under the headline "Fraternization of the Soldiers with the Workers." In mockery of Lenin's teaching, Stalin asserted that the slogan of "Soviets" in China would mean the demand for an immediate formation of the proletarian dictatorship. As a matter of fact Lenin, as long ago as in the revolution of 1905, advanced the slogan of Soviets as organs of the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasants. The slogan of Soviets for China, proposed at the proper time by the Op-

¹ *Pravda*, July 3, 1927.

position, was met by Stalin and Bukharin with an accusation of "aiding and abetting the counter-revolution," etc. When the homes of the revolting workers and peasants were devastated by "our" generals, the "revolutionary" generals, Stalin and Bukharin, in order to cover up their own bankruptcy, unexpectedly advanced the slogan of "Soviets" for China—and then forgot it again the next morning.

At first the Chinese Communist party was declared to be "a model section of the International," and the slightest criticism of it from the Opposition—at a time when its mistakes might still have been corrected—was suppressed and denounced as a "spiteful attack" upon the Chinese party. Afterward, when the dismal failure of Martinov-Stalin-Bukharin became perfectly clear, they attempted to throw all the blame upon the young Chinese Communist party.

At first they staked everything upon Chang Kai-shek, then upon Tan Shen-tchi, then upon Feng Yuhsiang, then upon the "tried and true" Wan Tin-wei. One after the other every one of these hangmen of workers and peasants was hailed as a "warrior against imperialism" and "our" ally.

This Menshevik policy is now being completed by the frank and open castration of the revolutionary teaching of Lenin. Stalin-Bukharin and the "school of the young" are now occupied with "proving" that the teachings of Lenin on the national revolutionary

movements come down in effect to a gospel of "union with the bourgeoisie."

In 1920, at the Second Congress of the Communist International, Lenin said: "There has occurred a certain drawing together of the bourgeois classes of the imperialist and colonial countries, such that very often, and indeed in the majority of cases, the bourgeoisie of the oppressed country, although it supports the national movement, at the same time fights in union with the imperialist bourgeoisie against all revolutionary movements and revolutionary classes."²

Lenin would denounce with the same words today these people who dare refer to him for justification of their Menshevik policy of union with Chang Kai-shek and Wan Tin-wei. Lenin himself spoke of this very thing in March 1917:

"Our revolution is bourgeois and therefore the workers should support the bourgeoisie,' say the good-for-nothing politicians from the camp of the liquidators. 'Our revolution is bourgeois' say we, Marxists, 'therefore the workers ought to open the eyes of the whole people to the deceit of the bourgeois politicians and teach the people not to believe the words of these politicians, but to rely on their own strength, on their own organization, on their own union, on their own arms and ammunition.'"³

² Vol. XVII, p. 275.

³ Vol. XIV, Part I, p. 11.

There could be no greater crime before the international proletariat than this attempt to represent Lenin as the apostle of "union with the bourgeoisie." You will rarely find in the history of revolutionary struggle a case where the Marxian predictions were confirmed so swiftly and so accurately as were the views of the Opposition on the problems of the Chinese revolution in 1926-1927.

A study of the course of events in the Chinese revolution and the causes of its defeat is the urgent and immediate task of Communists throughout the world.

These questions will tomorrow become questions of life and death for the working-class movement, not only in China but in India and other Eastern countries—and thus, for the entire international proletariat. In the debates on these questions which touch the very foundations of the Marxian world-view, will be formed the genuine Bolshevik regiments of the coming revolution.

THE PARTIAL STABILIZATION OF CAPITALISM AND THE TACTICS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

One of the fundamental tenets of Bolshevism is that the epoch beginning with the World War and our revolution is the epoch of the socialist revolution. The Communist International was founded as a "party of world revolution." A recognition of this

fact was incorporated in the "twenty-one points." And it was primarily along this line that the Communists split with the social-democratic "independent" Mensheviks of all sorts and kinds.

A recognition of the fact that the war and October opened an epoch of world revolution does not mean, of course, that at every given moment we have on hand an immediately revolutionary situation. In certain periods, in individual countries, and in individual branches of production, "dying capitalism" (Lenin) is capable of a partial reestablishment of its economy and even a further development of its productive forces. The epoch of world revolution will have its periods of rise and fall. So much the greater will be the importance of the preparedness of the working-class and its party, the degree of influence exercised by the counter-revolutionary social democracy, the correct leadership of the International. But this ebb and flow of the revolution will not change the fundamental Leninist evaluation of the present historical epoch taken as a whole. Only this evaluation can form the basis of the revolutionary strategy of the Communist International.

Nevertheless, as a result of a series of defeats of the international revolutionary movement and the pessimistic moods growing out of them, the Stalin group, unnoticeably even to itself, has arrived at a completely "new" and essentially social-democratic appraisal of the present epoch. The whole "theory"

of socialism in one country derives fundamentally from the assumption that the "stabilization" of capitalism will endure for a series of decades. This whole "theory" is essentially a product of the degenerate mood of the apostles of "stabilization." It is no accident that the "theory" of socialism in one country has been welcomed by the Social Revolutionaries, both right and left. Chernov himself has written on this theme about the "Communist populism" of Stalin and Bukharin. The organ of the Left Social Revolutionaries wrote: "Stalin and Bukharin affirm, *exactly like Narodniks*, that socialism can win in one country." ⁴ The Social Revolutionaries support this theory because they see in it a renunciation of the tactics of world revolution.

In the resolution of the fourteenth party congress, adopted on the report of Stalin, the following obviously incorrect statement is made: "In the sphere of international relations we have a reënforcement and lengthening of the 'breathing spell,' which is transforming itself into a whole period." ⁵ At the seventh enlarged plenum of the International (Dec. 7, 1926), Stalin in his report based the whole policy of the International upon the same radically incorrect evaluation of the world situation. ⁶ This evaluation has already proven quite obviously incorrect.

⁴ *Znamia Borbi*, Nos. 17 and 18, 1926.

⁵ Report of the Fourteenth Congress, p. 957.

⁶ Stenographic report, p. 12.

The resolution of the united plenums of the Central Committee and the Central Control Committee (July, August, 1927) speaks without the slightest qualification of the technical, economic, and political stabilization of capitalism. This brings the Stalinist evaluation of the world situation very much nearer to that of the leaders of the Second International (Otto Bauer, Hilferding, Kautsy, and others).

Since the Fourteenth Congress something over a year and a half has passed. During that time, taking only the most important events, we have had the general strike in England, the gigantic events of the Chinese revolution, the workers' uprising in Vienna. These events, wrapped up with all their explosive power in the conditions of the present "stabilization," show us how much disruptive material has been accumulated by capitalism, how unstable its "stabilization" is. These events run straight against the "theory" of socialism in one country.

Another side of the "stabilization" of capitalism is the unemployed population of 20 million, the colossal idleness of the productive apparatus, the insane growth of military preparation, the extreme shakiness of international economic relations. Nothing so surely reveals the vanity of the hope for a long peaceful period as the present new danger of war that hangs over Europe. It is the petty bourgeois who dreams about stabilization for "decades," blinded as he is by the victory of capitalism over the workers,

blinded by the technical, economic, and political successes of capitalism. But the real facts are developing in the direction of a war which will explode every "stabilization." And moreover the working-class and the oppressed colonial masses of the East will be attempting time and again to overthrow violently this "stabilization." Now in England, now in China, now in Vienna. A general strike in England—and only 5,000 members in the English Communist party. A workers' insurrection in Vienna, with enough victims for a whole revolution—and only 6,000 members in the Austrian Communist party! A military uprising of the worker-peasant masses in China—and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party turns out to be a mere appendix to the bourgeois officialdom of the Kuomintang! These are the crying contradictions of the present world situation. These are the facts which support and prolong the "stabilization" of capitalism. Our greatest problem is to help the Communist parties raise themselves to the height of the gigantic demand which the present epoch makes upon them. But this assumes, in the first place, a correct understanding of the character of the world situation on the part of the Communist International itself.

Our International Communist party (the Communist International) ought to give itself the task of consolidating the whole international working-class for the struggle to prevent war, to defend the Soviet

Union, to transform an imperialist war into a war for socialism. To this end the worker Communist ought above all to win over the revolutionary-minded worker who is non-Communist, non-party, social-democrat, syndicalist, anarchist, trade-unionist, and also that honest worker who is still a member of a purely bourgeois organization. "By the united workers' front must be understood the unity of all the workers who desire to struggle against capitalism, and that includes the workers still following the anarchist syndicalists, etc. In the Latin countries, the number of these workers is still considerable." This was the resolution of the Fourth Congress of the Communist International under Lenin. It retains its full force and applicability today. The present activities of the leaders of the Second International and the Amsterdam Trade-Union International, make it perfectly clear that their conduct in a future war will exceed, in disloyalty and unscrupulous betrayal, the rôle they played in 1914-1918. Paul Boncour (France) has introduced a law betraying the workers in advance by means of a bourgeois dictator in war time. The General Council of Trade-Unions (England) is defending the murderers of Voikov and giving its benediction to the shipping of troops into China. Kautsky (Germany) is advocating an armed insurrection against the Soviet power in Russia, and the Central Committee of the German social democracy is organizing "a grenade cam-

paign." The social-democratic ministers of Finland and Latvia, and the leaders of the Polish socialist party, are perpetually ready to support a war against the Soviet Union. The leaders of the American official trade-union organization are talking the language of the most venomous reactionaries, fighting openly against recognition of the Soviet Union. The Balkan "socialists" are supporting the hangmen of "their" workers and will always be ready to support any campaign against the "foreign" Soviet Union. The Austrian social-democratic leaders are "for the Soviet Union" in words, but people who have helped their own Fascists drown in blood the workers' insurrection of Vienna will obviously, at the decisive moment, be on the side of the capitalists. The Russian Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries are not advocating intervention against the Soviet Union, only because there are not yet any strong nations ready to intervene. The leaders of the so-called "left social-democracy," keeping concealed the counter-revolutionary essence of their opinions, are the chief danger, because they more than anybody else prevent the workers who are following the social-democratic banner from decisively breaking with these agents of the bourgeoisie in the workers' movement. Former members of the Communist International (such as Katz, Schwartz, Korsch, Rosenberg) are playing the same traitorous rôle, having broken with Communism by the road of ultra-leftism.

Flirting with these social-democratic leaders (absolutely anti-revolutionary in all their shapes, from the overt rights to the pretended "lefts") will become more and more dangerous as war draws near. The tactic of the united front should under no condition be interpreted as a bloc with the traitors of the General Council of Trade-Unions, or as a *rapprochement* with Amsterdam. Such a policy weakens and confuses the working-class, increases the prestige of the indubitable traitors, and prevents the maximum consolidation of our own forces. The wrong course, summed up in the phrase of Stalin, "Fire to the left," has brought it about in the last year or two that the predominating rôle of leadership in the most important sections of the International has passed, against the will of the worker Communists, into the hands of the right wing. (This has happened in Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, and England.)

The policy of these dominating Right groups, directed toward cutting off the whole left wing of the Communist International, is weakening the power of the International and preparing ominous dangers.

In particular the cutting off of the Urbans group in Germany was dictated by this policy of getting rid of the whole left wing of the International. Unduly emphasizing certain sharply polemical phrases used by the Left partisans of Urbans and Maslov, in response to those who slandered and baited them

as "renegades," "counter-revolutionists, "agents of Chamberlain," etc., the Stalin group is obstinately pushing the German Left along the road of a second party. The Stalin group is trying its best to bring it about that the split in the ranks of the German Communists shall become a completed fact.

In reality, upon all fundamental questions of the International working-class movement, the Urbans group is defending the views of Lenin. It is defending, and at the decisive minute it will indubitably continue to defend to the last ditch, the Soviet Union. It embraces hundreds of thousands of old rank-and-file worker Bolsheviks, bound up with broad masses of the proletariat. It has the sympathy of many thousands of working-class Communists who have remained in the German Communist party.

Re-admittance into the International of all these excluded comrades, who acknowledge the authority of the congresses of the International—and first among them the Urbans group—is the first step towards correcting the moves made by Stalin towards a split in the International. In his *Infantile Disease of Leftism*, Lenin, exposing the mistakes of the real "ultra-leftists," wrote that the chief enemy of Bolshevism within the workers' movement is and remains opportunism. "This enemy remains the chief one also on the international scale."⁷ At the Second Congress of the International, Lenin added to this the state-

⁷ Lenin, Vol. XVII, p. 194.

ment that "in comparison with this problem . . . it is an easy problem to correct 'mistakes' of the 'left' tendency in Communism."⁸ When he speaks of the "left," Lenin had in mind the ultra-leftist tendency, Stalin, when he speaks of the struggle against the "right" tendency, has in view the revolutionary Leninist

A decisive struggle with the right or ultra-right movement as the chief enemy, and a correction of the mistakes of the "left" tendency—that was the slogan of Lenin. We, the Oppositionists, propose the following slogan.

The power of "socialist" opportunism is to be analyzed in the power of capitalism. During the years after the war crisis (1918-1921) capitalism was swiftly sliding into the abyss, and the social democracy was weakening and falling apart. These years of partial stabilization of capitalism bring with them a temporary strengthening of the social democracy. The defeat of the German workers in 1920-1921, of the German proletarians in 1921-1923, the defeat of the great strike in England in 1926, and the defeat of the Chinese proletariat in 1927, whatever may have been the reasons, have themselves become the cause of a temporary depression of the revolutionary wave in the upper levels of the proletariat. They have for a certain period strengthened the social democracy at the expense of the Communist party. And with the

⁸ Vol. XVII, p. 267.

munist party they are giving a temporary dominance to the right wing at the expense of the left. The rôle of the labor aristocracy, the labor bureaucracy and its petty-bourgeois associates, becomes at such a period especially great and especially

... to a certain extent these processes must inevitably be directed by the Communist party of the Soviet Union. The "center" has opened its "fire" especially upon the left and by purely mechanical means has created a new inter-relation of forces, to the disadvantage of the left-Leninist wing. A situation has been created in which as a fact the left never votes, but only the apparatus.

... the general causes of the weakening of the Leninist wing upon the policies of the Communist International, the Russian Communist party, and the Soviet state. In consequence of this, the right semi-social-democratic elements, who long after October were still in the ranks of the bourgeoisie, and were at last admitted into the Communist International somewhat as though on probation (Martineau, Shmeral, Rafies, D. Petrovsky, Pepper, and others) are more and more frequently and more and more loudly speaking in the name of the International. And to them must be added the names of a number of night adventurers, like Heinz Neuman and others of the same kind. In the masses, however, the demands for a new movement to the left, a new revolu-

tionary arising, are already gathering together. The Opposition is engaged in preparing for that new day, both theoretically and politically.

THE PRINCIPAL CONCLUSION

(1) In the dominant circles of the majority, under the influence of our break with England and other difficulties, both foreign and domestic, such "plans" are being prepared as the following: (a) To recognize the debt. (b) To annul more or less the monopoly of foreign trade. (c) To withdraw from China—that is, withdraw "for a time" our support of the Chinese revolution, and the national-revolutionary movement in general. (d) To execute within the country a right "maneuver"—that is, expand the NEP a little. At this price it is hoped to ward off the danger of war, improve the international situation of the Soviet Union, and get rid of (or at least reduce) the interior difficulties. This whole "plan" is based upon the one assumption that capitalism is assured for decades.

In reality this would not be a "maneuver," but in the present situation a full capitulation on the part of the Soviet power: through the "political NEP," the "neo-NEP," back to capitalism. The imperialists would accept all our concessions and proceed so much the more swiftly to the new attack and even to war. The Kulaks, the Nepmen, and the bureaucrats, tak-

ing cognizance of our concessions, would the more insistently organize all the anti-Soviet forces against our party. Such a "tactic" upon our part would result in the closest possible union of our new "bourgeoisie" with the foreign bourgeoisies. The economic development of the Soviet Union would fall under the complete control of international capital—a penny of loan and a ruble of slavery. And the working-class and the fundamental mass of the peasants would begin to lose their faith in the might of the Soviet state, their faith that the Soviet state knows where it is leading the people.

We are bound to try to "buy ourselves off" from war, if that shall be possible. But just for that reason we must be strong and united, unwaveringly defend the tactics of the world revolution, and reinforce the International. Only thus have we a serious chance of gaining a really long postponement of the war without paying a price that would undermine the foundations of our power, and at the same time, in case war proves inevitable, of gaining the support of the international proletariat and winning.

Lenin made certain economic concessions to the imperialists in order to buy himself off from war or to attract international capital upon acceptable terms. But neither in these circumstances nor even in the heaviest moments of the revolution did Lenin ever admit the idea of abolishing the monopoly of foreign trade, of offering political rights to the

Kulak, of weakening our support to the world revolution, of weakening the tactics of the world revolution in general.

We must, first of all, wholly and without reserve affirm and reënforce our support to the international revolution. We must offer a firm resistance to all "stabilization" tendencies, to all this pseudo-statesmanship which expresses itself in the remarks that we had no business "butting-in in China," that we had better "get out of China as quick as we can," that if we will behave ourselves "reasonably" they will "leave us alone," etc. The "theory" of socialism in one country is now playing an actually disintegrating rôle and clearly hindering the consolidation of the international forces of the proletariat around the Soviet Union. It is lulling the workers of other countries, dulling their sense of the actual dangers.

(2) Another task of equal importance is to consolidate the ranks of our own party, to put an end to the open speculation of the imperialist bourgeoisie and the leaders of the social democracy on a split, or an amputation, or a "cutting-off," etc. All this has the most direct connection with the question of war, for at present the "probing" of the imperialists is being carried out chiefly along this moral-political line. All the organs of the international bourgeoisie and the social democrats are now showing a quite unusual interest in our inner-party disputes. They

are openly encouraging and spurring on the present majority of the Central Committee to exclude the Opposition from the governing organs of the party, and if possible from the party, and if possible to put them out of the way altogether. Beginning with the richest bourgeois newspaper, the *New York Times*, and ending with the most successfully wriggling paper of the Second International, the *Vienna Workers' Gazette* (Otto Bauer), all the organs of the bourgeoisie and the social democrats are saluting the "government of Stalin" for its struggle against the Opposition. They are urging this government to prove still further its "statesmanlike intelligence" by decisively cutting off these Oppositional "propagandists of international revolution." Other things being equal, a war will come so much the later in proportion as these hopes of the enemy for a "cutting off" of the Opposition, etc., remain unrealized. Moreover, we can buy ourselves off from a war, if that is possible—and conquer in the war, if we have to fight—only in case we preserve a complete unity; if we deceive the hopes of the imperialists for a split or an amputation. Such a thing will benefit only the capitalists.

(3) It is necessary to correct our class line in the international workers' movement, stop the struggle against the left wing in the International, restore to the International those excluded members who accept the decisions of the congresses, and once for all

put an end to the policy of "heartly accord" with the traitorous leaders of the English Trade-Union Council. A break with the General Council will have the same significance in the present situation as in 1914 the break with the International Socialist Bureau of the Second International. Lenin demanded that break from every revolutionist in an ultimatum. To remain in union with such a General Council means now as then to help the counter-revolutionary leaders of the Second International.

(4) We must decisively correct our line in the national-revolutionary movement—first of all in China, but also in a series of other countries. We must liquidate the policy of Martinov-Stalin-Bukharin and return to the course outlined by Lenin in the resolutions of the Second and Fourth Congresses of the Communist International. Otherwise, instead of being an accelerator we shall become a brake upon the national-revolutionary movement and inevitably lose the sympathy of the workers and peasants of the East. The Chinese Communist party must dissolve all organizational and political dependence upon the Kuomintang. The Communist International must expel the Kuomintang from its midst.

(5) We must consistently, systematically, and stubbornly wage the struggle for peace. We must postpone the war, "buy ourselves off from the war threat." Everything possible and permissible must be done to this end (see point 1). At the same time we

must get ready for war immediately, not folding our hands for one instant. And our first duty is to put an end to all disintegrating intellectual and political gossip and speculation as to whether there exists any close danger of war.

(6) We must decisively correct our class line within the country. If war is inevitable, only a strictly Bolshevik policy can win: *the worker and farm-hand, with the support of the poor peasant, in alliance with the middle peasant, against the Kulak, the Nepman, the bureaucrat.*

(7) An all-sided preparation of our entire economy, budget, etc., for the event of war.

Capitalism is entering into a new period of disturbances. A war with the Soviet Union, like a war with China, will mean a series of catastrophes to international capitalism. The war of 1914-1918 was a gigantic "accelerator" (Lenin) of the socialist revolution. New wars, and especially a war against the Soviet Union, in which with a correct policy on our side we should win the sympathy of the laboring masses of the whole earth, can become a still greater "accelerator" of the downfall of world capitalism. *Socialist revolutions will develop without new wars. But new wars will inevitably lead to socialist revolutions.*

CHAPTER X

THE RED ARMY AND THE RED FLEET

The international situation is bringing more and more to the front the question of the defense of the Soviet Union. The party, the working-class, and the peasantry ought to give renewed and greater attention to the Red Army and the Red Fleet.

All the facts of our economy, politics, and culture, are connected with the problem of defense. The army is a pattern of the whole social structure. It reflects, in the sharpest possible manner not only the strong, but the weak side of the existing régime. Experience teaches that in this sphere least of all is it safe to rely upon appearances. Here especially it is better to err upon the side of triple tests and self-criticism, than on the side of easy-going trust and confidence.

The question of the mutual relation of classes in the country, and the true policy of the party in this sphere has a decisive significance for the inner solidarity of the army and for the mutual relations between the commanding staff and the body of the soldiers. The question of industrialization has decisive significance for the technical resources of our defense. All the measures advocated in the present platform—in the sphere of international politics and

the international workers' movement, industry, agriculture, the Soviet system, the national question, the party, and the League of Communist Youth—all these questions are of first-class importance in strengthening the Red Army and the Red Fleet.

Our practical proposals in this field have been presented to the Politburo.

CHAPTER XI

AS TO REAL AND PRETENDED DISAGREEMENTS

Nothing testifies so surely to the erroneous political course of the Stalin group as their unceasing determination to quarrel not with our real opinions, but with imaginary opinions which we do not and never did hold.

When the Bolsheviks were disputing with the Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, and other petty-bourgeois tendencies, the Bolsheviks expounded before the workers the actual system of opinions advanced by their opponents. But when the Mensheviks or Social Revolutionaries disputed with the Bolsheviks, instead of refuting their real opinions they would attribute to the Bolsheviks things which they had never said. The Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries *could not* expound the views of the Bolsheviks before the workers with any approach to justice, because in that case the workers would have supported the Bolsheviks. The whole mechanics of the class struggle reduced these petty-bourgeois groups to the necessity of opposing the Bolsheviks by calling them "conspirators," "allies of the counter-revolution," and later "agents of Wilhelm."

In the same way now, the petty-bourgeois deviation within our own party cannot struggle against our Leninist views otherwise than by attributing to us things which we never thought or said. The Stalin group knows perfectly well that if we could defend our true opinions with any approach to freedom, an immense majority of the members of our party would support us.

The most elementary conditions of an honest inner-party debate are not observed. On the question of the Chinese revolution, a question of world importance, the Central Committee has not printed up to the present time one word of what the Opposition says. After shutting the lid down tight on the party, and cutting off the Opposition from the party press, the Stalin group carries on against us an uninterrupted argument, attributing to us from day to day a continually increasing series of stupidities and crimes. The party member becomes every day less inclined to believe these accusations.

(1) When we state that the present stabilization of capitalism is not a stabilization for decades, and that our epoch remains an epoch of imperialist wars and social revolutions (Lenin), the Stalin group attributes to us a denial of all the elements of stabilization of capitalism.

(2) When we say, in the words of Lenin, that for the construction of a socialist society in our country, a victory of the proletarian revolution is necessary

in one or more of the advanced capitalist countries, that the final victory of socialism in one country, and above all a backward country, is impossible, as Marx, Engels, and Lenin have all proven, the Stalin group makes the wholly false assertion that we "do not believe" in socialism and in the building of socialism in the Soviet Union.

(3) When, following Lenin, we point out the growing bureaucratic distortions of our proletarian state, the Stalin group attributes to us the opinion that our Soviet state in general is not proletarian. When we announce before the entire Communist International that "every one who, attempting either directly or indirectly to support us, shall at the same time deny the proletarian character of our party and our state and the socialist character of the constructive work of the Soviet Union, will be ruthlessly opposed and rejected by us"—the Stalin group conceals our announcement and continues its slander against us.¹

(4) When we point out that Thermidorian elements with a sufficiently serious social basis are growing in the country; when we demand that the party leadership offer a more systematic, firm, and planful resistance to these phenomena and their influence upon certain links in our party, the Stalin group attributes to us the announcement that the party is

¹ See the Announcement of Dec. 15, 1926, at the seventh enlarged plenum of the Communist International, p. 1.

Thermidorian, and that the proletarian revolution has degenerated. When we announce to the entire International: "It is not true that we accuse the majority of our party of a right deviation; we merely think that there are right tendencies and right groups in the Russian Communist party which now have a disproportionate influence, but which the party can overcome"—the Stalin group conceals our announcement and continues to slander us.²

(5) When we point to the enormous growth of the Kulak; when we, following Lenin, continue to assert that "the Kulak cannot peacefully grow into socialism," that he is the most dangerous enemy of the proletarian revolution—the Stalin group accuses us of wishing to "rob the peasants."

(6) When we draw the attention of our party to the fact of the strengthening position of private capital, of the immoderate growth of its accumulations and its influence in the country, the Stalin group accuses us of attacking the NEP and demanding a restoration of military Communism.

(7) When we point to the incorrectness of the party policy as to the material condition of the workers, the inadequacy of the measures against unemployment and the housing needs; and especially when we point out that the share of non-proletarian elements in the national income is growing im-

² *Idem*, point 14.

moderately—they say that we are guilty of a “guild-socialist” deviation, and of “demagogism.”

(8) When we point to the systematic lagging of industry behind the demands of the public economy with all its inevitable consequences—disproportion, goods famine, rupture of the union between the city and the country—they call us “super-industrialists.”

(9) When we point to the incorrect price policy, which is not reducing the high cost of living but piling up a mad profit for the private capitalist, the Stalin group accuses us of advocating a policy of raising prices. When a year ago we announced to the entire International: “The Opposition never in any of its utterances demanded or proposed a raising of prices, but saw the chief mistake of our economic policy exactly in the fact that it does not lead with sufficient energy to a reduction of the goods famine with which the high retail prices are inevitably bound up”—our announcement was concealed and the slander continued.

(10) When we speak against the “hearty accord” with the traitors to the general strike, the counter-revolutionists of the English General Council, who are openly playing the rôle of Chamberlain’s agents, we are accused of being opposed to the work of Communists within the trade-unions and against the tactic of a united front.

(11) When we oppose the entrance of the trade-unions of the Soviet Union into the Amsterdam

Trade-Union International, or any kind of flirting with the leaders of the Second International, we are accused of a "social-democratic deviation."

(12) When we oppose a policy based on the Chinese generals, when we oppose the subjection of the Chinese working-class to the bourgeois Kuomintang, when we oppose the Menshevik tactics of Martinov, we are accused of being against "the agrarian revolution in China," of being "in cahoots with Chiang Kai-Shek."

(13) When, on the basis of our evaluation of the world situation, we come to the conclusion that war is approaching, and warn the party of this in good season, the Stalinists bring forward against us the dishonest accusation that we "desire war."

(14) When, true to the teaching of Lenin, we point out that the approach of war demands only the more insistently a firm, sheer, and clear-cut class policy, the Stalinists shamelessly assert that we do not want to defend the Soviet Union, that we are "conditional defenders," semi-defeatists, etc.

(15) When we point out the indubitable fact that the entire world press of the capitalists and social democrats is supporting Stalin's struggle against the Opposition in the Russian Communist party, praising Stalin for his repression of the left wing, and summoning him to cut off the Opposition and expel it from the Central Committee and from the party, *Pravda* and the entire party and Soviet press

day after day deceitfully pretend that the bourgeoisie and the social democracy are "for the Opposition."

(16) When we oppose the passing of leadership in the Communist International into the hands of the right wing, and the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of worker Bolsheviks, the Stalin group accuse us of attempting to split the Communist International.

(17) When, under the existing perverted party régime, Oppositionists who are devoted party members attempt to inform the membership of their real opinions, they are thrown out of the Russian Communist party. They are accused of "factionalism." Proceedings are got up over pretended attempts to split the party. The most important party questions, instead of being discussed, are covered up with rubbish.

(18) But the favorite accusation of late years is the accusation that we believe in "Trotskyism." We announced to the whole Communist International:³ "It is not true that we are defending Trotskyism. Trotsky has stated to the International that in all those questions of principle upon which he disputed with Lenin, Lenin was right—and particularly upon the question of permanent revolution and the peasantry." That announcement, made to the whole Communist International, the Stalin group refuses to

³ See the above announcement, Dec. 15, 1926, with the signatures of Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Trotsky.

print. It continues to accuse us of "Trotskyism." The above-quoted announcement relates, of course, only to past disagreements with Lenin and not to those "divisions" unscrupulously invented by Stalin and Bukharin. The relation which they pretend to discover between our differences in the remote past and the practical disagreements which arose in the course of the October Revolution is imaginary.

[We note as unfair fighting, the attempt of the Stalin group to distract attention from the views of the Opposition, as expounded in the present platform, by references to earlier disagreements between the groups existing in 1923 and 1925. These disagreements have now lost their significance. The mistakes and exaggerations committed by both groups of Bolsheviks in the dispute of 1923-1924, as a result of a series of obscurities in the state of affairs in the party and in the country, are now corrected, and offer no obstacle to a hearty coöperation in the struggle against opportunism for Leninism.]⁴

By tearing quotations from their context, by a

⁴ The paragraph in brackets should be ignored by those who want to know Trotsky's thought. It was inserted in the platform at the instance of Zinoviev and Kamenev and their followers, who fought against Trotsky with Stalin in 1923 and 1925. (See footnote, p. 221.) Trotsky made this and some other minor concessions in gaining their adherence to his platform.

The fact is, of course, that the issues in this struggle have been fundamentally the same since Lenin's departure from political life in 1923. The Opposition surrounding Trotsky made no mistakes in principle—and least of all any "exaggerations"—in 1923-24.—*Tr.*

brutal and disloyal misuse of falsely selected old polemic remarks of Lenin, and by hiding from the party other far more recent remarks, by a direct falsification of party history and the facts of yesterday, and still more important, by distorting and directly altering our writings upon all present debated questions, the group of Stalin and Bukharin, departing farther and farther from the principles of Lenin, are trying to deceive the party into believing that this is a struggle between Leninism and Trotskyism. The struggle is, in actual fact, between Leninism and the opportunism of Stalin. In exactly the same way the revisionists, under pretense of a struggle with "Blanquism," waged their battle against Marxism. Our whole-hearted coöperative struggle against the Stalin course has been possible only because we are all completely united in the desire and determination to defend the real Leninist proletarian course.

The present platform is the best answer to the accusation of "Trotskyism." Every one who reads it through will know that it is based from the first to the last line on the teachings of Lenin. It is saturated with the genuine spirit of Bolshevism.

Let the party find out our real opinions. Let the party get acquainted with the genuine documents of our disagreements—and especially our disagreement upon that question of international historic importance, the Chinese revolution. Lenin taught us, in

case of a disagreement, to believe nothing on anybody's say-so, but to demand documents, listen to both of the contending sides, reject pretenses, and find out conscientiously what the argument is about. We, the Opposition, repeat this advice of Lenin.

We must, once for all, put an end to the very possibility of what happened at the Fourteenth Congress, when the disagreements were suddenly landed in the lap of the party two or three days before the congress. We must create the conditions for an honest dispute and an honest decision on the real subject of the disagreement, as this was always done during the life of Lenin.

CHAPTER XII

AGAINST OPPORTUNISM—FOR THE UNITY OF THE PARTY

We have frankly expounded our opinion of the serious mistakes committed by the majority of the Central Committee in all the fundamental spheres of foreign and domestic policy. We have shown how these mistakes of the Central Committee have weakened our party, which is the fundamental instrument of the revolution. We have shown that, in spite of it all, our party can correct its policy from within. But in order to correct the policy, it is necessary clearly and candidly to define the character of the mistakes committed by the party leadership.

The mistakes made have been *opportunist* mistakes. Opportunism in its developed form—according to the classic definition of Lenin—is a bloc formed by the working-class leaders with the bourgeoisie and directed against the majority of the working-class. In the conditions now existing in the Soviet Union, opportunism in its completed form would be an aspiration of the heads of the working-class towards compromise with the developing new bourgeoisie (Kulaks and Nepmen) and with world capitalism, at

the expense of the interests of the broad mass of the workers and the peasant poor.

When we note the presence of such tendencies in certain circles of our party—in some places just appearing and in others fully developed—it is absurd to accuse us, upon that ground, of slandering the party. It is exactly to the party that we are appealing against these tendencies which threaten it. It is equally absurd to pretend that we are accusing this or that section of the party or the Central Committee of disloyalty to the revolution, of betraying the interests of the proletariat. A false political course can be dictated by the most sincere concern for the interests of the working-class. Even the most extreme representatives of the right wing are convinced that the compromises with bourgeois elements into which they are prepared to enter are necessary to the interests of the workers and peasants, that they are merely another of those maneuvers which Lenin considered entirely permissible. Even that right group which represents an open tendency to abandon the proletarian revolution does not consciously desire the Thermidor. And this is still more true of the “center,” which is carrying out a typical policy of illusion, self-consolation, and self-deceit.

Stalin and his closest adherents are convinced that, with their powerful apparatus, they can outwit, instead of conquering in a struggle, all the forces of the bourgeoisie. Stalin and the Stalinists undoubtedly

believed in all sincerity that they were "playing" for a limited period of time with the Chinese generals, and that they would throw them away like a sucked lemon after having used them in the interests of the revolution. Stalin and the Stalinists undoubtedly believed in all sincerity that they would "play" with the Purcells and not vice versa. Stalin and the Stalinists believe in all sincerity that they can "freely" make concessions to "their own" bourgeoisie, and afterward with equal freedom take these concessions back.

In their bureaucratic self-conceit, the Stalinists "facilitate" their maneuvers by cutting off the party, in the essence of the matter, from all participation in political decisions and thus avoiding its resistance. The Stalin officialdom decides and acts and then lets the party "justify" its decisions. But this process weakens, if it does not paralyze, those very forces which might be deployed in a good political maneuver, both necessary and timely—or which might weaken and remove the bad consequences of maneuvers upon the part of leaders which were obviously bad. Thus there is a *cumulative result* of the compromising tendencies of the right wing of the Central Committee and the maneuvers of its Centrist group, a result which in its sum total means: a weakening of the international position of the Soviet Union, a weakening of the position of the proletariat in relation to other classes within the Union, a rela-

tive deterioration of its material conditions of life, a weakening of its bonds with the peasant poor, threatening its alliance with the middle peasants, a weakening of its rôle in the state apparatus, a slowing down of the tempo of industrialization. It is *these consequences* of the policy of the majority of the Central Committee, and not its *intention*, that the Opposition had in view when it raised the question of the danger of a Thermidor—that is, a departure from the rails of the proletarian revolution to the petty-bourgeois rails. The enormous difference in the history and character of our party from the parties of the Second International is clear to everybody. The Russian Communist party has been tempered in the fires of three revolutions. It has seized and held the power against a world of enemies. It has organized the Third International. Its fate is the fate of the first victorious proletarian revolution. The revolution determines the tempo of its inner life. All intellectual processes within the party, carrying themselves out under a high class-pressure, have a tendency to ripen and develop swiftly. Just for this reason we must have in our party a timely and decisive struggle against every first tendency to depart from the Leninist line.

The opportunist tendencies in the Russian Communist party have, in the present circumstances, deep objective roots: (1) The international bourgeois encirclement and the temporary partial stabi-

lization of capitalism create a disposition to believe in complete "stabilization." (2) The New Economic Policy, unconditionally necessary as a road toward socialism, having partially resurrected capitalism, revives also the forces hostile to socialism. (3) The petty-bourgeois elements in a country with an enormous majority of peasants cannot fail to overflow not only into the Soviets, but also into the party. (4) The fact that the party has a monopoly in the political field, a thing unconditionally necessary to the revolution, creates a further series of special dangers. The Eleventh Congress of the party, under Lenin, pointed out directly and candidly that there existed already in our party whole groups of people (from the well-off peasants, the upper clerical layers, and the intelligentsia) who would have been in the Social Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, if those parties were not illegal. (5) The state apparatus operated by the party pours into the party in its turn much that is bourgeois and petty bourgeois, infecting it with opportunism. (6) Through the specialists and the upper categories of the clerical workers and intelligentsia, necessary as they are to our constructive work, there flows into our apparatus—state, economic, and party—a continual stream of non-proletarian influences.

That is why the Leninist Oppositional wing of the party sounds the alarm so insistently as to the obvious and daily more and more threatening departures

of the Stalin group. It is criminal light-mindedness to assert that the great past of the party, and its old ranks of Bolsheviks, constitute a guarantee in all circumstances and for all time against the danger of opportunistic degeneration. Such an idea has nothing whatever in common with Marxism.

It is not such ideas that Lenin taught. At the Eleventh Congress of the party Lenin said: "History knows degenerations of all kinds. To rely upon the conviction, loyalty, and other excellent spiritual qualities of individuals—that is no serious thing in politics."¹

The workers who constituted the immense majority of the socialist parties of the West before the imperialist war were unconditionally opposed to an opportunist deviation. But they did not overcome *in time* the opportunistic mistakes of their leaders, which were not at first very great. They underestimated the significance of these mistakes. They did not understand that the first serious historical disturbance after that prolonged period of peaceful development, which had given birth to so powerful a workers' bureaucracy and aristocracy, would compel, not only the opportunists, but the Centrists also, to capitulate before the bourgeoisie, leaving the masses at that critical moment disarmed. If you can reproach the revolutionary Marxists, who were the left wing in the Second International before the war,

¹ Vol. XVIII, Part II, p. 42.

with anything, it is not that they exaggerated the danger of opportunism when they called it a national-liberal workers' policy, but that they relied too much upon the working-class membership of the socialist parties of those days. They relied upon the revolutionary instincts of the proletariat and upon the sharpening of class contradictions. They underestimated the real danger and mobilized against it with insufficient energy the revolutionary lower classes. We are not going to repeat that mistake. We are going to correct, in good time, the course of the party leadership. By that very fact we answer the accusation of a desire to split our party and form a new one. The dictatorship of the proletariat imperiously demands a single and united proletarian party as the leader of the working masses and the poor. Such unity unweakened by factional strife is unconditionally necessary to the proletariat in the fulfillment of its historic mission. This can be realized only upon the basis of the teachings of Marx and Lenin, undiluted with personal interpretations and undistorted with revisionism.

In contending for a definite tempo of industrialization as the premise of our socialist construction, in contending against the growth of the Kulak and his aspiration toward rulership in the country, in contending for a timely improvement of the living conditions of the workers, for democracy within the party, the trade-unions, and the Soviets—the Oppo-

sition contends not for ideas which might bring about a separation of the working-class from its party, but on the contrary for a reënforcement of the foundations of real unity in the All-Union Communist party. Without correcting the opportunist mistakes, you can have nothing but a show unity, which will weaken the party before the attack of the growing bourgeoisie, and in the case of war compel it to reform its ranks on the march and under the fire of the enemy. When they find out our real views and proposals, the proletarian nucleus of the party—of this we are sure—will accept them and fight for them, not as “factional” slogans, but as the very banner of party unity.

Our party has not yet clearly recognized, and for that reason has not corrected, the mistakes of its leadership. The extraordinarily swift growth of our industry during the restoration period has been one of the fundamental causes of that opportunistic illusion which the majority of the Central Committee has systematically encouraged in the party and the working-class. The swift beginnings of a betterment in the condition of the workers, by comparison with their condition during the civil war, gave birth in broad circles of the workers to the hope of a swift and painless overcoming of the contradictions of the NEP. This prevented the party from seeing in due season the danger of an opportunist departure.

The growth of the Leninist Opposition in the

party has impelled the worst elements of the bureaucracy to resort to methods heretofore unheard-of in the practice of Bolshevism. Being no longer able to prevent by decree the discussion of political questions in the party locals, a part of the bureaucracy is now resorting—just before the Fifteenth Congress—to the creation of gangs whose job is to break up all discussions of party problems by means of yells, whistles, putting out of lights, etc.

This attempt to introduce into our party methods of direct physical violence will arouse the indignation of all honest proletarian elements and will inevitably turn against its own organizers. No mechanical tricks of the worst part of the party apparatus will succeed in separating the party mass from the Opposition. Behind the Opposition stand the Leninist traditions of our party, the experience of the whole international workers' movement, the contemporary state of international politics and of our economic work of construction as seen by the international proletariat. Class contradictions, inevitably growing sharper after the restoration period, will more and more confirm our views of the way out of the present crisis. They will more and more consolidate the vanguard of the proletariat in the struggle for Leninism.

The growing danger of war is already impelling the worker member to think more deeply about the fundamental problems of the revolution. His

thoughts will inevitably force him to enter actively into the work of correcting opportunist mistakes.

The working-class section of our party has been largely crowded out of the party leadership in late years. It has been subjected to the devastating influence of a long campaign of slander, whose goal has been to prove that left is right and right is left. This working-class section of the party will come to itself. It will find out what is really happening. It will take the fate of the party into its own hands. To help the vanguard of the workers in this process is the task of the Opposition. It is the task of this platform.

The most important, the most militant, question, and the one which troubles all the members of our party, is the question of party unity. And in truth it is upon this question that the further fate of the proletarian revolution depends. Innumerable class enemies of the proletariat are listening intently to our inner-party disputes and with unconcealed delight and impatience are awaiting a split in our ranks. A split in our party, a formation of two parties, would mean enormous danger to the revolution.

We, the Opposition, unqualifiedly condemn every attempt whatsoever to create a second party. The slogan of two parties is the slogan of the Stalin group in its effort to crowd out of the All-Union Communist party the Leninist Opposition. Our task

is not to create a new party, but to correct the course of the All-Union Communist party. The proletarian revolution in the Soviet Union can win through to the end only with a united Bolshevik party. We are struggling within the Communist party for our views, and we decisively condemn the slogan, "Two parties," as *the slogan of adventurers*. The slogan, "Two parties," expresses on the one hand the desire of certain elements in the party apparatus for a split, and on the other, a mood of despair and a failure to comprehend that the task of Leninists is to win the victory of Lenin's ideas within the party, notwithstanding all difficulties. Nobody who sincerely defends the line of Lenin can entertain the idea of "two parties" or play with the suggestion of a split. Only those who desire to replace Lenin's course with some other can advocate a split or a movement along the two-party road.

We will struggle with all our force against the formation of two parties, for the dictatorship of the proletariat demands as its very core a united proletarian party. It demands a single party. It demands a proletarian party—that is, a party whose policy is determined by the interests of the proletariat and carried out by a proletarian nucleus. Correction of the line of our party, betterment of its social composition—this is not the two-party road, but the strengthening and guaranteeing of its unity as a revolutionary party of the proletariat.

On the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution, we express our profound conviction that the working-class did not sacrifice its innumerable victims, and overthrow capitalism, in order to prove unequal now to the task of correcting the mistakes of its leadership, carrying the proletarian revolution forward with a firm hand, and defending the Soviet Union, which is the center of the world revolution.

Against opportunism! Against a split! For the unity of the Leninist party!

PART III

STALIN FALSIFIES HISTORY

To the Bureau of Party History of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party:
Concerning the Falsification of the History of the October Insurrection, the History of the Revolution, and the History of the Party.

Esteemed Comrades:

You have sent me a very detailed printed sheet of inquiry concerning my participation in the October Revolution, and you request an answer. I doubt if I could add much to what is printed in various documents, speeches, and books, including my own. But I permit myself to ask you: What is the sense of questioning me about my participation in the October Revolution, when the entire official apparatus, yours along with the rest, is occupied with concealing, destroying, or at least distorting, every trace of that participation?

Hundreds of comrades have asked me again and again why I continue silent in the face of a perfectly outrageous falsification directed against me of the history of the October Revolution, and the history of our party. I certainly do not intend here to exhaust the topic of these falsifications. That would require several volumes. But in answer to your

questionnaire, I will indicate a few dozen examples of this conscious and spiteful distortion of the past, which is now organized on an enormous scale, sustained by the authority of all kinds of public institutions, and even carried into the textbooks.

CHAPTER I

THE WAR AND MY ARRIVAL IN PETROGRAD ¹

I arrived in Petrograd from a Canadian prison at the beginning of May 1917, on the second day after the entry of the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries into the Coalition Government.

The organs of your bureau, like many other publications, are trying at this late date to describe my work during the war as coming close to "social patriotism."² In this attempt they "forget" that a collection of my writings during the war, entitled *War and Revolution*, was published in many editions during Lenin's life, was studied in the party schools, and appeared in foreign translation among the publications of the Communist International.

You are trying to deceive the younger generation in regard to my line during the war, although it is well known that, for my revolutionary-internationalist struggle against the war, I was condemned to be imprisoned on sight in Germany as early as the end of 1914. This was for my German book *The War and the International*. I was banished from France,

¹ I have supplied the chapter headings in this letter. I have also placed in footnotes certain passages that were in Trotsky's main text.—*Tr.*

² Social patriotism is a contemptuous name given by the Bolsheviks to those socialists who abandoned their internationalism and their loyalty to the class-struggle, in order to support their own governments during and after the war.—*Tr.*

where I worked with the future founders of the Communist Party. I was arrested in Spain, where I had formed connections with the future Communists. I was deported from Spain to the United States, carried on revolutionary-internationalist work in New York, participated with Bolsheviks in the editorship of the newspaper *Novy Mir*, and there gave a Leninist evaluation of the first stages of the February Revolution. Returning from America to Russia, I was removed from the steamship by the British authorities, spent a month in a concentration camp in Canada, along with six or seven hundred German sailors, who subsequently enlisted on the side of Liebknecht and Lenin. (Many of them took part afterward in the civil war in Germany, and I receive letters from them to this day.)

On the subject of a British dispatch as to the causes of my arrest in Canada, Lenin's *Pravda* wrote as follows:

"From the editors: Is it possible to believe for a minute the dispatch received by the English ambassador stating that *Trotsky*, the former president of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies in Petrograd in 1905—a revolutionist devoted for decades to the service of the revolution—that this man had any connection with a plan subsidized by the 'German government'? This is clearly a monstrous and unscrupulous slander against a revolutionist." ³

³ *Pravda*, April 16, 1917.

How fresh those words sound now in this epoch of contemptible slanders against the Opposition—differing in no essential from the slanders against the Bolsheviks in 1917.

In the Notes to Volume XIV of the *Complete Works* of Lenin, published in 1921, you read:

“From the beginning of the imperialist war [Trotsky] took a straight internationalist position.”⁴

Such comments, and still more categorical ones, could be adduced to any number. The writers in our party press, both Russian and foreign, have pointed out hundreds of times in regard to my book, *War and Revolution*, that, considering my work during the war as a whole, one must recognize and understand that my differences with Lenin were of a subordinate character, and that my fundamental line was revolutionary and continually brought me nearer to Bolshevism—and this, not in words, but in deeds. I will not take the trouble here to dig into the political biographies of my present accusers—especially their activities during the war.

They are trying now to rest their case on certain isolated sharply polemical remarks of Lenin against me, among them some that were spoken during the war. Lenin could never endure any half-statements or unclearness. He was right in dealing double and triple blows when a political thought seemed to him

⁴ P. 482.

incomplete or ambiguous. But a political blow struck at a given moment is one thing, and the appraisal of a man's political line as a whole is another.

In 1918 or 1919, in America, a certain F. published a collection of articles by Lenin and me during the war period, among them my articles on the then debated question of the United States of Europe. How did Lenin react to that? He wrote:

"The American comrade F. was wholly right in publishing a thick book containing a series of articles by Trotsky and me, and thus giving an outline of the history of the Russian Revolution."⁵

On the arrival of our group in Leningrad, Comrade Fedorov, then a member of the Bolshevik Central Committee, welcomed us at the Finland station, and in his speech of welcome posed the question of the further stages of the revolution, the proletarian

⁵ Lenin, Vol. XVII, p. 96.

I will not touch upon the conduct of the majority of my present accusers at the beginning of the February Revolution. Here one could relate many interesting things as to the Skvortzov-Stepanovs, Yaroslavskis, and many, many others. I confine myself to a few words concerning Comrade Melnichansky, who has attempted in the press to bear false witness in regard to my attitude in New York in 1917.

Everybody in America knew Melnichansky as a Menshevik. In the struggle of the Bolsheviks and revolutionary internationalists against social patriotism and centrism, Melnichansky took no part. He side-stepped all such questions. He did the same thing in the Canadian camp where he (like many others) landed accidentally, along with me and Chudnovsky. In making our plans for future work, Chudnovsky and I did not impart them to Melnichansky. But since we had to live side by side in the barracks, Chudnovsky and I decided to put a plain question to Melnichansky: With whom was he going to work in Russia, with

dictatorship, and the socialist course of development. I answered in full accord with his formulation of the prospects of the revolution. Fedorov told me subsequently that the fundamental points of his speech had been formulated by him in agreement with Lenin—or more accurately at Lenin's direction. It goes without saying that Lenin considered those points decisive as to the possibility of our coöperation.

I did not enter, immediately upon my arrival from Canada, into the Bolshevik organization. Why? Was it because of disagreements? You are trying to make them up now after the fact. Whoever lived through 1917 as a member of the central nucleus of the Bolsheviks, knows that there was never a hint of any disagreement whatever between me and Lenin from the first day. On my arrival in Petrograd, or rather

the Mensheviks or the Bolsheviks? To Melnichansky's credit it is necessary to state that he answered, "With the Bolsheviks." Only after that Chudnovsky and I began to talk with him as with a comrade.

Read over what Melnichansky has written in 1924 and 1927. Anybody who knew Melnichansky in America could only laugh at it. But why go back to America? You have only to listen to any speech of Melnichansky's in order to recognize the opportunist office-holder, to whom Purcellism is much closer than Leninism.

(Skvortzov-Stepanov is the present editor of *Izvestia*. In 1917, when Lenin and Trotsky were summoning the Russian workers to stop the war and form their own government, Skvortzov-Stepanov was urging them to subscribe to Kerensky's "Liberty Bonds." Yaroslavsky is the literary henchman of Stalin. He also advocated support to the Provisional Government after the February Revolution. Melnichansky is president of the Moscow Council of Trade Unions. Of Chudnovsky I know nothing.—*Tr.*)

in the Finland station, I learned from the comrades sent to meet us that there existed in Petrograd an organization of revolutionary internationalists (the so-called Mezhrayontzi) which was considering the question of fusion with the Bolsheviks, and that certain of the leading workers in this organization were postponing the decision of this question until my arrival. In the staff of the Mezhrayontzi organization, which comprised about 3,000 Petrograd workers, were to be found Uritzky, A. A. Joffé, Lunacharsky, Iurenev, Karakhan, Vladimirov, Manuisky, Pozern, Litvens, and others.

Here is the characterization of the Mezhrayontzi to be found in the fourteenth volume of the works of Lenin:

"On the war question the Mezhrayontzi occupied an internationalist position, and in their tactics were close to the Bolsheviks."⁶

From the first days after my arrival I said, first to Comrade Kamenev, afterward to the editor of *Pravda* in the presence of Lenin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, that I was ready that day to join the Bolshevik organization, in view of the absence of any disagreements whatever, but that it was necessary to decide the question of the quickest possible attraction into the party of the Mezhrayontzi organization. I remember that some one of those present raised the question how I thought the fusion should be carried

⁶ Vol. XIV, pp. 488-489.

out (what member of the Mezhrayontzi should go into the editorial staff of *Pravda*, who into the Central Committee, etc.). I answered that for me that question had no political importance, in view of the absence of all disagreements.

In the staff of the Mezhrayontzi there were elements which tried to delay the fusion, advancing this or that condition, etc. Between the Petersburg Committee of the Party and the Mezhrayontzi there had piled up, as always in such circumstances, old grudges, lack of confidence, etc. That and that alone caused the delay in our fusion.

CHAPTER II

RASKOLNIKOV'S TWO OPINIONS

Comrade Raskolnikov ¹ has covered no little paper in recent times with attempts to contrast my line in the year 1917 with Lenin's. It is needless to adduce examples, especially since his writing does not differ in the least from all the other falsifications of the same period. Suffice it to quote some words which this same Raskolnikov wrote about that period a little earlier.

"The echoes of past disagreements during the pre-war period had completely disappeared. No differences existed between the tactical line of Lenin and Trotsky. That fusion, already observable during the war, was completely and definitely achieved from the moment of Trotsky's return to Russia. From his first public speech all of us old Leninists felt that he was ours." ²

Those words were written not in order to prove something, or refute something, but just to tell it as

¹ In 1917 Raskolnikov was an officer in the fleet, and took part in the overthrow of the Provisional Government as one of the leaders of the Kronstadt Soviet. He works now in the Communist International.

² "Kerensky's Jail," *The Proletarian Revolution*, Nos. 10, 22, 1923, pp. 150-152.

it was. Later on Raskolnikov showed that he also knows how to tell it as it was not. In republishing his articles in the organ of the Bureau of Party History, Raskolnikov carefully removed from them what was, in order to replace it with what was not.

Maybe it is not worth while to dwell upon Comrade Raskolnikov, but his example is very clear. In his review of the third volume of my works³ Raskolnikov asks, "And what was the position of Trotsky himself in 1917"? and answers, "Comrade Trotsky still considered himself a member of the same general party with the Mensheviks, Tzeretelli and Skobelev." And further: "Comrade Trotsky had not yet clarified his attitude towards Bolshevism and Menshevism. At that time Comrade Trotsky still occupied a wavering, indefinite, straddling position."

How shall we reconcile these really impudent assertions with the words of this same Raskolnikov quoted above: "The echoes of past disagreements during the pre-war period had completely disappeared"? If Trotsky had not defined his attitude towards Bolshevism and Menshevism, how did it happen that "all of us old Leninists felt that he was ours"?

But that is not all. In the article of this same Raskolnikov entitled "July Days,"⁴ we read:

"Leon Davidovich was not at that time formally

³ *Krasnaia Nov*, Nos. 7 and 8, pp. 395-401.

⁴ *Proletarian Revolution*, No. 517, 1923, pp. 71-72.

a member of our party, but as a matter of fact he worked within it continually from the day of his arrival from America. At any rate, immediately after his first speech in the Soviet, we all looked upon him as one of our party leaders.”

That seems clear. It seems incapable of false interpretation. But never fear. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. And how great is the “evil” of our day—an evil systematically organized and reënforced by official command and instruction.

In order that the conduct of Raskolnikov, characteristic not of him personally but of our entire present system of leadership and education, may appear in its full beauty, I must cite from his article on “Kerensky’s Prison” a longer paragraph. Here is what he says there:

“Trotsky’s attitude to Vladimir Ilych was one of enormous respect. He held Lenin higher than all contemporaries whom he had met in Russia or abroad. In the tone in which Trotsky spoke of Lenin you felt the devotion of a pupil. At that time Lenin had done thirty years’ service to the proletariat, Trotsky twenty. The echoes of past disagreements of the pre-war period had completely disappeared. No distinction existed between the tactical line of Lenin and Trotsky. That fusion, already observable during the war, was completely and definitely achieved from the moment of Trotsky’s return to Russia.

From his first public speech all of us old Leninists felt that he was ours.”⁵

It is necessary to add that Raskolnikov met me often during his work in the summer months of 1917. He drove me to Kronstadt, he turned to me many times for counsel, held long conversations with me in

⁵ This testimony of Raskolnikov as to the relations between Lenin and Trotsky does not, of course, deter Raskolnikov from quoting the “Letter of Trotsky to Tcheidze,” for the education of the younger members of the party. (Tcheidze was a leader of the Mensheviks, to whom in 1912—at the height of his disputes with Lenin—Trotsky wrote a letter attacking Lenin in extreme language.—*Tr.*)

Before parting with Raskolnikov, let us hear how he portrayed in his recollections the reading by the investigator of the testimony of Ermolenko in regard to German gold, etc.:

“During the reading of his testimony we made from time to time ironical comments, but when the dispassionate voice of the investigator arrived at the name so dear to us of Comrade Lenin, Trotsky could not restrain himself. He struck the table with his fist, rose to his full height, and announced with indignation that he refused to listen to this vile and lying testimony. Unable to restrain our wrath in the face of this unconcealed falsification, we all to the last man hotly supported Comrade Trotsky.”

Wrath in the face of “unconcealed falsification” is a perfectly understandable feeling. But leaving aside the trivial falsifications of Raskolnikov himself (also none too well concealed), let me ask: What is the attitude of the present Raskolnikov, having graduated from the Stalin school, to the latest creations *à la* Ermolenko in regard to the officer of Wrangel and the counter-revolutionary conspiracy?

(Ermolenko was the czarist spy who fabricated documents to establish a connection between Lenin and Trotsky and the German General Staff. They became known in America as the “Sisson Documents.” The investigation described here was held by a commission appointed by the Provisional Government. The allusion in the final paragraph is to the fact that Stalin employed an *agent provocateur*, quite in the manner of the czarist government, in order to establish a connection between the Opposition led by Trotsky and the White Guards operating in Russia. See Explanatory Note following my Introduction.—*Tr.*)

prison, and so forth and so forth. His recollections represent therefore an invaluable testimonial proof, whereas his later "corrections" are nothing more nor less than the work of a falsificator fulfilling his task under orders.

CHAPTER III

MAY TO OCTOBER 1917

A series of documents issued by the Bolsheviks in May, June, and July 1917, were written by me or with my editorial participation. To this series belong, for instance, the declaration of the Bolshevik fraction of the Soviet Congress as to the proposed advance on the front (first Congress of the Soviets), the letter to the Executive Committee from the Central Committee of the Bolshevik party in the days of the June demonstration, and others. I have chanced upon quite a number of Bolshevik resolutions of this period which I wrote, or participated in writing. In all my speeches at all meetings, as is well known to all the comrades, I identified myself with the Bolsheviks.

One of the "Marxist historians" of the new style attempted not long ago to discover disagreements between me and Lenin on the subject of the July uprising.¹ Every one tries to contribute his mite, hoping

¹ A spontaneous uprising of the Petrograd workers and soldiers against the Provisional Government. It was not initiated nor desired by the Bolsheviks, but when it occurred the party decided to take its place at the head of it. As the masses were not ready to seize the power, the movement weakened rapidly and subsided in two or three days. The entire bourgeois and Menshevik press

to receive it back a hundredfold. You have to overcome a feeling of disgust even to refute such falsifications. I will not cite memoirs. I limit myself to documents. In my declaration to the Provisional Government at that time, I wrote:

“(1) I share the fundamental position of Lenin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, and I have developed it in my journal, *Vperiod*, and in general in all my public speeches. . . .

“(2) My not participating in the editorship of *Pravda* and not belonging to the Bolshevik organization are not due to political differences, but to conditions in our party history which have now lost all significance.”²

In connection with the July uprising, the Social Revolutionary-Menshevik Praesidium called a meeting of the Central Executive Committee. The Bolshevik faction invited me to make their declaration on the question of the new situation and the problems of the party. That was *before* my formal union with the party, and notwithstanding the fact that Stalin, for example, was then in Petrograd. The “Marxist historians” of the new style did not then exist, and the assembled Bolsheviks unanimously con-

accused the Bolsheviks of organizing this uprising and started a furious attack on them. Lenin went into hiding. Trotsky remained free for a time, but on the twenty-third of July was arrested, and remained in prison until the fourth of September.

—*Tr.*

² *Works*, Vol. III, Part I, pp. 165-166.

firmed the fundamental ideas of my declaration as to the July uprising and the problems of the party. There is printed testimony to this, particularly in the memoirs of N. I. Muralev.

Lenin, as is well known, did not suffer from benevolent confidence in people when it was a question of mental attitude or of political conduct in hard circumstances, and such benevolence was particularly foreign to him in relation to revolutionists who had stood in a preceding period outside the ranks of the Bolshevik party. It was the July uprising which broke down all remnants of the old dividing lines. In his letter on the list of Bolshevik candidates for the Constituent Assembly, Vladimir Ilych wrote:

“We cannot possibly permit such an immoderate number of candidates from people of little experience who have just recently joined the party (such as U. Larin). We must have a special reconsideration and correction of the list. . . .

“It goes without saying that . . . nobody would oppose such a candidature, for example, as that of L. D. Trotsky, for, in the first place, Trotsky immediately, from the day of his arrival, occupied an internationalist position; in the second place, he fought among the Mezhrayontzi for union with the Bolsheviks; and third, in the difficult July days, he showed himself at the height of the task, a devoted defender of the party of the revolutionary proletariat. Obviously that cannot be said for a majority of

the recent members of the party who appear in the list.”³

The question of our relation to the “Pre-parliament” was decided in Lenin’s absence. I appeared as the speaker for those Bolsheviks who believed in boycotting the Pre-parliament. The majority of the Bolshevik fraction of the Democratic Conference⁴ voted, as is well known, against the boycott. Lenin decisively supported the minority. Here is what he wrote on that theme:

“We must boycott the Pre-parliament. We must

³ “The First Legal Petersburg Committee of the Bolsheviks in 1917,” *Leningrad Party History*, pp. 305-306.

⁴ The Democratic Conference was a gathering of delegates from various coöperative and other social organizations called together by the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries on the fourteenth of September, 1917. Their purpose was to find some means of supporting the Provisional Government, already losing power to the Soviets, which were going Bolshevik. The Democratic Conference endeavored to create a new organ, the so-called Pre-parliament or Soviet of the Republic, which was supposed to control the government.

Those Bolsheviks who were consciously moving toward the revolutionary seizure of power, with Trotsky and Lenin at their head, naturally opposed the Democratic Conference and the Pre-parliament. Those who subsequently opposed the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, Kamenev and Rykov in particular, favored this attempt to support the Provisional Government. Lenin was then “underground,” writing vigorous daily letters to the party, insisting upon an aggressive policy of preparation for the seizure of power.

In his letters supporting Trotsky, Lenin wrote:

“There is no possible doubt that in the ‘summits’ of our party there is a disposition to waver which may be ruinous for the struggle is developing. . . . There is something the matter in the ‘parliamentary’ summits of the party.”

It is interesting to note that the Central Committee of that time, and the editors of *Pravda*, behaved in relation to Lenin

abandon the Soviet of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies, and go to the trade-unions, go to the masses in general. We must summon them to the fight. We must give them a true and clear slogan: Disperse the Bonapartist band of Kerensky, with his false Pre-parliament, with its Tzeretelli-Bulyginsky Duma. The Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries did not accept, even after Kornilov's attack, our compromise, our proposal of a peaceful transfer of power to the Soviets (in which, at that time, we did not have a majority). They sank again into the swamp of dirty and underhand bargains with the Cadets. Down with the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries! Ruthless war on them!

much as they did afterward in relation to Trotsky. In his letter of September 29, Lenin wrote:

"Seeing that the Central Committee has left *even without an answer* my insistence upon this from the beginning of the Democratic Conference, and that the Central Committee *omits* from my article my indication of such flagrant mistakes as the shameful decision to take part in the Pre-parliament, the offering to Mensheviks of places in the praesidium of the Soviet, and so forth and so forth, I cannot but see here a 'gentle' hint as to the unwillingness of the Central Committee even to consider this question. A gentle hint as to shutting my mouth and even a proposal that I should withdraw.

"It becomes necessary for me to *request permission to withdraw* from the Central Committee, which I do and reserve my freedom of agitation in the lower levels of the party and at the party congress."

As the majority of the Central Committee did not, at that time, have a monopoly of the press or the assistance of the G.P.U., Lenin's letter came before the party and the situation was quickly changed. At the meeting of the Bolshevik fraction on October 7, where again Trotsky spoke for the boycott and Kamenev against, the point of view of Lenin and Trotsky was adopted after a stormy debate.—*Tr.*

“Ruthlessly drive them out of all revolutionary organizations. No negotiations, no conferences with those friends of the Kishkins, friends of Kornilov’s landlords and capitalists.

“Saturday, September 23.

“Trotsky was for the boycott. Bravo, Comrade Trotsky!

“Boycottism was beaten in the Bolshevik faction attending the Democratic Conference. Long live the boycott!”⁵

⁵ *Proletarian Revolution*, No. 3, 1924.

CHAPTER IV

MY PART IN THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

As to my participation in the October Revolution—in the notes to Volume XIV of the *Complete Works* of Lenin, you read:

“After the majority of the Petersburg Soviet passed into the hands of the Bolsheviki, Trotsky was elected its president and in that position organized and led the insurrection of October 25.”¹

How much is true here, and how much false, let the Bureau of Party History decide—if not the present one, then some future Bureau. Comrade Stalin has lately categorically denied the truth of this assertion. Thus:

“I have to say that Comrade Trotsky played no particular rôle in the October insurrection and could not do so, that being president of the Petrograd Soviet, he merely fulfilled the will of the corresponding party authority, which guided his every step.”

And further:

“Comrade Trotsky played no particular rôle either in the party or the October insurrection, and

¹ P. 482.

could not do so, being a man comparatively new to our party in the October period.”²

In giving this testimony, Stalin forgot what he himself said on the sixth of November, 1918; that is, on the first anniversary of the revolution, when facts and events were still too fresh in the minds of all. Even then Stalin had already begun that work in relation to me which he has now developed on such a grand scale. But he was then compelled to conduct it far more cautiously and underhandedly than he is now. Here is what he wrote then in *Pravda*³ under the title, “The Rôle of the Most Eminent Party Leaders”:

“All the work of practical organization of the insurrection was conducted under the immediate leadership of the President of the Petrograd Soviet, Comrade Trotsky. It is possible to declare with certainty that the swift passing of the garrison to the side of the Soviet, and the bold execution of the work of the Military Revolutionary Committee, the party owes principally and above all to Comrade Trotsky.”

Those words, spoken by no means for the purpose of laudatory exaggeration—on the contrary, Stalin’s goal was then wholly different, but I will not dwell on that—those words sound absolutely incredible today as coming from the lips of Stalin.

It was said long ago: A truthful man has this

² J. Stalin, *About Trotskyism, Trotskyism or Leninism*, pp. 68-69.

³ No. 241.

advantage, that even with a bad memory he never contradicts himself. A disloyal, unscrupulous, and dishonest man has always to remember what he said in the past, in order not to shame himself.

Comrade Stalin, with the help of the Yaroslavskies, is trying to construct a new history of the organization of the October insurrection based on the fact that the party created a "practical center for the organizational leadership of the insurrection," of which, it appears, Trotsky was not a member. Lenin was not a member of that committee. That fact alone demonstrates that the committee had only a subordinate organizational significance. It played no independent rôle whatever. The legend about this committee has been created today for the simple reason that Stalin was a member of it. Here is the membership: "Sverdlov, Stalin, Dzerzhinsky, Bubnov, Uritzky." However unpleasant it is to dig in the rubbish, it seems necessary for me, as a sufficiently close participant and witness of the events of that time, to testify as follows:

The rôle of Lenin, of course, needs no illumination. Sverdlov I often met, and I often turned to him for counsel and for people to help me. Comrade Kamenev, who, as is well known, occupied then a special position, the incorrectness of which he himself has long ago acknowledged,⁴ took nevertheless a most active

⁴This is a mild reference to the fact that Kamenev and Zinoviev opposed the seizure of power in October, held negotiations against it with the Mensheviks, and even made known in a non-Bolshevik paper the *secret resolution* of the Bolshevik Cen-

part in the events of the revolution. The decisive night, from the twenty-fifth to the twenty-sixth, Kamenev and I spent together in the quarters of the Military Revolutionary Committee, answering questions and giving orders by telephone. But stretch my memory as I will, I cannot answer the question in just what consisted, during those decisive days, the rôle of Stalin. It never once happened that I turned to him for advice or coöperation. He never showed the slightest initiative. He never advanced one independent proposal. This fact no "Marxist historian" of the new style can alter.

A SUPPLEMENTARY INSERTION

Stalin and Yaroslavsky, as I said above, have wasted much effort these last months in proving that the organizational center created by the party consisting of Sverdlov, Stalin, Bubnov, Uritzky, and Dzherzhinsky guided, so to speak, the whole course of the insurrection. Stalin has emphasized, every way he can, the fact that Trotsky was not a member of that center. But alas! through sheer carelessness on the

tral Committee calling for the insurrection. They were denounced as "traitors," "deserters," "strike-breakers," etc., by Lenin in a long letter which I published in my *Since Lenin Died*.

Zinoviev subsequently stated that the two greatest mistakes of his life were this opposition to Lenin in 1917 and his opposition to Trotsky in 1924. "I am working with Trotsky now for long," he said. That was two years ago, and he has already deserted again, and is writing "anti-Trotskyist" articles at the behest of Stalin.—*Tr.*

part of Stalin's historians, in *Pravda* for Nov. 2, 1927—that is, after the present letter was written—there appeared an accurate excerpt from the report of the Central Committee for the sixteenth to the twenty-ninth of October, 1917.

“The Central Committee creates a military revolutionary center with the following members, Sverdlov, Stalin, Bubnov, Uritzky, and Dzerzhinsky. *This center is to be a constituent part of the Revolutionary Soviet Committee.*”

The Revolutionary Soviet Committee is the Military Revolutionary Committee created by the Petrograd Soviet. No other Soviet organ for the leadership of the insurrection existed. Thus these five comrades, designated by the Central Committee, were required to enter as a supplement into the staff of that same Military Revolutionary Committee of which Trotsky was the president. Superfluous, it would seem, for Trotsky to be introduced a second time into the staff of an organization of which he was already the president! How hard it is, after all, to correct history after it is finished!

Nov. 11, 1927.

I wrote at Brest a short outline of the October Revolution. This book went through a great number of editions in various languages. Nobody ever told me that there is a flagrant omission in my book—namely, that it nowhere points out the chief guide

school book of the history of the October Revolution. How does this happen? It happens because the eyes of Stalin and the Stalinists were opened to "Trotskyism," only after the eyes of Lenin were closed forever.

CHAPTER V

"LOST" DOCUMENTS

Shortly after the October Revolution, there appeared among the heads of the party sharp disagreements as to our relations with other "Socialist" parties. (Should we form a homogeneous Bolshevik government or a coalition with the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries?) The fourteenth of November, Lenin spoke on this question at the meeting of the Petrograd Committee. The reports of the Central Committee meetings for 1917 were published on the Tenth Anniversary of October. Originally the report of this session of November 14 was included among them. In the first proof of the chapter headings, this report is indicated. But afterwards, under orders from above, the report of November 14 was removed and concealed from the party. It is easy to understand why. On the question of a coalition, Lenin spoke to the committee as follows:

"As for a coalition, I cannot even speak about that seriously. Trotsky long ago said that a union is impossible. Trotsky understood this, and from that time on *there has been no better Bolshevik.*"¹

¹ This statement acquires added significance from the fact that exactly at this time and on this question, Lenin was at war with five of his own followers, including Rykov, Kamenev, and Zinoviev. They resigned from the Central Committee, and Rykov

The speech ends with the slogan:

"No compromise! A homogeneous Bolshevik government."

They tell us that the order to remove this report came from the Bureau of Party History with this explanation, that "obviously" the speech of Lenin was incorrectly reported. It certainly is true that the speech of Lenin does not correspond to the history of October which is being written now.

It is worth noting that this same report of the session of the Petersburg Committee testifies as to Lenin's attitude to the question of discipline when discipline is being used to cover a clearly opportunist policy. After the speech of Comrade Fenigstein, Lenin announced:

"If you want a split, go ahead. If you get the majority, take the power in the Central Executive Committee and carry on. We'll go to the sailors."

Exactly by means of this bold, decisive, irreconcilable attitude, Lenin saved the party from a split.

Iron discipline, yes, but on the basis of a revolutionary policy.

On the fourth of April Lenin said (at a party conference the report of which Stalin hides from the party):

also from his post in the Government, because of Lenin's refusal to form a coalition with the other Socialist parties. Lenin denounced them publicly as "deserters" and called upon the workers and soldiers and peasants to denounce them also. In these circumstances his statement about Trotsky, "From that time on there has been no better Bolshevik," had somewhat the character of a formal notification to his own followers.—*Tr.*

"Even our Bolsheviks are showing confidence in the Provisional Government. That can only be explained by the gas rising from the revolution. That is the end of socialism. You, comrades, have an attitude of confidence in the Government. If that is so, we can't work together."

And further:

"I hear that a coalition tendency is abroad in Russia, coalition with the national defenders. That is a betrayal of socialism. I think it is better to remain alone, like Liebknecht—one against a hundred and ten."

Why did Lenin put this matter so drastically—one against a hundred and ten? Because in the March conference of 1917 the half-compromising tendencies were very strong.

Stalin supported in that conference the resolution of the Krasnoyarsk Soviet which advocated:

"Support to the Provisional Government in its activities, only in so far as it follows a course of satisfying the demands of the working class and the revolutionary peasantry in the revolution that is taking place."

More than that, Stalin stood for a coalition with Tzeretelli.² Here is an accurate excerpt from the report of the conference:

² Tzeretelli was the leader of the Mensheviks, subsequently head of the Menshevik government of Georgia, now on the Executive Committee of the Second International.—*Tr.*

"On the order of the day the proposal of Tzeretelli for coalition.

"Stalin: We ought to go. It is necessary to define our proposal as to the terms of union. A coalition is possible on the terms of Zimmerwald-Kienthal."

To the objection of certain members of the conference that such a coalition would be too many-colored, Stalin answered:

"It is no use running ahead and anticipating disagreements. There is no party life without disagreements. We will overcome trivial disagreements within the party."

Disagreements with Tzeretelli, Stalin considered trivial. In his relations with the followers of Tzeretelli, Stalin was for a broad democracy. "There is no party life without disagreements," he said.

Now, Comrade directors of the Bureau of Party History, permit me to ask you: Why have the reports of the party conference of March 1917 never yet seen the light of day? You sprinkle abroad questionnaires with innumerable graphs and rubrics. You collect every kind of triviality, often the most insignificant. Why do you keep on hiding the reports of the March conference, which have a monumental significance for the history of our party? Those reports reveal the condition of the dominant elements of the party on the eve of Lenin's return to Russia. In the secretariat of the Central Committee and in the praesidium of the Central Control Committee, I

have repeatedly asked: Why does the Bureau of Party History conceal from the party a document of such extraordinary significance? The document is known to you. It is in your possession. You do not publish it for the simple reason that it cruelly reflects upon the political course of Stalin at the end of March and the beginning of April—that is to say, in that period when Stalin *independently* tried to work out a political policy.

In his same speech at the conference of April 4, Lenin said:

“*Pravda* demands from the government that it renounce annexations. Nonsense! Flagrant mockery of . . .”

The report is not edited. There is an omission here. But the general thought and the general direction of the speech are absolutely clear. One of the editors of *Pravda* was Stalin. In *Pravda* Stalin wrote semi-patriotic³ articles and supported the Provisional Government “in so far as,” etc. With reservations, Stalin welcomed the manifesto of Kerensky and Tzeretelli to the people—a lying social patriotic document which aroused nothing but indignation in Lenin.

That is why, Comrades of the Bureau of Party History, and that is the only reason why, you do not

³ The Russian word which I translate *patriotic*, means more exactly *in favor of defending the fatherland*.—Tr.

publish the report of the party conference of March 1917, but hide it from the party.

I cited above the speech of Lenin at the meeting of the Petersburg Committee, November 14. Where is the report of that meeting printed? Nowhere. Why? Because you have forbidden it. There has just appeared a collection of the reports of the first legal Petersburg Committee of 1917. The report of the session of November 14 was originally included in this collection and was indicated in the table of contents as at first set up. But afterward, as I said, at the direction of the Bureau of Party History, the report was withdrawn from the book with this remarkable explanation, that "obviously" the speech of Lenin was distorted by the secretary in his notes. In what consists this "obvious" distortion? It consists in this: That Lenin's speech ruthlessly refutes the false assertions of the present historical school of Stalin-Yaroslavsky in regard to Trotsky. Every one who knows the oratorical manner of Lenin will acknowledge without hesitation the authenticity of the phrase attributed to him. Behind the words of Lenin about compromise, behind his threat—"We will go to the sailors"—you feel the living Lenin of those days. You hide him from the party. Why? Because of his comment on Trotsky. Only that.

You hide the reports of the March conference of 1917 because they compromise Stalin. You hide the

report of the session of November 14 because it obstructs your work of falsification against Trotsky.*

*Permit me to touch upon an incidental episode concerning Comrade Rykov. Many comrades were surprised at the publication, in the notes of the Lenin Institute, of an article in which Lenin wrote several unpleasant lines in regard to Rykov. Here is what he wrote:

"*Rabochaia Gazeta*, an organ of the Menshevik Ministerialists, is trying to reproach us because the police in 1911 arrested a Bolshevik compromiser, Rykov, in order to give 'free' activity on the eve of the elections to the fourth Duma (*Rabochaia Gazeta* especially emphasizes this to the Bolsheviks of our party)."

Thus, in 1911, Lenin numbered Rykov among the non-party Bolsheviks. How did these lines happen to see the light of day? Ordinarily in these times only harsh comments on the Oppositionists are quoted from the works of Lenin. About the representatives of the present majority, it is permitted to quote only praise (provided there is any). How then did the above lines get into print? Everybody is explaining this fact in exactly the same way: Stalin's historians consider necessary (so soon! so soon!) a complete objectivity—in regard to Rykov.

CHAPTER VI

THE TWO OPINIONS OF YAROSLAVSKY

Nine tenths of his slanders and falsifications Yaroslavsky dedicates to the author of these lines. It would be hard to imagine lies more confused and at the same time more spiteful. Do not make the mistake of thinking, however, that Yaroslavsky always wrote this way. No, he wrote quite differently. It was just as purple, it was in just as bad taste, but to exactly the opposite effect. In the spring of 1923, Yaroslavsky devoted an article to the beginnings of the political activity of the author of these lines. The article is a tumultuous panegyric, unbearable to read. It requires an effort to quote from it. Still it is necessary. In his character of inquisitor, Yaroslavsky takes a voluptuous pleasure in bringing face to face on the witness-stand communists guilty of distributing the Testament of Lenin, the letters of Lenin on the national question, and other illegal documents in which Lenin dared to criticize Stalin. Let us bring Yaroslavsky face to face with himself.

“The brilliant literary-publicistic activity of Comrade Trotsky (so Yaroslavsky wrote in 1923) gained him the world-wide name of ‘Prince of Pam-

phleteers.' The English writer Bernard Shaw described him thus. Whoever has followed his activity during the course of a quarter of a century, cannot but be convinced that this talent of the pamphleteer and polemist developed, grew, and blossomed with especial brilliancy during the years of our proletarian revolution. But even at the dawn of his activity, it was observable that we had before us an endowment most profound. All his newspaper articles were saturated with inspiration, they all partook of imagery, color, although they had to be written within the jaws of the vise of the czarist censorship, which defaced the bold thought and the bold form of every one who wished to escape from the grip of those jaws and raise himself above the common level. But so great were the ripening underground forces, so strongly was felt the beating of the heart of the awakening people, so sharp were the developing contradictions, that all the censors in the world could not stamp out the creative power of such a shining individual personality as was already in those days the figure of L. D. Trotsky.

"Probably many have seen the quite widely distributed photograph of the youth Trotsky when he was first sentenced to exile in Siberia—that boisterous head of hair, those characteristic lips and lofty brow. Under that head of hair, under that lofty brow, was boiling even then a turbulent stream of

images, thoughts, moods—sometimes diverting Comrade Trotsky a little from the great road of history, compelling him sometimes to choose a too long way round, or, on the other hand, to cut his way fearlessly through where it was inadvisable to go. *But in all these searchings we had before us a deeply devoted revolutionary man, born to the rôle of tribune, with a tongue sharply whetted and flexible as steel, slaughtering his enemies, and a pen scattering in handfuls (!) like artistic pearls the riches of his thought.*”

And further: “The articles at our disposal embrace a period of more than two years—from Oct. 15, 1900, to Sept. 12, 1902. The Siberian comrades read with delight these brilliant articles and awaited their appearance with impatience. Only a few knew who was the author, and those knowing him never guessed in those days that he would be *one of the recognized leaders of the most revolutionary army and of the greatest revolution in the world.*”

And finally the conclusion:

“His protest against the pessimism of the demagnetized Russian intelligentsia (ahem!) Comrade Trotsky established later. Not in words, but in deeds he established it, shoulder to shoulder with the revolutionary proletariat of the great proletarian revolution. For this great powers were needed. The Siberian village did not destroy in him these powers. It only

further convinced him of the necessity of radically breaking, to the foundation, that whole structure in which the facts described by him were possible.”¹

Although in some of his more recent appreciations Comrade Yaroslavsky may have rounded the circle at 180 degrees, we must confess that in one respect he remains exactly the same: he is equally unbearable in slander and in praise.

¹ *Siberian Fires*, Nos. 1 and 2, January and April 1923.

CHAPTER VII

THE TWO OPINIONS OF OLMINSKY AND LUNACHARSKY

Among the exposers of "Trotskyism," Olmsky¹ has occupied a fairly prominent place. He has been especially zealous, I remember, on the subject of my book *1905*, which appeared originally in the German language. But Olmsky has had two opinions upon this subject: one in the days of Lenin, another in the days of Stalin. In October 1921, somebody raised the question of the publication of my book, *1905*. Olmsky wrote me on that subject the following letter:

"Dear Leon Davidovich:

"The Bureau of Party History will be delighted, of course, to publish your book in Russian, but the question is: Who shall translate it? You can't let the first man you meet translate a book by *Trotsky*! All the beauty and individuality of the style will be lost. Maybe you could dig out a little hour a day from your other work of State importance for this work—

¹ Olmsky is a man ninety years of age. He is President of the "Commission for the Study of the History of the Party and the October Revolution," which I have called for short the "Bureau of Party History."—*Tr.*

also, by the way, of State importance—and dictate the text in Russian to a typist.

“One other question: Why not begin to prepare a complete collection of your literary works? We could easily commission some one to take charge of that. It is time to do it. The new generation, not knowing as it should the history of the party, unacquainted with the old and recent writings of the leaders, will always be getting off the track. I am returning the book in the hope that it soon comes back to the Bureau in a Russian text.

“With best wishes,

“M. OLMINSKY.

“Oct. 10, 1921.”

That is how Olminsky wrote at the end of 1921—that is to say, long after the disagreement about the Brest-Litovsk peace and about the trade-unions, disagreements to which Olminsky and Co. are now trying to impart such an exaggerated significance. In the autumn of 1921 Olminsky considered the publication of *1905* a work of “State importance.” Olminsky was the initiator of the publication of my complete works, which he considered necessary for the education of party members. In the autumn of 1921 Olminsky was not a child. He knew the past. My disagreements with Bolshevism were known to him better than to anybody else. He himself had engaged in polemics with me in the old days. All this did not

prevent him, in the autumn of 1921, from insisting upon the publication of a complete collection of my works in the interests of educating the party youth. Was Olminsky perhaps a "Trotskyist" in 1921?

Comrade Lunacharsky also now appears among the "exposers" of the Opposition. Following the others, he accuses us of pessimism and lack of faith. This rôle is especially becoming to Lunacharsky.²

Following the others, Lunacharsky occupies himself not only with contrasting "Trotskyism" and Leninism, but also supports—in a very slightly disguised form—every kind of personal insinuation. Like certain others, Lunacharsky knows how to write on one and the same question, both for and against. In 1923 he issued a little book, *Revolutionary Silhouettes*. There is a chapter in that book dedicated to me. I will not quote this chapter for the oratorical exaggeration of its praise. I will quote merely two passages in which Lunacharsky speaks of my attitude toward Lenin:

"Trotsky is a prickly person, imperious. Only in his relations with Lenin after their union, Trotsky always showed, and still shows, a tender and touching yieldingness, and with a modesty characteristic of

² This irony at the expense of Lunacharsky refers to the fact that during the October days, when it was reported in Petrograd that the beautiful church of Vassily the Blessed in Moscow had been injured by the revolutionists, Lunacharsky declared that if the revolution necessitated the destruction of works of art, he was against the revolution.

the truly great recognizes Lenin's superior authority."³

And a few pages earlier:

"When Lenin lay wounded mortally as we feared, no one expressed our feeling about him better than Trotsky. In the terrible storm of world events Trotsky, the other leader of the Russian revolution, by no means inclined to sentimentalism, said: 'When you think that Lenin might die, it seems as if all of our lives were useless, and you want to stop living.'"⁴

What sort of people are these, who know how to write this thing or that, at the direction of their master, like a social secretary?

³ P. 25.

⁴ P. 13.

CHAPTER VIII

THE DEBATES ABOUT BREST-LITOVSK AND THE TRADE-UNIONS

What I have demonstrated above with examples taken from the year 1917, could be carried through all the years which followed. I do not mean that there were no disagreements between Lenin and me. There were. The disagreement about the Brest-Litovsk peace lasted several weeks and assumed a sharp character for several days. The monstrous exaggeration that has been built up around this disagreement is exposed, with documents, in the fourteenth volume of my *Works* and in the notes to that volume. This disagreement did not leave the shadow of any bitterness in our personal relations. Just a few days after the signing of the peace, I was placed—at the direction of Vladimir Ilych—at the head of the military work.

The conflict on the trade-union question was more sharp and protracted. The very sharpness of this disagreement was an expression of the fact that the economy of the country had arrived in a blind alley. The passage out of that blind alley by way of the New Economic Policy was adopted, however, with

complete unanimity.¹ With the same unanimity was adopted, a few months later, the new resolution about the trade-unions, replacing the contrary resolution of the Tenth Congress.

To believe the present party historians and theoreticians, you might think that the first six years of the revolution were entirely filled with disagreements about Brest-Litovsk and the trade-unions. All the rest has disappeared: The preparation of the October insurrection, the insurrection itself, the creation of the government, the creation of the Red Army, the civil war, the four congresses of the Com-

¹ The new theoretician of Stalinism, the Menshevik Martinov, who came to us on the wave of the New Economic Policy, has described our disagreement on the trade-unions as a disagreement on the question of the New Economic Policy. On this subject Martinov wrote, in 1923:

"L. Trotsky, in 1905, thought more logically and consistently than either the Bolsheviks or the Mensheviks. But the fault of his thinking was that he was 'too consistent.' The picture which he drew very accurately predicted the Bolshevik dictatorship which in the first three years of the October Revolution got into a blind alley, separating the proletariat from the peasantry, as a result of which the Bolshevik Party was compelled to make a long retreat" (*Krasnaia Nov*, No. 2, 1923, p. 262).

Before the NEP Trotskyism reigned! Bolshevism began with the New Economic Policy! It is remarkable that Martinov reasoned in exactly the same way about the revolution of 1905. According to him in October, November, and December of 1905—that is, at the height of the revolutionary uprising—"Trotskyism" reigned. The real Marxian policy began only after the dispersal of the Moscow insurrection—approximately with the elections to the first State Duma. Martinov now contrasts Bolshevism with "Trotskyism," using exactly the same arguments with which twenty years ago he contrasted Menshevism with "Trotskyism." And these writings pass for Marxian science! They educate the young "theoreticians" of the party!

munist International, all the literary work on Communist propaganda, the work of leadership of the foreign communist parties and our own. Of all this work, in which upon all fundamental questions I was united with Lenin in full solidarity, there remain, according to the present historians, only two moments, Brest-Litovsk and the trade-unions.

Stalin and his lackeys have worked hard over the effort to picture the trade-union discussion as my "bitter" struggle against Lenin.

Here is what I said at the height of this discussion, at the Miners' Congress, Jan. 26, 1921:

"Comrade Shliapnikov² said here—perhaps I express his thought a little crudely—he said: 'Don't believe in this disagreement between Trotsky and Lenin. They will unite just the same and the struggle will be only against us!' He says, 'Don't believe.'

"I don't know what this means about believing or not believing. Of course we will unite. We may dispute, in deciding any very important question, but the dispute only pushes our thoughts in the direction of union."³

And here is what Lenin said upon this same ques-

² Shliapnikov with Alexandra Kollontai headed a faction called "Workers' Opposition," which opposed Lenin's policies and was defeated by him in 1919.—*Tr.*

³ My concluding words at the Second All-Russian Congress of Miners, Jan. 26, 1921.

Here is another passage from my speech, which Lenin quoted in his brochure:

"In my sharpest polemic with Comrade Tomsy I always said

tion in his concluding speech at the Tenth Congress of the party, summarizing the discussion about the trade-unions:

"Shliapnikov said, 'Lenin and Trotsky will unite.' Trotsky replied, 'Whoever does not understand that it is necessary to unite is going against the party; of course we will unite because we are party men.' I supported Trotsky. To be sure Trotsky and I differed. But when a more or less even division is formed in the Central Committee, the party decides, and decides in such a way that we unite according to the will and direction of the party. That is the announcement with which Trotsky and I went to the Miners' Congress and have come here."⁴

Is that anything like the spiteful scribbling which is given out these days for a history of the trade-union discussion?

The thing becomes laughable when Bukharin incautiously attempts to exploit the trade-union discussion as a weapon against "Trotskyism." Here is the way Lenin appraised Bukharin's position in that discussion:

"Up to now the 'chief' in the struggle has been

that it is perfectly clear to me that our leaders in the trade-unions can be only people with the experience and authority possessed by Comrade Tomsky. I said this in the caucus of the trade-union conference and I said it only recently in the Zimina Theatre. An intellectual conflict in the party does not mean mutual rejection but mutual influence." (P. 34 in the report of the discussion of December 30—Lenin, Vol. XVIII, Part I, p. 71.)

⁴ That is, to the Party Congress. (Vol. XVIII, Part I, p. 132.)

Trotsky. But now Bukharin has left him way behind and completely eclipsed him. Bukharin has created a completely new situation in the struggle, because he has talked himself into a mistake a hundred times bigger than all the mistakes of Trotsky taken together.

“How could Bukharin talk himself into this departure from communism? We know all the softness of Comrade Bukharin, one of the characteristics for which you love him so, and can’t help loving him. We know that he is often jokingly called ‘soft wax.’ It seems that ‘any unprincipled person,’ any ‘demagogue’ can print on that soft wax anything he wants to. The harsh expression included in the quotation marks was used by Comrade Kamenev in the discussion of January 17. He had a right to use it, but it would never occur to Kamenev, of course, or to anybody else, to explain what happened as unprincipled demagogism, to reduce it all to that.”⁵

⁵ Vol. XVIII, Part I, p. 35.

CHAPTER IX

WITH LENIN IN THE INTERNATIONAL

After all, was the question of the trade-unions the only question in the life of the party and the Soviet Republic during the years of my coöperation with Lenin? In the same year, 1921, the year of the Tenth Congress of our party, occurred the Third Congress of the Comintern,¹ which played an enormous rôle in the history of the International Workers' movement.

At this Third Congress there developed a profound struggle upon fundamental questions of Communist politics. That struggle was transferred into our Politburo. I told something of it briefly at a session of the Politburo not long ago:

"There was danger at that time that the policy of the Comintern would follow the line of the March events in Germany. That is, the attempt to create a revolutionary situation artificially—'electrification' of the proletariat, as one of the German comrades expressed it. That mood was the prevailing one in the congress. And Vladimir Ilych came to the conclusion that, following this course, the International would most certainly go to smash. Before the congress I

¹ Communist International.—*Tr.*

wrote to Comrade Radek my impression of the March events in a letter of which Vladimir Ilych knew nothing. Considering the ticklish situation, and not knowing the opinion of Vladimir Ilych, and knowing that Zinoviev, Bukharin, and Radek were in general for the German Left, I naturally did not express myself publicly, but wrote a letter (in the form of theses) to Comrade Radek, asking him to give me his ideas. Radek and I did not agree. Vladimir Ilych heard about this, sent for me, and characterized the situation in the Comintern as one involving the very gravest dangers. In appraising the situation and its problems, we were in full accord.

"After that conference, Vladimir Ilych sent for Comrade Kamenev in order to assure himself of a majority in the Politburo. There were then five men in the Politburo. With Comrade Kamenev we had three and consequently a majority. But in our delegation at the Comintern there were, on one side, Comrades Zinoviev, Bukharin, and Radek, on the other Vladimir Ilych and I and Kamenev. And, by the way, we had formal sittings of these groups. Vladimir Ilych said at that time, 'Well, we are forming a new faction.' In negotiations as to the text of the resolution to be introduced, I represented the faction of Vladimir Ilych. Radek represented the faction of Comrade Zinoviev.

"Zinoviev: Now the state of affairs is changed.

"Yes, it has changed, and, by the way, Comrade

Zinoviev rather sharply accused Comrade Radek at that time of 'betraying' his faction in those negotiations; that is, of making too great concessions.

"The struggle was a big one throughout all the parties of the Comintern, and Vladimir Ilych consulted with me as to what we should do if the congress voted against us. Should we submit to the congress, whose decision might be ruinous, or should we not submit? The reflection of our consultation you can find in the stenographic report of my speech. I said at that time—in agreement with Ilych—that 'if you, the congress, adopt a decision against us, I trust you will leave us a sufficient frame-work in which to defend our point of view in the future.' The meaning of this warning was perfectly clear. I ought to add, however, that the relations then existing within our delegation, thanks to the leadership of Vladimir Ilych, continued to be perfectly comradely."²

In agreement with Lenin, I defended our common position in the Executive Committee of our party, the sitting of which preceded the sessions of the Third Congress. I launched a fierce attack against the so-called "Leftists." Vladimir Ilych hurried to the session of the Executive Committee, and this is what he said there:

"I came here in order to protest against the speech

² Stenographic report of the session of the Politburo, March 18, 1926, pp. 12-13.

of Comrade Bela Kun who spoke against Comrade Trotsky, instead of defending him, as he ought to have done if he wanted to be a genuine Marxist. . . ."

"Comrade LaPorte was absolutely wrong, and Comrade Trotsky, protesting against it, was absolutely right. . . . Comrade Trotsky was a thousand times right when he made that assertion. And here is another Luxembourg Comrade who reproached the French party because it did not sabotage the occupation of Luxembourg. There you have it. He thinks that this is a geographical question, just as Comrade Bela Kun does. No, this is a political question, and Comrade Trotsky was entirely right in protesting against that. . . .

"That is why I considered it my duty to support fundamentally all that Comrade Trotsky said . . . ," etc.

Throughout the whole speech of Lenin about the Third Congress recurs this sharp emphasis upon his complete solidarity with Trotsky.

Here is another example of our solidarity. In 1922 there was created upon the initiative of Comrade Ter-Vaganian a magazine, *Under the Banner of Marxism*. In the first number I contributed an article on the difference in the conditions of education of the two generations of the party, the old and the new, and on the necessity of a special theoretical approach for the new generation, in order to safe-

guard the theoretical and political inheritance of the party. In the following number of the new magazine, Lenin wrote:

“Concerning the general task of the magazine *Under the Banner of Marxism*, Comrade Trotsky in Numbers 1 and 2 said all that was essential, and said it excellently. I should like to touch upon certain questions defining more closely the contents and program of work issued by the editors of the journal in their preliminary announcement to Numbers 1 and 2.”³

Could our solidarity upon these root questions have been accidental? The only accident was the fact that this solidarity happened to be so clearly recorded in the press. In the overwhelming majority of cases our solidarity was expressed only in deeds.

³ Lenin, Vol. XX, Supplementary, Part II, p. 492.

CHAPTER X

LENIN AND TROTSKY ON THE PEASANT QUESTION

After Bukharin, out of sheer rejection of or disregard for the peasants, had arrived at his reactionary slogan "Get rich!" he thought he had corrected in one word all of his old mistakes. More than that, he thought he could string on the same thread with the peasant question my disagreement with Lenin about Brest-Litovsk and my other partial disagreements with Lenin. The stupidities and trivialities put in circulation by the Bukharin school on this theme are absolutely unnumbered. It would take a book to refute them all specifically. I will mention only the most important points:

(a) I do not touch here upon the old prerevolutionary disagreements that really existed. I will say only that they have been monstrously enlarged, distorted, and perverted by Stalin's agency and the little school of Bukharin.

(b) In 1917 there was no disagreement whatever upon this question between Lenin and me.

(c) The "fathering" of the Social Revolutionary Land Program was carried out by Vladimir Ilych in full agreement with me.

(d) I first read Lenin's decree on the Land Question written in pencil. There was not a hint of disagreement. We were of one mind.

(e) In the food policy the peasant question occupied, obviously, no small place. Triflers like Martinov are saying that this policy was "Trotskyist."¹ No, it was a Bolshevik policy. I took part in its enactment hand in hand with Lenin. There was not a shadow of disagreement.

(f) The course based on the middle peasantry was adopted with my most active participation. The members of the Politburo know that after the death of Sverdlov, the first thought of Vladimir Ilych was to name Comrade Kamenev president of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. The proposal to select a "worker-peasant" figure came from me. The candidature of Comrade Kalinin was proposed by me. He was named by me also with the title of "All-Russian *Starosta*." All this is of course a trivial matter, upon which it would not be worth while to pause. But at present these trivialities, these symptoms, are murderous evidence against the falsifiers of the past.

(g) Nine tenths of all our military policy and organization reduced itself to the question of the relation of the worker to the peasantry. That policy—against petty bourgeois partisanship and home industry—I carried out hand in hand with Vladimir Ilych.

¹ See the article of Martinov in *Krasnaia Nov*, 1923.

(h) At the beginning of 1920,² basing myself on an analysis of the condition of peasant economy, I introduced into the Politburo the proposal of a series of measures similar to the New Economic Policy. That proposal could not possibly have been dictated by "inattention" to the peasants.

(i) The discussion of the trade-unions was, as I said, a search for a way out of an economic blind alley. The passage to the New Economic Policy was carried out in complete unanimity.

All this can be proven on the basis of unquestionable documents. Some time it will be. Here I limit myself to two quotations.

In answer to a question as to our relation to the Kulaks, the middle, and the poor peasants, and as to pretended disagreements between Lenin and Trotsky on the peasant question, I wrote in 1919:

"No disagreements upon this question in the centers of the Soviet power have existed or exist. The counter-revolutionists, whose cause is getting more and more hopeless, have nothing left but to deceive the working masses as to a pretended conflict supposed to be dividing the Soviet of People's Commissars within."³

Lenin wrote upon this theme, in answer to a question from the peasant Gulov, the following words:

² A year before the New Economic Policy was advocated by Lenin and adopted.—*Tr.*

³ *Izvestia*, Feb. 7, 1919.

"In *Izvestia* for February 7, there appeared a letter from the peasant G. Gulov, who asks about the relation of our Workers' and Peasants' Government to the middle peasantry, and speaks of rumors to the effect that Lenin and Trotsky are not in harmony, that there are big disagreements between them, and especially upon this subject of the middle peasant.

"Comrade Trotsky has already given his answer in *Izvestia* for February 7. Comrade Trotsky says that the rumors of disagreements between him and me are a monstrous lie, propagated by the landlords and capitalists or their conscious or unconscious servants. I, upon my part, fully confirm this statement of Comrade Trotsky. There are no disagreements between him and me, and in regard to the middle peasants there are no disagreements not only between Trotsky and me, but in general in the Communist Party of which we are both members.

"Comrade Trotsky in his letter explained clearly and in detail why the party of the Communists and the present Workers' and Peasants' Government, elected by the Soviets and members of that party, do not consider the middle peasants their enemies. I subscribe with both hands to everything Trotsky wrote." *

Here we run into the same fact again. The rumor was first set going by the White Guards. Now it is caught up by the Stalin-Bukharin school, developed and deliberately propagated.

* Lenin, Vol. XIV, pp. 28-29, *Pravda*, No. 35, February 1919.

CHAPTER XI

MY MILITARY WORK

On the subject of my military work, which began in the spring of 1918, an attempt has been made, under the guidance of Stalin, to rewrite history. In fact the attempt has been made to rewrite the entire history of the Civil War for the purpose of the struggle against "Trotskyism"—or to put it more honestly, the struggle against Trotsky.

To rehearse here the story of the creation of the Red Army and the relation of Lenin to that work, would be to write the history of the Civil War. For the time being the Gusevs¹ are writing it. Later others will write it. I must limit myself to two or three examples supported by documents.

When Kazan was captured by our troops, I received a telegram of congratulation from Vladimir Ilych, then rapidly convalescing:

"I greet with rapture the brilliant victory of the Red Army. Let it serve as a promise that the union of workers and revolutionary peasants will shatter the bourgeoisie completely, will break every resist-

¹ Gusev was formerly a military worker under Trotsky—a member of the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the eastern front.—*Tr.*

ance of the exploiters, and guarantee the victory of world socialism. Long live the Workers' Revolution.

“LENIN.

“Sept. 19, 1918.”

The intensely elated (for Lenin) tone of the telegram—“I greet with rapture”—testifies to the enormous significance he attributed, and rightly so, to the capture of Kazan. Here occurred the first and the essentially decisive trial of strength of the union of workers and revolutionary peasants, and of the ability of the party, amid the economic ruin and terrible desolation left by the imperialist war, to create a fighting, revolutionary army. Here the methods of creating the Red Army underwent their trial by fire, and Lenin knew the significance of this trial.

At the Eighth Congress of the party, a group of military delegates criticized the war policy. The Stalins and Voroshilovs have been talking lately as though I dared not appear at the congress and hear these criticisms. How monstrously far that is from the actual fact! Here is the resolution of the Central Committee on the subject of my departure for the front on the eve of the congress:

Excerpt from the report of the session of the Central Committee, March 16, 1919. Members present: Comrades Lenin, Zinoviev, Krestinsky, Vladimirsky, Stalin, Schmidt, Smilga, Dzerzhinsky, Lashevitch, Bukharin, Sokolnikov, Trotsky, Stasov.

TOPIC

(12) Certain Comrades from the front, learning of the resolution for the immediate return of the leaders to the front, raised a question as to the correctness of this decision, which might be interpreted by the organizations on the front as an unwillingness of the Central Government to hear the voice of the Army. Some are even interpreting it as a sort of trick, for the departure of Comrade Trotsky and the non-admission of army deputies makes it futile even to raise the question of military policy. Comrade Trotsky protests against the interpretation of the resolution of the Central Committee as a trick, and calls attention to the extreme seriousness of the situation caused by the retreat from Ufa and still farther west. He insists upon his departure.

RESOLUTION

(1) Comrade Trotsky shall depart immediately for the front.

(2) Comrade Sokolnikov shall announce at a meeting of the leaders of the front that the order for the departure of all of them is annulled, and it is resolved that those should depart immediately who themselves consider their presence at the front necessary.

(3) The question of military policy shall be the first on the order of the day of the Congress.

(4) Comrade V. M. Smirnov is permitted to remain, according to his request, in Moscow.

There you have a clear example of the party régime of that epoch. All who were *attacking* the Central Committee for its military policy, and especially the leader of the military opposition, V. M. Smirnov, were permitted to remain for the Congress, notwithstanding the difficult situation at the front. Those who *supported* the official policy were sent to the front before the opening of the Congress. Nowadays things are done in exactly the opposite way.

The reports of the military section of the Eighth Congress of the party, where Lenin spoke decisively in defense of the policy carried out by me at the direction of the Central Committee, are not yet published. Why? Because they murderously expose the incorrectness of Stalin and Gusev during the period of the Civil War.

Stalin has tried to put in circulation an absurdly exaggerated account of the military disagreement which arose in the Politburo in regard to the eastern front at the beginning of 1919. The essence of the disagreement was this: Should we continue the advance in Siberia or fortify ourselves in the Urals and throw all our forces to the south in order to dispel the threat against Moscow? I was inclined, during a certain period of time, towards the second plan. Many military workers, among them Smilga, Lashevich, I. N. Smirnov, K. I. Grunschtein and others, were in favor of the first plan. The first plan was adopted and gave admirable results. There was

nothing fundamental in this disagreement. It was purely practical. The attempt demonstrated that the army of Kolchak was wholly disintegrated. The advance in Siberia was entirely successful.

The military work was harsh work. It was not carried out without pressure, repressions, and measures of force. Many prides were hurt—oftenest through necessity, but sometimes by mistake. Much discontent resulted, and some of it of course was entirely legitimate. When the disagreements arose in regard to the eastern front, and the Central Committee was to decide the question as to the change of the Chief Command, I offered the Central Committee my resignation from the position of People's Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs. On the same day, July 6, 1919, the Central Committee adopted a resolution of which the principal part follows:

“The Organization Bureau and the Politburo of the Central Committee, having considered the declaration of Comrade Trotsky from all sides, have come to the unanimous conclusion that his resignation cannot be accepted.

“The Organization Bureau and the Politburo of the Central Committee will do all that they can to make more comfortable for Comrade Trotsky, and more fruitful for the Republic, that work on the southern front which Comrade Trotsky himself has chosen, and which is the most difficult, the most

dangerous, and the most important at the present moment. In his position as People's Commissar for War and President of the Military Revolutionary Soviet, and as a member of the Military Revolutionary Soviet of the southern front, with that Commissar of the southern front, Yegorov, whom he himself nominated and the Central Committee has confirmed, Comrade Trotsky is free to act.

"The Organization Bureau and the Politburo of the Central Committee gives Comrade Trotsky full authority by every means whatsoever to achieve what he considers a necessary correction of policy on the military question and, if he so desires, to attempt to hasten the congress of the party."

The signatures to this resolution were: Lenin, Kamenev, Krestinsky, Kalinin, Serebriakov, Stalin, Stasov. This resolution speaks for itself. It ended the disagreement, and the work went forward in due order.

Apropos of this: at the united session of the Politburo and the Praesidium of the Central Control Committee, Sept. 8, 1927, Stalin asserted, according to the stenographic reports, that the Central Committee "forbade" me to touch the southern front. On that question the above resolution gives a sufficiently exhaustive answer.

But was the disagreement about the eastern front the only disagreement of that kind? Not by any

means. There was a disagreement about the strategic plan against Denikin. There was a disagreement about Petrograd—yield it to Yudenich or defend it? There was a disagreement about the advance on Warsaw² and about the possibility of a second campaign after we had retired to Minsk. Disagreements of this kind were born of the practical struggle and were decided in struggle.

On the question of the southern front, the necessary documents are published in my book, *How the Revolution Armed Itself*.³

During the advance of Yudenich against Petrograd, Lenin at one time thought it was not worth while trying to defend the city, and that we ought to move the line of defense nearer Moscow. I objected. Comrade Zinoviev supported me, and I think also Comrade Stalin. On the seventeenth of October, Lenin communicated with me in Petrograd by direct wire:

“Comrade Trotsky:

“I spent last night in the Soviet of Defense and have sent you in cipher their resolution.

“As you see, your plan was adopted. But the retreat of the Petersburg workers to the south was not rejected (they tell me you developed this idea with

² Trotsky opposed the advance on Warsaw, and Lenin favored it. Lenin subsequently stated that he had been wrong here, and Trotsky right.—*Tr.*

³ Vol. II, Book I, p. 301.

Krassin and Rykov.) To speak of this before the necessity arises would distract attention from the fight.

"An attempt to surround and cut off Petersburg, will of course demand corresponding changes of policy, which you will carry out on the spot.

"Direct some one in each department of the local executive committee to collect Soviet papers and documents in preparation for an evacuation.

"I enclose a manifesto, endorsed by the Soviet of Defense. I was in a hurry and it isn't much good. You'd better put my signature under yours.

"Greetings!

"LENIN."

There were many such episodes. They had immense practical importance at the given moment, but the dispute had no fundamental significance. It was not a struggle about principles, but a working-out of the best plan for fighting off the enemy at a given moment and given place. The Stalins and Gusevs are trying to rewrite the history of the Civil War. They will not succeed.

CHAPTER XII

THE MOST CONTEMPTIBLE LIE OF THE STALINISTS

The most contemptible part of the campaign of the Stalinists against me is their accusation that I had Communists shot. This accusation was once put in circulation by our enemies, the "Information Agency." That is, the political departments of the White Armies tried to scatter leaflets among our red soldiers, accusing the Red Command, and Trotsky in particular, of bloodthirstiness. The agency of Stalin are now going the same road.

Assume for a minute that this lie is true. Then why were Stalin, Yaroslavsky, Gusev, and the other agents of Stalin silent during the Civil War? What is the significance of this present tardy "exposure" on the lips of the Stalin agency? It means this:

"Workers, peasants, and red soldiers, the party deceived you when it told you that Trotsky, the Commander of the Army, was fulfilling the will of the party and carrying out its policy. In its innumerable articles about the work of Trotsky, in the resolutions of its congresses and the congresses of the Soviets, the party deceived you, supporting the

military work of Trotsky and hiding from you such facts as the execution of Communists. Lenin participated in this deceit, decisively supporting the military policy of Trotsky.”

That is the real meaning of this tardy “exposure” of Stalin’s. He compromises not Trotsky, but the party, its leadership. He undermines the confidence of the mass in all the Bolsheviks. For if in the past, when Lenin and the fundamental nucleus of his colleagues stood at the head of the party, it was possible to conceal monstrous mistakes and even crimes, what can you expect now, when the staff of the Central Committee has infinitely less authority? If, for example, Yaroslavsky in 1923, when the Civil War was already long past, sang the immoderate praises of Trotsky, his faithfulness, his revolutionary devotion to the cause of the working class, then what is the thoughtful young party member going to say today? He is going to ask himself: “Just when was Yaroslavsky lying to me—when he exalted Trotsky above the skies, or now when he is trying to cover him with mud?”

Such is the real work of Stalin, and of his agents in their effort to invent a new biography for him.¹

¹ Such is the famous “exposure” of Stalin in regard to Michael Romanov. What essentially did Stalin say to the party and the Comintern about that? He said: “For ten years the Central Committee has been deceiving you about Kamenev. There was printed in *Pravda* a false denial by the editors. Lenin deceived the party. I, Stalin, took part in that deception, and since Kamenev now differs with me in his political views, I have de-

As is known, Comrade Gusev has devoted special energy to the literary revision of our war history. He has even written a brochure entitled *Our Military Disagreements*. In this brochure the poisonous gossip first appeared about shooting Communists (not deserters, not traitors, but Communists).

Gusev's misfortune, like that of so many others, is that he has written twice about one and the same fact and question; once in the time of Lenin, once in the time of Stalin.

Here is what Gusev wrote the first time:

"The arrival of Comrade Trotsky (near Kazan) produced a decisive change in the situation. In Trotsky's train, at the wayside station, Sviazhk, was a firm will to victory, initiative, and momentum for all sides of the work of the Army. From the very first day, in that station crowded with the wagon trains of the innumerable troops, where were the headquarters of the political department and the commissariat, and in the regiments, which were

cided to expose this whole deceit." The party mass cannot possibly believe in the greater part of Stalin's "exposures." The only thing they can do is to have less faith in the leadership of the party—yesterday's, today's, and tomorrow's. We shall have to win this faith anew—against Stalin and the Stalinists.

(This refers to the story that a telegram of congratulation was sent from Siberia by Kamenev to the Grand Duke Michael when it was rumored that the Grand Duke would establish a constitutional monarchy in Russia. Some assert that the telegram was signed with Kamenev's name, after his departure, by a meeting at which he had presided, others that he signed it himself, others that no such telegram existed.—*Tr.*)

thrown forward fifteen versts, everybody felt that a great turning point had arrived.

"This appeared first of all in the sphere of discipline. . . . The harsh methods of Comrade Trotsky in that epoch of partisanship, undiscipline, and petty bourgeois egotisms, were especially and above all advantageous and necessary. You could do nothing with persuasion. And moreover, there was no time for it. In the course of those twenty-five days that Comrade Trotsky spent in Sviazhk an enormous work was accomplished. The disorganized and degenerating regiments of the Fifth Army were converted into fighting troops and prepared for the capture of Kazan."²

Every member of the party who lived through the Civil War and has not lost his memory will say—at least to himself, if he is afraid to say it out loud—that you could quote tens of hundreds of printed testimonials of the same sort as this testimonial written by Gusev.

I limit myself here to testimonials of the most authoritative character. In his recollections of Lenin, Gorky says:

"Striking his fist on the table, he [Lenin] exclaimed, 'Show me another man who would be able in a year to organize almost a model army, yes, and win the esteem of the military specialists. We have

² *Proletarian Revolution*, No. 225, 1924.

such a man. We have everything, and you'll see miracles.' " ³

In the same conversation Lenin said, according to Gorky:

"Yes, yes, I know. They lie a lot about my relations with him. They lie a great deal, it seems, especially about Trotsky and me." ⁴

Yes, they lied a lot about the relations of Lenin and Trotsky. But can you compare the poor home-industry lying of those days with the properly organized all-Russian and international lying of today? In those days the liars were the Black Hundreds, the White Guards, in part also the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. Now it is the Stalin faction that has adopted this method.

³ Maxim Gorky, *Vladimir Lenin*, p. 23.

⁴ *Idem.*

CHAPTER XIII

THE BLANKET-ENDORSEMENT OF LENIN

In the Bolshevik faction of the All-Russian Central Council of Trade-Unions, Jan. 12, 1920, Lenin said:

"If we defeated Denikin and Kolchak, it was because our discipline was higher than that of all the capitalist countries of the world. Comrade Trotsky has introduced the death penalty, and we will support him. He has introduced it by the road of conscious organization and agitation on the part of Communists."

I have not at hand the many other speeches of Lenin in defense of the military policy which I carried out in full accord with him. In particular the report of the conference of delegates to the Eighth Congress on Military Affairs is not published. Why is that report not published? Because Lenin in that conference opposed with all his energy the colleagues of Stalin, who are now so industriously falsifying the past.

But I have at hand one document which is worth a hundred. I spoke of this document in the Praesidium of the Central Control Commission, when Yaro-

slavsky started a poisonous intrigue against me—under protest from Comrade Ordjonikidze. I quoted it at the last plenum, August 1927, when Voroshilov appeared on the side of Yaroslavsky.

Lenin gave me, on his own initiative, a blank sheet of paper with the following lines written at the bottom:

“Comrades: knowing the harsh character of Comrade Trotsky’s orders, I am so convinced, so absolutely convinced, of the rightness, expediency, and necessity, for the good of our cause, of the orders he has given that I give them my full support.

“V. ULIANOV (LENIN).”

The purpose of this blank I explained to the Praesidium of the Central Control Committee in the following words:

“When he handed me that sheet of paper with these lines written under a clean page, I was perplexed. He said, ‘I have been informed that rumors are being started against you that you are shooting Communists. I give you this blank, and I will give you as many of them as you want, stating that I support your decisions. Above it you can write any decision you want to, and my signature will be ready.’ That was in July 1919. Since much gossip is now abroad about my relations with Vladimir Ilych, and what is far more important, his attitude to me, I would suggest that somebody else show me such a

blank page with his signature, where Lenin says that he endorses beforehand every decision that I make. From those decisions depended not only the fate of individual Communists, but often a far greater thing."

CHAPTER XIV

THE LIE ABOUT MILITARIZATION OF LABOR

Martinov ¹ maintains, as is well known, that civil war and military communism are "Trotskyism." This doctrine has now acquired a vast popularity. The creation of industrial armies, the militarization of labor, and other measures flowing inevitably, just as did the food-distribution, from the conditions of that epoch are portrayed by Philistines and triflers as manifestations of "Trotskyism." On what side did Lenin stand in these questions?

In the organization section of the Seventh Congress of the Soviets, we were debating the question of bossism in the directing centers. In my speech I pointed out that bossism might choke our industries, that centralization is not an absolute principle, that

¹ Martinov is one of the old leaders of the Russian social democracy. He was a prominent opponent of Lenin at the original party congress in London in 1901, and for twenty years thereafter was a leader of the Right Wing of the Mensheviks. In 1923, Martinov suddenly announced that he had changed his mind and that he agreed with the Bolsheviks. He returned to Russia, was received into the party, and after the death of Lenin was appointed editor of the magazine, *The Communist International*. In that position he became one of the chief guides or theoretical defenders of the policy of the International in the Chinese revolution.—*Tr.*

the necessary coördination between local initiative and the leadership of the center ought to be carried out in practice. Lenin, in his speech, emphasized his full agreement with me and added:

"Let me say in conclusion that I agreed entirely with Comrade Trotsky when he said that there have been some very wrong attempts made here to present our disputes as a disagreement between workers and peasants, and to mix up with this question the question of the proletarian dictatorship."²

"Our disputes"—this means those very prolonged disputes in which Lenin and Trotsky were on one side, Rykov, Tomsky, Larin, and others, on the other side. In these disputes, as in so many others, Comrade Stalin remained behind the scenes, maneuvering and waiting.

At the caucus of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Jan. 12, 1920, Lenin said on the subject of our disputes with Rykov, Tomsky, and others:

"Who started this disgusting departmental squabble? Not Comrade Trotsky. There is none of it in his theses. It was Comrades Lomov, Rykov, and Larin. Every one of them occupies the highest position. Members of the Praesidium of the All-Russian Council of People's Economy. Among them is the president of the Council, who has so many titles that if I wanted to number them over I should lose five minutes of my ten-minute speech. Therefore, it is

² Speech of Dec. 8, 1918. Vol. XVI, p. 433.

needless to say that he has shown great benevolence and condescension and indubitable interest in this meeting, etc. . . . Rykov and others have got up here and started a disgusting literary squabble. Comrade Trotsky posed the question of new problems, and they have started a departmental polemic with the Seventh Soviet Congress. Of course we know that Comrades Lomov, Rykov, and Larin did not say this directly in their extremely stupid article. As some orator here has said, 'You must not indulge in polemics with the Seventh Soviet Congress.' The Seventh Soviet Congress made a mistake. Correct that mistake in the meeting, and stop blabbing about centralization and decentralization. Comrade Rykov says that it is necessary to talk about centralization and decentralization, because Trotsky did not notice it. This man assumes that the people sitting here are so backward that they have forgotten the first lines of Comrade Trotsky's theses, which say, 'economic administration assumes a general plan,' etc. Do you know how to read Russian, most condescending Rykov, Lomov, and Larin? Let's go back to the time when we were sixteen years old and start blabbing about centralization and decentralization. Is that the governmental work of the members of the collegium, of the Praesidium of the All-Russian Council of People's Economy? Such nonsense and pitiful rubbish—it is a shame and a disgrace to waste time on it!"

And further:

“War gave us the ability to carry discipline to a maximum and centralize tens and hundreds of thousands of people—comrades—who died to save the Soviet Republic. Without that we would have all gone to hell.”

I remark that this speech, which is at the disposition of the Lenin Institute, has not been published simply because it is inconvenient for the present cheaters of the party. The concealment from the party of a part of our intellectual inheritance from Lenin is a necessary element in the departure from the Leninist course. The speech of Lenin quoted above will be brought forward when the time comes to decapitate Rykov.

CHAPTER XV

MY SOLIDARITY WITH LENIN IN THE INDUSTRIAL WORK

About my work on the railroad service Lenin said, at the Eighth Congress of the Soviets:

“You have seen already, by the way, from the theses of Comrades Emshanov and Trotsky that in this sphere, (the resurrection of our transport) we have to do with a real plan, looking ahead many years. Order No. 1042 reckons on five years. In five years we can restore our transport, reduce the number of sick locomotives, and, if you please, as the most *difficult* I emphasize in the ninth article the indication that we might even shorten that period.

“When big plans are made, based on a many years’ calculation, there are often skeptics who say: How can we talk about many years? God help us to do what we have to do right now. Comrades, it is necessary to learn how to unite the one thing and the other. You can’t work without having a plan that assumes a long period and serious success. That this is necessary, is proven by the indubitable improvement of the transport work. I want to call your attention to that place in the ninth article where it

says that the term would be four and a half years but that it is already shortened because we are working above the normal. The term is already cut down to three and a half years. That is the way to work in the backward branches of our industry.”¹

I remark here that a year after the publication of Order No. 1042, in the order of Comrade Dzerzhinsky, “Concerning the Fundamental Principles of Further Work,” May 27, 1921, we read:

“Due to the fact that the lowering of the norm established by Orders No. 1042 and 1157, *the first brilliant experiment in planned industrial work*, is temporary and due to the existing fuel crisis . . . measures must be taken to support and restore the equipment and the shops. . . .”

As to the attempt to close the Putilov shops:² In Comrade Rykov’s thesis written in October 1927—that is, four years after the question arose—there appears again the legend about my urging the shutting-down of the Putilov shops. In this case, as by the way, in many others, Comrade Rykov is moving very incautiously, collecting material against himself.

The fact is that the proposal to shut down the Putilov shops was introduced in the Politburo at the

¹ Lenin, Vol. XVII, pp. 423-424. Speech of Dec. 22, 1920.

² Ten thousand men work in the Putilov shops. The attempt was made to turn them against Trotsky, at a time when he was demanding better conditions for the workers in general, by asserting that he had urged the shutting-down of these shops.—*Tr.*

beginning of 1923 by Comrade Rykov himself, as President of the Soviet of People's Economy. Rykov demonstrated that the Putilov shops will not be needed in the course of the next ten years, and that their artificial support will have a harmful effect upon other factories. The Politburo—and I, with the rest—took the data adduced by Comrade Rykov for good money. I voted for the closing of the Putilov shops upon the proposal of Comrade Rykov, and so also did Stalin. Comrade Zinoviev was on a vacation. He protested against the decision. The question was raised again in the Politburo, and the decision reversed. Thus the initiative in this affair was wholly in the hands of Rykov as President of the Soviet of People's Economy. To what extent must the feeling of impunity have grown, when Rykov dares, after a short four years, to attribute to me his own "sin." However, don't worry. This fact will indubitably swim out in a new form when the time comes to alter Rykov. You won't have long to wait.

They delude the party with tales about how "Lenin wanted to send Trotsky to the Ukraine as People's Commissar of Food Supplies." On that subject they confuse and twist the facts beyond recognition. I made many such journeys at the direction of the Central Committee. In full agreement with Lenin I went to the Ukraine to improve the organization of the coal industry in the Don Basin. In full agree-

ment with Lenin I worked as President of the Soviet of the Industrial Army in the Ural. It is perfectly true that Lenin insisted that I go to the Ukraine for two weeks—for *two weeks!*—in order to improve the organization of the food supplies. I got into telephone communication with Comrade Rakovsky, who told me that all the necessary measures to guarantee food for the workers' centers had been taken without my help. Vladimir Ilych at first insisted upon my going, but afterward abandoned the idea. That was all there was to it. It was a question of the practical fighting problem which Lenin considered the most important for the given moment.

Here is what Lenin said at the Eighth Congress of the Soviets, Dec. 22, 1920, on the question of my journey to the Don Basin: "Coal from the Don Basin which we were receiving at the rate of 25,000,000 puds a month has now reached 50,000,000, thanks to the work of the Plenipotentiary Commission which was sent to the Don Basin with Comrade Trotsky as president, and which took the decision that experienced and responsible workers should be transported there. At present Comrade Piatakov³ has been sent there to direct the work."⁴

Apropos of this: Comrade Piatakov was crowded

³ Piatakov stood with Trotsky in the opposition throughout the whole period from 1923-1928. He has recently signed a partial recantation.—*Tr.*

⁴ Vol. XIII, p. 422.

out of the Don Basin by the underground intrigues of Stalin. Lenin considered this a serious blow to the coal industry, attacked it in the Politburo, and protested publicly against the disorganizing activities of Stalin.

"That we have had immense success was demonstrated especially, for example, in the Don Basin, where such comrades as Piatakov have been working with extraordinary devotion and with extraordinary success in the sphere of the big industries." ⁵

"In the central management of the coal industry, stood people not only of undoubted devotion, but people of real education and great ability, and I think I make no mistake if I say, talented people, and therefore the attention of the Central Committee was directed thither. We, the Central Committee, have all had a certain amount of experience, and we decided unanimously not to remove the managing group. . . . I made inquiries among the Ukrainian comrades. And Comrade Ordjonikidze, I asked especially, and also the Central Committee directed him, to go there and find out what was happening. Quite evidently *there was an intrigue there*, and all kinds of a mess which the party historians will not unravel in ten years, if they ever take it up. But the practical result was that, *contrary to the unanimous orders of*

⁵ Vol. XVIII, Part I, p. 443. The Report of Lenin at the Ninth Congress of the Soviets, Dec. 23, 1921.

*the Central Committee the managing group was replaced by another.”*⁶

It is known to all the members of the old Politburo—Stalin best of all—that the acrid words of Lenin about *intrigue* against devoted, educated, and talented leaders in the Don Basin referred to the intrigue of Stalin against Piatakov.

During the Eleventh Congress of the Soviets in December 1921, Lenin wrote some theses concerning the fundamental problems of industrial construction. I remember I answered that the theses were excellent and that there was only one point lacking, that about the specialists. (In a few words I indicated the contents of that point.) The same day I received the following letter from Vladimir Ilych:

“Strictly secret.

“Comrade Trotsky:

“I am sitting in a meeting of non-party members with Kalinin. He advises me to make a short speech on that resolution which I introduced (and to which you proposed a supplement, entirely correct, about the specialists).

“Couldn’t you undertake a very short *speech* on that resolution *Wednesday*—at the plenum of the Congress?

⁶ Lenin, Speech at the Eleventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party, March 27, 1923. Vol. XVIII, Part I, pp. 50-51.

"Your military report must be ready and you are done with it on Tuesday.

"It is impossible for me to undertake a second speech at the Congress. Write me two words or send a telegram. If you agree, it will be the best possible, and it can be confirmed by telephone with the vote of the Politburo.

"LENIN."

Our solidarity on the fundamental problems of Socialist construction was so complete that Vladimir Ilych considered it possible to authorize me to make a speech in his place on those questions. I remember that I persuaded him by telephone to appear himself on this important matter, if only his health permitted. In the end that was done.

CHAPTER XVI

AFTER LENIN'S ILLNESS

The falsifications and inventions in relation to the last period of Lenin's life are especially numerous. It would behoove Stalin to be extremely cautious about this period, when Vladimir Ilych arrived at certain final conclusions about Stalin.

It is naturally difficult to expound the inner history of the Politburo during Vladimir Ilych's active life. There were no stenographic reports and only the decisions were written down. That is why it is easy to lift out separate completely insignificant episodes,¹ distort them and puff them up, or indeed simply invent "disagreements" where there was not a sign of one.

¹ Really shameful in its stupidity is the legend about "the cuckoo," which is supposed to indicate in the retrospect my "pessimism." The "cuckoo" is the last resort of Stalin and Bukharin when reasonings or facts drive them to the wall. The "cuckoo" is borrowed from my conversation with Vladimir Ilych in the first period of the NEP. The reapportionment of our limited state resources awakened in me a serious alarm both from the point of view of the waste of the already limited resources of the Workers' Government and from the point of view of the possibility of swift accumulations of private capital at this critical period. I talked about that more than once with Vladimir Ilych. In order to investigate the industrial processes in progress in the country I organized at that time the so-called

To be sure, practical disagreements arose often enough in the Politburo, and among them disagreements between Vladimir Ilych and me. The whole question is, what place did these disagreements occupy in the common work? On that theme the Stalin faction, with extreme lack of caution, is putting into circulation spiteful legends which go to pieces at the first touch of real fact, and which will ultimately turn wholly against Stalin.

To refute these legends it is necessary to take first of all the period of Lenin's illness—more accurately, the period *between* the two heavy attacks of it—when the doctors permitted Lenin to take part in the work, and when many important questions were decided in correspondence. In this correspondence—that is, in unquestionable documents—it is possible to see what debated question arose in the Central Committee, who had disagreements with whom, and in part also what was the attitude of Vladimir Ilych toward individual comrades. I will adduce a few examples.

Moscow Amalgamated Trust. In one of my conversations with Lenin, referring to certain flagrant examples of disorganized selling, I used approximately this phrase: "If we administer things that way, the cuckoo will soon be singing our death-knell." Something of that kind. Phrases like that every one of us repeated more than once. How many times Lenin exclaimed, "If it goes on that way, we're gone for sure." It was a strong statement, but by no means a "pessimistic" prognosis.

That is, approximately, the history of the "cuckoo," with the interest of which Stalin and Bukharin are trying to pay their debts for the Chinese revolution, the Anglo-Russian Committee, the economic leadership and the party régime.

THE MONOPOLY OF FOREIGN TRADE

In the Central Committee, at the end of 1922, there arose a very fundamental disagreement on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade. I do not want to exaggerate its significance in the retrospect, but the political grouping created in the Central Committee around that problem was nevertheless very characteristic.

On the initiative of Comrade Sokolnikov, the Central Committee adopted a decision which meant a serious breach in the monopoly of foreign trade. Vladimir Ilych was decisively against this resolution. Knowing from Krassin that I was not present at the meeting of the Central Committee and that I had expressed myself against the resolution, Lenin entered into correspondence with me. Those letters are not yet published, as also the correspondence of Lenin with the Politburo on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade. The censorship established over our inheritance from Lenin is ruthless. You publish two or three words written by Lenin on a scrap of paper, if only they may directly or indirectly injure the Opposition. You suppress documents of vast and fundamental significance, if they directly or indirectly injure Stalin.

I quote the letters from Lenin touching that problem:

"Comrade Trotsky:

"I am sending you a letter from Krestinsky. Write immediately. Do you agree? I will fight at the plenum for the monopoly. And you?

"Yours,

"LENIN.

"P.S. Better return it quick."

"To Comrades Frumkin and Stomoniakov,² copy to Trotsky:

"In view of my increasing sickness, I cannot be present at the plenum. I am conscious how awkwardly, and even worse than awkwardly, I am behaving in relation to you, but all the same I can't do any better.

"Today I have received a letter from Comrade Trotsky, with which I agree in all essentials, with the exception perhaps of the last lines about the Gosplan.³ I will write Trotsky of my agreement with him and my request that he take upon himself, in view of my sickness, the defense of my position at the plenum.

"I think that this defense ought to be divided into three parts. First, the defense of the fundamental principle of the monopoly of foreign trade—its full and final confirmation; second, delegate to a special commission the detailed consideration of those prac-

² Non-members of the Central Committee with whom Lenin entered into a "conspiracy" against the majority of the committee!

³ Bureau of State Planning.—*Tr.*

tical plans for realizing this monopoly which are advanced by Avenesov; in this commission there ought to be no less than 50 per cent of members from the Commissariat of Foreign Trade; third, the question of the work of the Gosplan ought to be considered separately. And by the way, I think that there will be no disagreement between me and Trotsky, if he confines himself to the demand that the work of the Gosplan, carried on under the aegis of the development of state industry, should give its opinion about all parts of the activity of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade.

"I hope to write again today or tomorrow, and send you my declaration on the essence of the given problem at the plenum of the Central Committee. At any rate I think that this question is of such fundamental importance that in case I do not get the agreement of the plenum, I ought to carry it into the Party Congress, and before that, announce the existing disagreement at the faction of our party at the coming Congress of the Soviets.

"LENIN.

"Dictated to L. F.

"Dec. 12, 1922."

"To Comrade Trotsky, copy to Frumkin and Stomoniakov:

"Comrade Trotsky:

"I received your comment on the letter of Krestinsky and the plan of Avenesov. I think that we are

in maximum agreement, and I think that the question about the Gosplan in the given situation excludes (or postpones) the argument as to whether the Gosplan needs to have administrative rights.

"At any rate I earnestly ask you to take upon yourself, at the coming plenum, the defense of our common opinion of the unconditional necessity of preserving and reënforcing the monopoly of foreign trade.

"Inasmuch as the preceding plenum adopted a decision going wholly contrary to the monopoly of foreign trade, and since it is impossible to yield on this question, I think, as I say in my letter to Frumkin and Stomoniakov, that in case of our defeat we must carry the question into the Party Congress. For that we will need a short exposition of our disagreement before the party faction of the coming Congress of Soviets. If I can, I will write one, and I should be very glad if you would do the same thing. Wavering on this question will do us untold injury. The argument against the monopoly amounts to an accusation of inadequacy against our apparatus. But our apparatus is inadequate here and everywhere, and to renounce the monopoly because of the inadequacy of the apparatus would be to pour the baby out with the bath.

"LENIN.

"Dictated by telephone to L. F.

"Dec. 12, 1922."

"To Comrade Trotsky:

"I send you a letter received today from Frumkin. I also think that it is absolutely necessary to settle this question once for all. If there is any fear that this question excites me and might have a bad effect on my health, I think this is wholly wrong, because I should be ten thousand times more excited by a delay which would make completely unstable our policy upon one of the fundamental questions. Therefore I call your attention to the inclosed letter and earnestly ask you to support an immediate consideration of this question. I am convinced that if we are in danger of losing out, it would be far more advantageous to lose out before the Party Congress, and immediately turn to the faction of the Congress, than to lose out after the Congress. Perhaps such a compromise as this would be accepted: adopt the decision about confirmation of the monopoly now, but raise the question nevertheless at the Party Congress, and make that agreement now. No other compromise in my opinion would be to our interest in any circumstances.

"LENIN.

"Dictated by telephone to L. F.

"Dec. 15, 1922."

"Comrade Trotsky:

"I think we have arrived at a full agreement. I ask you to announce our solidarity in the plenum. I

am in hope that our decision will go through, for a part of those voting against in October have now come over partially or completely to our side. If, unexpectedly, our decision does not go through, we will turn to our faction of the Soviet Congress and declare that we are going to carry the question into the Party Congress.

“Notify me in that case and I will send my declaration. If this question should be removed from the order of the day of the present plenum (which I do not expect and against which, of course, you must protest with all your strength in our common name), then I think we must turn just the same to the faction of the Soviet Congress, and demand the transfer of this question to the Party Congress. For any more wavering is absolutely unpermissible.

“All the materials which I sent you, you can keep until after the plenum.

“Yours,

“LENIN.

“Dec. 15, 1922.”

“Leon Davidovich:

“Professor Forster today permitted Vladimir Ilych to dictate a letter, and he dictated to me the following letter to you:

“Comrade Trotsky:

“It seems we captured the position without firing a shot by mere movements of maneuver. I propose

that we should not stop but continue the attack, and to that effect, introduce a resolution to raise the question at the Party Congress of reënforcing the monopoly of foreign trade and of measures looking to its better enactment. Announce this at the faction of the Soviet Congress. I hope you have no objection and will not fail to make a speech at the faction.

“‘N. LENIN.’

“Vladimir Ilych also asks you to telephone an answer.

“N. K. ULIANOVA.

“Dec. 21, 1922.”

Neither the content nor the tone of these letters needs any comment.

On the question of foreign trade, the Central Committee adopted a new decision annulling the old one. The joking words in Lenin's letter about a victory gained “without firing a shot” refer to that.

It remains to ask: Suppose that in the number of those voting for the resolution destroying the monopoly of foreign trade had appeared the name of Trotsky, and that Stalin, in agreement with Lenin, had fought for the annulment of that resolution, how many books, brochures, and pamphlets would have been written in proof of the petty bourgeois and Kulak “deviation” of Trotsky?

CHAPTER XVII

GOVERNMENT PLANNING

I related our unsystematic selling to the planlessness of our national economy in general. There were debates in the Politburo on the question of planning and of the rôle of the Gosplan. Among them a debate between me and Vladimir Ilych. There were debates about the personal staff of the planning bureaus.

In his letters to the members of the Politburo about the Gosplan, Vladimir Ilych wrote as follows:

“As to giving legislative functions to the Gosplan:

“Comrade Trotsky advanced this idea, it seems, long ago. I opposed it then, because I thought that there would be in that case a fundamental incoherence in our system of legislative institutions, but after attentively reconsidering the matter, I find that there is an essentially healthy thought here: the Gosplan stands somewhat apart from our legislative institutions, notwithstanding the fact that, as a meeting center of the leaders, experts, and representatives of science and technique, it possesses, as a matter of fact, the best possible data for a correct judgment of things. . . . In that respect I think I

should and must come over to Comrade Trotsky, but not in respect to giving the presidency of the Gosplan to any one of our political leaders, or to the president of the Supreme Council of People's Economy."¹

These disagreements were mentioned above, in Lenin's letter to me on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade. Lenin there proposed to *postpone* that question, describing it—not quite accurately—as a question of the administrative rights of the Gosplan. In insisting on the all-sided reënforcement of the Gosplan, the subordination to it of the planning work of all the departments, I did not propose to give the Gosplan administrative rights, believing that they ought to be concentrated as before in the hands of the Soviet of Labor and Defense. But that is not the essential thing now. Both the character and the tone of the letter show how quietly, and just as a matter of business discussion, Lenin regarded our previously existing disagreements, proposing to the Politburo to resolve those disagreements in the direction of a very close approach to the views which I had defended. How many lies have been told the party on this subject!

¹ Dec. 27, 1922.

CHAPTER XVIII

WITH LENIN AGAINST STALIN

I will not quote here Lenin's principal letter against Stalin on the national question. It is printed in the stenographic reports of the plenum of July 26, and, moreover, it is being passed around in separate leaflets. They will fail to conceal that letter. But there are other documents on the same theme, completely unknown to the party. Arkhivarius and the historians of the Stalin school are taking every measure to prevent those documents from appearing. They will continue to do so. They are quite capable, in fact, of simply destroying them.

For that reason I think it necessary to quote here the most important excerpts from the earliest letter of Lenin, and the answer of Stalin, on the question of the structure of the Soviet Union. Lenin's letter, dated Sept. 27, 1922, was addressed to Comrade Kamenev, a copy being sent to all the members of the Politburo. Here is the beginning of the letter:

"You probably have received already from Stalin the resolution of his commission on the admission of the independent republics into the Soviet Union.

"If you have not received it, get it from the sec-

retary and please read it immediately. I spoke about it yesterday with Sokolnikov, today with Stalin, tomorrow I will see Mdivani (a Georgian Communist suspected of advocating 'independence').

"In my opinion the question is supremely important. Stalin has a slight aspiration toward hurry. You must think it over well. Zinoviev too. (You once had the intention to take this matter up and did so to some extent.)

"Stalin has already agreed to one concession, in Section I, instead of saying 'entry' into the R.S.F.S.R. to say 'formal unification' with the R.S.F.S.R. in a union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia. I trust the spirit of this concession is obvious. We acknowledge ourselves on an equal basis with the Ukrainian Republic and the other Republics, and together with them on the basis of equality we enter into a new union, a new federation, 'the union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia.'"

There follows a whole series of Lenin's corrections made in the same spirit. In the concluding part of his letter Lenin says:

"Stalin agreed to postpone introducing the resolution in the Politburo until my arrival. I arrive Monday, October 2. I should like to have an interview with you and Rykov for a couple of hours—in the morning, say, from one to two, and, if necessary in the evening, say five to seven, or six to eight.

"Here is my preliminary project. On the basis of a conversation with Mdivani and other comrades, I will fight for it and change it. I urge you to do the same and answer me.

"Yours,

"LENIN.

"P.S. Send copies to *all* members of the Politburo."

Stalin sent his answer to Lenin to the members of the Politburo the same day, Sept. 27, 1922. I quote from his answer two important passages:

"Lenin's correction to paragraph 2, proposing to create along with the Central Executive Committee of the Russian Republic, a Central Executive Committee of the Federation, should not, in my opinion, be adopted. The existence of two Central Executive Committees in Moscow, one of which will obviously represent a 'lower house' and the other an 'upper house,' will give us nothing but conflict and debate."

And further:

"4. On the subject of paragraph 4, in my opinion, Comrade Lenin himself 'hurried' a little, demanding a fusion of the commissariats of finance, food supply, labor and people's economy with the commissariats of the Federation. There is hardly a doubt that this 'hurriedness' will 'supply fuel to the advocates of "independence,"' to the detriment of the national liberalism of Lenin.

"5. Lenin's correction to paragraph 5 is, in my opinion, superfluous.

"J. STALIN."

This extraordinarily illuminating correspondence, concealed from the party like many other documents, preceded the famous letter of Lenin on the national question. In his remarks upon Stalin's draft, Lenin is exceptionally reserved and gentle in his expression. Lenin still hoped, in that period, to adjust the matter without a big conflict. He gently accuses Stalin of "hurrying." Stalin's accusation against Mdivani of "independence" Lenin places in quotation marks, obviously dissociating himself from that accusation. Moreover, Lenin especially emphasizes the fact that he will introduce his correction on the basis of a conversation with Mdivani and other comrades.

Stalin's answer, on the contrary, is marked by rudeness; the concluding phrase of the fourth point, is especially worthy of attention:

"There is hardly a doubt that this 'hurriedness' will supply fuel to the advocates of 'independence,' to the detriment of the national liberalism (!) of Lenin."

Thus Lenin had arrived at the point of being accused of national liberalism.

The further course of the struggle about the national question showed Lenin that he could not straighten things out by means of inside and, so to

speech, family methods of influencing Stalin; that it was necessary to appeal to the congress and to the party. With this purpose, Lenin wrote in several installments, his letters on the national question.

Vladimir Ilych attributed enormous importance to the "Georgian" question, not only because he feared the consequences of a false national policy in Georgia—a fear which has been wholly confirmed—but also because upon that question was revealed to him the falseness of Stalin's whole course on the national question, and not only the national question. The big, fundamental letter of Lenin on the national question is concealed from the party to this day. The pretense that Lenin did not intend his letter to be read to the party is false to the bottom. Did Lenin intend his remarks in note books and on the borders of the books he read to be published? The fact is that you publish everything whatever which directly or indirectly strikes at the Opposition, but you hide the letter of Lenin giving his fundamental program on the national question.

Here are two quotations from this letter:

"I think that here the hastiness and administrative impulsiveness of Stalin played a fatal rôle, and also his spite against the notorious 'social chauvinism.' Spitefulness in general plays the worst possible rôle in politics" (from Lenin's note of Dec. 30, 1922).

And here in more exact terms:

"It is of course necessary to hold Stalin and

Dzerzhinsky responsible for all this really Great Russian nationalistic campaign" (from Lenin's letter of Dec. 31, 1922).

Vladimir Ilych sent me this letter at the moment when he felt that he would hardly be able to appear at the Twelfth Congress. Here is the note which I received from him in the course of the two last days of his participation in political life:

"Strictly secret. Personal.

"Esteemed Comrade Trotsky:

"I earnestly ask you to undertake the defense of the Georgian affair at the Central Committee of the party. That affair is now under 'prosecution' at the hands of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky, and I cannot rely on their impartiality. Indeed, quite the contrary. If you would agree to undertake its defense, I could be at rest. If for some reason you do not agree, send me back all the papers. I will consider that a sign of your disagreement.

"With the very best comradely greetings,

"LENIN.

"*Dictated to M. V.*

"March 5, 1923."

"To Comrade Trotsky:

"To his letter, sent to you by telephone, Vladimir Ilych asks me to add for your information that Comrade Kamenev is going to Georgia Wednesday, and

Vladimir Ilych asks me to find out whether you do not want to send something there from you.

"Signed, M. VOLODICHIVA.

"March 5, 1923."

"To Comrades Mdivani, Makharadze, and others
(copy to Comrades Trotsky and Kamenev):

"Esteemed Comrades:

"I am working in your behalf with all my heart. I am outraged at the rudeness of Ordjonikidze and the connivance of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky. I am preparing for you notes and a speech.

"With esteem,

"LENIN.

"March 6, 1923."

"To Comrade Kamenev (copy to Comrade Trotsky):

"Leon Borisovich:

"Supplementing our telephone conversation, I communicate to you as acting president of the Politburo the following:

"As I already told you, Dec. 31, 1922, Vladimir Ilych has dictated an article on the national question.

"This question has worried him extremely, and he was preparing to speak on it at the party conference. Not long before his last illness he told me that he would publish this article, but later. After that he got sick, without giving final directions.

"Vladimir Ilych considered this article to be a

guiding one and extremely important. At his direction it was communicated to Comrade Trotsky, whom Vladimir Ilych authorized to defend his point of view upon the given question at the party conference, in view of their solidarity upon it.

"The only copy of the article in my possession is preserved at the direction of Vladimir Ilych in his secret archive.

"I bring the above facts to your attention.

"I could not do it earlier since I returned to work only today after a sickness.

"L. FOTIEVA,

"Personal secretary of Comrade Lenin.

"March 16, 1923."

After all the slanders with which they have surrounded the question of Lenin's attitude to me, I cannot refrain from calling attention to the signature of his first letter—"with the very best comradely greetings." Whoever knows Lenin's parsimony of words and his manner of conversation and correspondence, will realize that Lenin did not sign those words to his letter accidentally. It was not accidental, either, that Stalin, when he was compelled to read this correspondence at the plenum of July 1926, substituted for the words "with the very best comradely greetings" the official phrase "with Communist greetings." Here again Stalin was true to himself.

CHAPTER XIX

WITH LENIN AGAINST STALIN, RYKOV, KALININ, AND BUKHARIN

Lenin's proposal to reorganize the Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection ¹ was met with extreme hostility by Stalin's group. I told of this in very restrained language in one of my former letters to the Central Committee. I reproduce the passage here:

"How did the Politburo react to Lenin's project for the reorganization of Rabkrin? Comrade Bukharin ² hesitated to print Lenin's article, while Lenin on his side insisted upon its immediate appearance. N. K. Krupskaja ³ told me by telephone about this article, and asked me to take steps to get it printed as soon as possible. At the meeting of the Politburo, called immediately upon my demand, all those present, Comrades Stalin, Molotov, Kuibishev, Rykov, Kalinin, Bukharin, were not only against Lenin's plan, but against the very printing of the article. The members of the secretariat were particularly harsh and categorical in their opposition. In view of the insistent demand of Lenin that the article should

¹ Called Rabkrin, for short.—*Tr.*

² Editor of *Pravda*.—*Tr.*

³ Lenin's wife.—*Tr.*

be shown to him in print, Comrade Kuibishev, afterwards the head of the Rabkrin, proposed that one special number of *Pravda* should be printed with Lenin's article and shown to him, while the article itself should be concealed from the party.

"I demonstrated that the radical reform proposed by Comrade Lenin was progressive in itself, if properly carried out, but that even if the contrary were true, it would be absurd and ridiculous to defend the party against the proposals of Comrade Lenin. I was answered in the same spirit of formalism: 'We are the Central Committee. We will take the responsibility. We will decide.' I was supported only by Comrade Kamenev, who appeared at the meeting of the Politburo almost an hour late.

"The chief argument which induced them to print the article was that an article by Lenin ought not to be concealed from the party in any case. Later on, that article became a special weapon in the hands of those who had not wanted to print it, a weapon which they attempted to use *against me!* Comrade Kuibishev, then a member of the secretariat, was placed at the head of the Central Control Committee.⁴ In place of a struggle against Lenin's plan, a policy of 'drawing its teeth' was adopted. Whether the Rabkrin acquired in this way the character of an independent, impartial institution, defending and confirming party justice and unity against all kinds

⁴ A party organization identical in personnel with Rabkrin.—*Tr.*

of administrative superfluities—it is hardly necessary to go into that question, since the answer is perfectly clear.”⁵

The conduct of Stalin upon this question first clearly proved to me that the proposal to reorganize the Central Control Committee and the Central Committee, was directed by Lenin solely and entirely against the bureaucratic power of Stalin, then already excessive, and against his disloyalty. Hence Stalin's stubborn opposition to Lenin's plan.

⁵ From a letter to the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Committee, Oct. 23, 1923.

CHAPTER XX

MY LAST TALK WITH LENIN

At the Praesidium of the Central Control Commission I recently told about my *last conversation with Vladimir Ilych*, not long before the second attack of his illness. I quote that narrative:

“Lenin summoned me to his room in the Kremlin, spoke of the terrible growth of bureaucratism in our Soviet apparatus and of the necessity of finding a lever with which to get at that problem. He proposed to create a special commission of the Central Committee, and invited me to take active part in the work. I answered him: ‘Vladimir Ilych, according to my conviction, in the present struggle with bureaucratism in the Soviet apparatus, we must not forget that there is going on, both in the provinces and in the center, a special selection of officials and specialists, party, non-party and half-party, around certain ruling party personalities and groups—in the provinces, in the districts, in the party locals and in the center—that is, the Central Committee, etc. Attacking the Soviet officials, you run into the party leader. The specialist is a member of his suite. In such circumstances I could not undertake this work.’

"Vladimir Ilych reflected a moment and—here I quote him practically verbatim—said: 'That is, I propose a struggle with Soviet bureaucratism, and you want to add to that the bureaucratism of the Organization Bureau of the party.'¹

"I laughed at the unexpectedness of this, because no such finished formulation of the idea was in my head.

"I answered, 'I suppose that's it.'

"Then Vladimir Ilych said, 'Well, all right, I propose a bloc.'

"I said, 'I'm always ready to form a bloc with a good man.'

"At the end of our conversation Vladimir Ilych said that he would propose the creation by the Central Committee of a commission for the struggle with bureaucratism 'in general,' and through that we would approach the Organization Bureau of the party. The organizational side he promised to think over 'further.' At that we parted. I then waited two weeks for the bell to summon me, but Ilych's health became continually worse and he soon went to bed. After that Vladimir Ilych sent me his letters on the national question through his secretary. And so that work was never carried through."

In the essence of the matter that plan of Lenin was wholly directed against Stalin.

¹ Stalin as General Secretary was at the head of this bureau.
—T.T.

CHAPTER XXI

LENIN BROKE CONCLUSIVELY WITH STALIN

Yes, I had disagreements with Lenin. But Stalin's attempt, relying upon these facts, to distort the general character of our relations goes to pieces completely when confronted with the facts of that period when, as I have said, things were decided, not in conversation and votings which leave no record, but by means of correspondence; that is, in the interval between the first and second illnesses of Lenin. To summarize:

(a) On the national question, Lenin was preparing for the Twelfth Congress a decisive attack against Stalin. Of this his secretary told me in his name and at his direction. The phrase she repeated oftenest of all was, "Vladimir Ilych is preparing a bomb against Stalin."

(b) In Lenin's article about the Rabkrin,¹ he says:

"The People's Commissariat of Rabkrin does not enjoy at the present moment a shadow of authority. Everybody knows that a worse-organized institution than our commissariat of Rabkrin does not exist, and that in the present circumstances you cannot expect

¹ "Workers' and Peasants' Inspection."

a thing of that commissariat. . . . As a matter of fact, what is the use of creating a commissariat whose work is carried on any old way, not inspiring the slightest confidence, and whose word enjoys an infinitely small authority? . . .

"I ask any of the present leaders of Rabkrin or any of the people in contact with it—can they tell me on their conscience what is the practical use of such a commissariat as Rabkrin?"²

Stalin stood at the head of Rabkrin throughout the first years of the revolution. Lenin's volley here was wholly directed against him.

(c) In the same article we read:

"(We have bureaucratism not only in the Soviet institutions, but also in the party.)"

Those words, clear enough in themselves, acquire an especially sharp significance in connection with my last conversation with Vladimir Ilych, quoted above, where he spoke of our forming a bloc against the Organization Bureau as the fountain head of bureaucratism. The modest Lenin-like remark in parenthesis was wholly directed against Stalin.

(d) Of the Testament it is needless to speak. It is filled with distrust for Stalin, his roughness and disloyalty. It speaks of the possible misuse of power upon his part, and the danger, due to this, of a party split. The sole organizational inference indicated in the Testament, from all the characterizations made

² Lenin, "Better Less and Better," March 4, 1923.

there is this: "Remove Stalin from the post of General Secretary."

(e) Finally, the last letter which Lenin ever wrote in his life—or rather dictated—was a letter to Stalin breaking off all comradely relations with him. Comrade Kamenev told me of that letter on the same night when it was written (March 5-6, 1923). Comrade Zinoviev described that letter at the united plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Committee. The existence of the letter was confirmed in the stenographic copy of the testimony of M. I. Ulianova.³

Counting over the "warnings," which Lenin gave to Stalin, Comrade Zinoviev said at the July plenum, 1926:

"And the third warning consists of this: That at the beginning of the year 1923, Vladimir Ilych, in a personal letter to Comrade Stalin, broke off all comradely relations with him."⁴

M. Ulianova tried to present the matter in such a way that the breaking off of comradely relations announced by Lenin to Stalin in the last letter before his death seemed to be evoked by personal and not political causes.⁵ Is it necessary to recall that with Lenin personal motives always derived from

³ "Documents on the subject of this incident exist."—From a declaration of M. I. Ulianova at the Praesidium of the plenum. (M. I. Ulianova is Lenin's sister.—*Tr.*)

⁴ Stenographic report, first issue, p. 32.

⁵ Stenographic report, fourth issue, p. 104.

political, revolutionary, party causes? "Rudeness" and "disloyalty" are also personal qualities. But Lenin warned the party about them, not for "personal," but for party reasons. Lenin's letter, breaking off comradely relations with Stalin, had exactly the same character. That last letter was written *after* the letter on the national question and *after* the Testament. Arduous attempts have been made to weaken the moral weight of the last letter of Lenin. The party has a right to know that letter!

That is how the facts stand. That is how Stalin is deceiving the party.⁶

⁶ The reader who is interested to follow the history of the conflict against Stalin's bureaucratic intrigues from this point on, will find it set forth with careful documentation in my little book *Since Lenin Died*. The opening chapters of my book are now superfluous, since Trotsky has here completely uncovered the documents of which I gave an accurate glimpse. He has also interpreted them in the same way that I did. But the body of my work is all the more important because of this confirmation of its point of departure. It is the only history in existence of those supremely important events within the Russian communist party which followed the death of Lenin.—*Tr.*

CHAPTER XXII

A FEW CONCLUSIONS

The above is a very small part of those facts, testimonies, and quotations which I might adduce in refutation of the history of the last ten years as falsified by Stalin, Yaroslavsky, and Company.

I must add that the falsification is not limited to these ten years, but spreads over the whole preceding history of the party, converting it into an uninterrupted struggle of Bolshevism with Trotskyism. In that sphere the falsifiers feel especially free, for the events belong to an already remote past, and they can make an arbitrary selection of documents. The thought of Lenin is counterfeited by means of a one-sided choice of quotations. At present, however, I will not enter into the preceding period of my revolutionary activities (1897 to 1917) since the motive to the present letter is your questionnaire as to my participation in the October Revolution and my meetings and relations with Lenin.

As to the twenty years preceding the October Revolution, I will confine myself to a few lines.

I was of that "minority" (*menschinstvo*) of the First Congress (1901), from which Menshevism subsequently developed. I remained politically and or-

ganizationally associated with this minority until the autumn of 1904—approximately, until the so-called “land campaign” of the *New Iskra*, when my irreconcilable conflict with Menshevism upon the questions of bourgeois liberalism and the prospects of the revolution defined itself. In 1904, that is, twenty-three years ago, I politically and organizationally, broke with Menshevism. I never called myself or considered myself a Menshevik.

At the plenum of the Central Committee of the Comintern, Dec. 9, 1926, in connection with the question of “Trotskyism” I made the following statement:

“Generally speaking, I do not think that the biographical method can lead us to a decision about questions of principle. It is indubitable that I made mistakes upon many questions, especially during my struggle against Bolshevism. From that, however, it hardly follows that political questions ought to be examined not according to their inner content but on the basis of biography. Otherwise we should have to demand a promulgation of the biographies of *all* the delegates. . . .¹ As I have many times stated, in my

¹ “I personally may refer to a certain great precedent. In Germany there lived and taught a man by the name of Franz Mehring, who only after a long and energetic struggle against the social democracy (until late years we all called ourselves Social Democrats) only after he was a fully grown man, joined the Social Democratic Party. Mehring wrote the history of the German Social Democracy at first as an enemy, as a lackey of capitalism, intellectually opposed to it—and afterward he re-

disagreements with Bolshevism upon a series of fundamental questions, the error was on my side. In order to outline, approximately in a few words, the nature and extent of those former disagreements of mine with Bolshevism, I will say this:

During the time when I stood outside the Bolshevik party, during that period when my differences with Bolshevism reached their highest point, the distance separating me from the views of Lenin was never as great as the distance which separates the present position of Stalin-Bukharin from the very foundations of Marxism and Leninism.

Every new stage in the development of the party and the revolution, every new book, every new fashionable theory has called forth a new zig-zag and a new blunder on the part of Bukharin. His whole theoretical and political biography is a chain of errors committed within the formal framework of Bolshevism. The mistakes of Bukharin, since the death of Lenin, far exceed in their scale, and especially in their political consequences, all his earlier mistakes. This scholiast, emptying Marxism of all concrete reality, converting it into a child's play with

wrote it in that celebrated work on the German Social Democracy as its true friend. On the other hand, Kautsky and Bernstein never struggled openly against Marx, and they both long stood under the whip of Frederick Engels. Bernstein, more than that, is famous as the literary executor of Engels. Nevertheless, Franz Mehring died and was buried as a Marxist, as a Communist, whereas the other two, Kautsky and Bernstein, still live the lives of reformist dogs. The biographical element is of course important, but of itself it decides nothing."

ideas, often into mere verbal sophistry, has proved naturally the most suitable "theoretician" for the period of the sliding over of the party leadership from the proletarian to the petty bourgeois rails. Without sophistry this cannot be done. Hence the present "theoretical" rôle of Bukharin.

In all those—very few—questions upon which Stalin has attempted to occupy an independent position, or has merely given, without the immediate direction of Lenin, his own answer upon big problems, he has always and invariably, and so to speak, organically, occupied an opportunist position.

The struggle of Lenin against Menshevism, against Vperedovism and conciliationism, Stalin denounced from exile, as an emigrant's "storm in a glass of water."²

No other political documents as to the form of Stalin's thoughts up to 1917 exist, as far as I know, except for a more or less correct but school-boy article on the national question.

The independent position of Stalin (before the arrival of Lenin) at the beginning of the February Revolution was opportunist through and through.

The independent position of Stalin in relation to the German revolution of 1923 was wholly saturated with do-nothingism and compromise.

The independent position of Stalin on the problems of the Chinese revolution is nothing but a cheap

² See *Eastern Dawn*, Dec. 23, 1925.

edition of Martinov's Menshevism of 1903 to 1905.

The independent position of Stalin on the problems of the British labor movement is a Centrist capitulation to Menshevism.

You can juggle citations, hide the reports of your own speeches, forbid the propagation of the letters and articles of Lenin, fabricate yards of dishonestly selected quotations. You can suppress, conceal, and burn up historical documents. You can extend your censorship even to the photographic and moving-picture records of revolutionary events. All these things Stalin is doing. But the results will not justify his hopes. Only a limited mind like Stalin's could imagine that these pitiful secretarial machinations will make men forget the gigantic events of modern history.

In the year 1918, Stalin, in the first steps of his campaign against me, found it necessary, as we all know, to write the following words:

"All the work of practical organization of the insurrection was carried out under the immediate leadership of the President of the Petrograd Soviet, Comrade Trotsky. We can say with certainty that the swift passing of the garrison to the side of the Soviet and the bold execution of the work of the Military Revolutionary Committee the party owes principally and above all to Comrade Trotsky."³

With full responsibility for my words, I am now

³ Stalin, *Pravda*, Nov. 6, 1918.

compelled to say that the cruel massacre of the Chinese proletariat and the Chinese revolution at its three most important turning-points, the strengthening of the position of the trade-union agents of British imperialism after the general strike of 1926, and the general weakening of the position of the Communist International and the Soviet Union, the party owes principally and above all to Comrade Stalin.

L. TROTSKY.

Oct. 21, 1927.

SUPPLEMENTS

SUPPLEMENT I

THE TESTAMENT OF LENIN

[Five years ago, lying on his deathbed and deprived of the power of speech, Lenin wrote a letter predicting the inevitable struggle between Trotsky and Stalin, analyzing the characters of the two men, and indicating the action which the party ought to take to avoid a split. The almost uncanny political sagacity of Lenin was never more clearly revealed than in that brief letter, which has been called his Testament to the party. The letter was locked up in the safe and declared non-existent by Stalin and his associates in power, because it contained a vigorous criticism of Stalin himself and the advice that he be removed from his commanding position as General Secretary of the party. I gave correct citations from the letter in 1925 in my book *Since Lenin Died*, but I was compelled to give them on my own authority. My citations were denounced and denied all over the world by the official Communist press, including the Politburo in Moscow. On Oct. 18, 1926—at the height of a militant effort of the Opposition to carry out the will of Lenin in regard to the General Secretary—I published the following translation of the full text of the Testament in the *New York Times*,

using the money received in the further propagation of Bolshevik ideas. This text is complete, accurate, and entirely to be relied on.—M. E.]

“By the stability of the Central Committee, of which I spoke before, I mean measures to prevent a split, so far as such measures can be taken. For, of course, the White Guard in Russkaya Mysl (I think it was S. E. Oldenburg) was right when, in the first place, in his play against Soviet Russia he banked on the hope of a split in our party, and when, in the second place, he banked for that split on serious disagreements in our party.

“Our party rests upon two classes, and for that reason its instability is possible, and if there cannot exist an agreement between those classes its fall is inevitable. In such an event it would be useless to take any measures or in general to discuss the stability of our Central Committee. In such an event no measures would prove capable of preventing a split. But I trust that is too remote a future, and too improbable an event, to talk about.

“I have in mind stability as a guarantee against a split in the near future, and I intend to examine here a series of considerations of a purely personal character.

“I think that the fundamental factor in the matter of stability—from this point of view—is such members of the Central Committee as Stalin and

Trotsky. The relation between them constitutes, in my opinion, a big half of the danger of that split, which might be avoided, and the avoidance of which might be promoted, in my opinion, by raising the number of members of the Central Committee to fifty or one hundred.

“Comrade Stalin, having become General Secretary, has concentrated an enormous power in his hands; and I am not sure that he always knows how to use that power with sufficient caution. On the other hand Comrade Trotsky, as was proved by his struggle against the Central Committee in connection with the question of the People’s Commissariat of Ways of Communication, is distinguished not only by his exceptional abilities—personally he is, to be sure, the most able man in the present Central Committee; but also by his too far-reaching self-confidence and a disposition to be too much attracted by the purely administrative side of affairs.

“These two qualities of the two most able leaders of the present Central Committee might, quite innocently, lead to a split; if our party does not take measures to prevent it, a split might arise unexpectedly.

“I will not further characterize the other members of the Central Committee as to their personal qualities. I will only remind you that the October episode of Zinoviev and Kamenev was not, of course, accidental, but that it ought as little to be used against

them personally as the non-Bolshevism of Trotsky.

"Of the younger members of the Central Committee, I want to say a few words about Bukharin and Piatakov. They are, in my opinion, the most able forces (among the youngest), and in regard to them it is necessary to bear in mind the following: Bukharin is not only the most valuable and biggest theoretician of the party, but also may legitimately be considered the favorite of the whole party; but his theoretical views can only with the very greatest doubt be regarded as fully Marxist, for there is something scholastic in him (he never has learned, and I think never has fully understood, the dialectic).

"And then Piatakov—a man undoubtedly distinguished in will and ability, but too much given over to administration and the administrative side of things to be relied on in a serious political question.

"Of course, both these remarks are made by me merely with a view to the present time, or supposing that these two able and loyal workers may not find an occasion to supplement their knowledge and correct their one-sidedness.

"Dec. 25, 1922.

"*Postscript*: Stalin is too rude, and this fault, entirely supportable in relations among us Communists, becomes insupportable in the office of General Secretary. Therefore, I propose to the comrades to find a way to remove Stalin from that position and

appoint to it another man who in all respects differs from Stalin only in superiority—namely, more patient, more loyal, more polite and more attentive to comrades, less capricious, etc. This circumstance may seem an insignificant trifle, but I think that from the point of view of preventing a split and from the point of view of the relation between Stalin and Trotsky which I discussed above, it is not a trifle, or it is such a trifle as may acquire a decisive significance.

“LENIN.

“Jan. 4, 1923.”

SUPPLEMENT II

THE LAST WORDS OF ADOLPH JOFFÉ

[The change of personnel and policy in the Bolshevik Government since Lenin died found a tragic symbol in the suicide of Adolph Joffé. Joffé was one of the strongest and ablest of the men surrounding Lenin in the revolutionary days. Like Rakovsky he was trained to be a physician. He was a man of serene strength and courage. He gave his whole life to the Communist movement, taking an active part in the revolution of 1905, and serving his time not only in prison but at hard labor in Siberia. In the October Revolution and the fighting days which followed, Joffé played a major rôle. He was among the leaders of the Military Revolutionary Committee, which, according to some accounts, accomplished the transfer of power in Petrograd before the actual insurrection. And he was chosen by Lenin for the two first and most critically important diplomatic posts to be occupied by a Bolshevik—the chairmanship of the delegation to Brest-Litovsk and the ambassadorship in Berlin. He was one of the delegates to the Genoa Conference, and he was subsequently the Russian envoy in Japan. Joffé put a pistol to his temple and shot himself on the sixteenth of November, 1927.

He left a letter to Trotsky beside him on the table, explaining his act. I give it as it was published in *The Nation* with some unimportant omissions.—*Tr.*]

“To Leon Trotsky.

“Dear Leon Davidovich:

“All my life I have thought that the man of politics ought to know how to go away at the right time, as an actor quits the stage, and that it is better to go too soon than too late.

“More than thirty years ago I embraced the philosophy that human life has meaning only to the degree that, and so long as, it is lived in the service of something infinite. For us humanity is infinite. The rest is finite, and to work for the rest is therefore meaningless. Even if humanity too must have a purpose beyond itself, that purpose will appear in so remote a future that for us humanity may be considered as an absolute infinite. It is in this and this only that I have always seen the meaning of life. And now, taking a glance backward over my past, of which twenty-seven years were spent in the ranks of our party, it seems to me that I have the right to say that during *all* my conscious life I have been faithful to this philosophy. I have lived according to this meaning of life: work and struggle for the good of humanity. I think I have the right to say that not a day of my life has been meaningless.

"But now, it seems, comes the time when my life loses its meaning, and in consequence I feel obliged to abandon it, to bring it to an end.

"For several years now the present heads of our party, in accordance with their general policy of not giving work to Communists of the Opposition, have given me neither political nor soviet work whose scope and character would permit me to be useful to the maximum of my capabilities. During the past year, as you know, the Politburo has completely cut me off, as an Oppositionist, from any political work.

"My health has kept on getting worse. About the twentieth of September, for reasons unknown to me, the Medical Commission of the Central Committee summoned me to an examination by specialists, who informed me categorically that the state of my health was much worse than I supposed, and that I must not stay another useless day in Moscow nor remain another hour without treatment, but go abroad immediately and enter an appropriate sanatorium.

"To my direct question, 'What chances have I to get well abroad, and can I take care of myself in Russia without giving up my work?' the physicians and assistants, the practicing doctor of the Central Committee, Comrade Abrossov, another Communist physician, and the director of the Kremlin hospital, all answered simply that the Russian sanatoria could help me in no way, that I must rely upon treatment in the West. They added that if I followed their in-

structions, they had no doubt that I would be able to work for a prolonged period.

“For about two months the Medical Commission of the Central Committee (in spite of having on its own initiative ordered the consultation) took no steps either toward my stay abroad or toward my treatment here. On the contrary, the Kremlin pharmacy, which had always delivered remedies to me according to the prescriptions, was forbidden to do it. I was, in fact, deprived of the help of free medicines, which I had always enjoyed. I was obliged to buy the medicines that were indispensable in the pharmacies of the city. It seems that this took place at the time when the group in power began to visit on the comrades of the Opposition its policy of ‘Hit the Opposition in the belly.’

“As long as I was well enough to work I paid little attention to all this, but as I kept getting worse my wife approached the Medical Commission of the Central Committee and personally Dr. Semashko, who has always, publicly, gone to extremes to realize his formula, ‘Save the old guard.’ The matter was nevertheless constantly adjourned, and all that my wife was able to obtain was an extract of the decision of the council of physicians. In this extract my chronic maladies are enumerated, and it is set down that the council insists on my being sent abroad ‘to a sanatorium of the type of Professor Friedlander’s’ for a period that may extend to one year.

“Meanwhile, nine days ago I went definitely to bed, on account of the acuteness and the aggravation (as always happens in such circumstances) of all my chronic ailments, and especially the most terrible, my inveterate polyneuritis, which has again become acute, forcing me to endure an absolutely intolerable pain and even preventing me from walking. For nine days I have been without any treatment, and the question of my trip abroad has not been taken up. Not one of the physicians of the Central Committee has come to see me. Professor Davidenko and Dr. Levine, being called to my bedside, prescribed a few trifles which obviously could do me no good, and then admitted that ‘nothing could be done,’ and that a trip abroad was indispensably urgent. Dr. Levine told my wife that the affair was dragging because the Medical Commission evidently thought that my wife wanted to go with me, and ‘that makes it too expensive.’ My wife answered that, in spite of the sad state I was in, she decidedly did not insist that she or any one else accompany me. Whereupon Dr. Levine assured us that, under these conditions, the matter would soon be settled. Dr. Levine repeated to me today that the doctors could do nothing, that the only resource was immediate departure abroad. Then in the evening the physician of the Central Committee, Comrade Potiomkin, notified my wife that the Medical Commission of the Central Committee had decided not to send me abroad but to care for me in

Russia. The reason was that the specialists insisted on a prolonged treatment abroad, deeming a short stay futile, and that the Central Committee would only give for my cure a maximum of one thousand dollars and found it impossible to give more.

“While abroad recently I received an offer guaranteeing me twenty thousand dollars in royalties for my memoirs, but [considering that they would have to be censored by the Politburo and] knowing how the history of the party and of the revolution is falsified in our country, I did not consider it possible to lend a hand to such a falsification. The entire censorship of the Politburo would consist of not allowing a true evaluation of the personages and their acts, either on one side or the other—either of the authentic leaders of the revolution or of those who at present find themselves invested with this dignity. In consequence I see no way to get treatment without receiving money from the Central Committee, which, for all my revolutionary work of twenty-seven years, thinks it possible to value my life and my health at a sum not exceeding one thousand dollars.

“That is why I say that the time has come when it is necessary to bring this life to an end. I know that the general opinion of the party is opposed to suicide, but I believe that none of those who understand my situation will condemn me for it. If I were in good health I should have found strength and energy to struggle against the situation created in

the party. But in my present state I cannot endure a situation in which the party silently tolerates *your exclusion from its ranks*, even though I am absolutely certain that sooner or later a crisis will come which will oblige the party to cast off those who have led it to such a disgrace. In this sense my death is *a protest* against those who have led the party to a situation such that it cannot react in any way to this opprobrium.

“If I may be permitted to compare something big with something little, I will say that the immensely important historical event, your exclusion and that of Zinoviev, an exclusion which must inevitably open a period of Thermidor in our revolution, and the fact that I am reduced, after twenty-seven years of revolutionary work at responsible posts in the party, to a situation where I have nothing left but to put a bullet through my head—these two facts illustrate one and the same thing—the present régime in our party. And perhaps the two events, the little and the big one together, will jar the party awake and halt it on the road leading to Thermidor.

“Dear Leon Davidovich, we are bound together by ten years of work in common and, I hope, of personal friendship, and that gives me the right to tell you, at the moment of farewell, what seems to me to be a weakness in you.

“I have never doubted the correctness of the way

you have pointed out, and you know that for more than twenty years, ever since the 'Permanent Revolution,' I have been with you. But I have always thought that you lacked the inflexibility, the intransigence, of Lenin, his resolution to remain at the task alone, if need be, in the road that he had marked out, sure of a future majority, of a future recognition by all of the rightness of that road. You have always been right politically, beginning with 1905, and I have often told you that with my own ears I have heard Lenin admit that in 1905 it was not he, but you, who were right. In the face of death one does not lie, and I repeat this to you now.

"But you have often renounced your right position in favor of an agreement, a compromise, whose value you overestimated. That was wrong. I repeat: politically you have always been in the right, and *now more than ever you are in the right*. Some day the party will understand this, and history be forced to recognize it.

"Moreover, don't be afraid today if certain ones desert you, and especially if the many do not come to you as quickly as we all wish. You are in the right, but the certainty of the victory of your truth lies precisely in a strict intransigence, in the most severe rigidity, in the repudiation of every compromise, exactly as that was always the secret of the victories of Ilych.

"I have often wanted to tell you this, and have only brought myself to it now, at the moment of saying good-by.

"I wish you energy and courage equal to those you have always shown, and a swift victory. I embrace you. Good-by.

"Your,

"A. JOFFÉ.

"P. S. I wrote my letter during the night between the fifteenth and sixteenth, and today, the sixteenth, Marie Mikhailovna went to the Medical Commission to insist on their sending me abroad, if only for one or two months. They answered her that in the opinion of the specialists a short stay abroad was absolutely useless. They told her that the Medical Commission had decided to transfer me immediately to the Kremlin hospital. Thus they refuse me even a short trip for the sake of my health, even though all the doctors agree that a cure in Russia is of no use and will do me no good.

"Good-by, dear Leon Davidovich. Be strong. You will need to be, and energetic, too. And bear me no grudge."

"A."

SUPPLEMENT III

STALIN-BUKHARIN AND THE CHINESE
REVOLUTION

BY ALBERT TREINT

[As a member of the Politburo of the French Communist party and of the Executive Committee of the International, Albert Treint was for four years the faithful supporter and lieutenant of the Stalin régime. Even Treint revolted, however, at the connivance of Stalin and Bukharin in the massacre of Chinese workers and peasants. In a letter to his colleagues in the French party, he exposed the whole history of this thing and is now of course out of the party. To supplement the very brief and rapid statement about the Chinese revolution in our text, I quote the following paragraphs from his letter.—*Tr.*]

“There lies between the opportunist policy of the Stalin-Bukharin group in China and true Leninism the blood of the Chinese workers. The Chinese workers were abandoned to the bourgeois oppression while the Communists of the whole world remained silent, because they had been left in complete igno-

rance of the actual situation. No compromise is possible with such a policy. . . .

“During a whole year the Stalin-Bukharin group concealed [not only from the Russian party and the International and its national sections, but from the majority of the Praesidium of the International] the knowledge of the first *coup d'état* of Chiang Kai-Shek in March 1926. That *coup d'état* gave the power into the hands of the reaction. The Mintuan, that is, the bands of mercenary soldiers paid by the great landlords, disarmed the peasants, and at the same time maltreated the workers. . . . Again in the months of July and August 1926 the Kuomintang and the government of Canton repressed the movement of the workers and peasants. At Wu Chau in the province of Wang Si, Communists were arrested and shot. . . . The government of Canton demanded that all politics be eliminated from the programs of the peasant leagues. . . . The decrees of Chiang Kai-Shek on the sixth of August ordered the disarmament of the workers and threatened with court-martial those who used their arms against the mercenaries of the capitalists. . . . A detachment of the twenty-sixth regiment of the third army penetrated at night into the railroad shops, fired on the workers, and went to sleep on a pile of the dead and wounded. . . . In Na Chin Tong the troops fired on a workers' demonstration, killing ten. . . . In Hunan, peasant organizations were dispersed and their leaders

hanged. . . . Such events were repeated many times throughout the whole territory of the national government. . . .

"The Stalin-Bukharin group concealed all these events from the mass of the Communists [and continued their policy of collaboration with Chang Kai-shek]. . . .

"In March 1927 after the capture of Shanghai, Chang Kai-shek made a declaration of loyalty and of discipline toward the Kuomintang in order to hide the preparations for his *coup d'état*. The Stalin-Bukharin group interpreted this declaration as a proof that collaboration with Chang Kai-shek might continue for another period. The fifth of April the secretary of the Chinese party signed a manifesto announcing that there were between the Chinese Communist party and the Kuomintang only some differences of opinion in regard to small questions of detail. The Stalin-Bukharin group continued to maintain their silence, although knowing that these differences of detail concerned the shooting of workers and peasants.

"This is only a part of what was concealed from the Communist mass. But that is not the whole story.

"The Stalin-Bukharin group concealed, so far as it could, all the documents which bore upon these events. It concealed the theses of Zinoviev upon the Chinese situation . . . which correctly estimated the situation as a whole and contained accurate predic-

tions. . . . It maintained silence about the criticism directed by Trotsky against the theses of Stalin, as well as several commentaries by Trotsky about certain despatches from China whose publication was forbidden to the Communist press. All these documents are official papers of the last session of the Executive. They contained exact predictions of what was going to happen. The Stalin-Bukharin group *concealed* all these documents which demonstrate the complete falsity of their judgment of the situation. Stalin even went so far as to conceal his own speech. Thus a speech by Stalin himself at the Communist Academy, in the presence of 3,000 officials of the party, was never published. It was never published because the *coup d'état* of Chang Kai-shek which occurred ten days later refuted his words brutally and categorically. But Radek, who spoke at the Communist Academy against Stalin and demonstrated that the treason of Chang Kai-shek was then only a question of weeks and perhaps of days, was removed from his position as rector of the University of Sun Yat-sen because his previsions were correct. . . .

“In order to conceal these facts, in order to break the resistance of those who knew them, in order to discredit those who knew, it was necessary to create in the interior of the Russian party as well as in the International an organizational régime which becomes more and more intolerable.

"Stalinism is just exactly this régime of bureaucratic strangulation and administrative terror applied in the Russian party and the International to the profit of an opportunist policy which the party and the International would reject instantly if they were accurately informed. . . .

"The confusion created by the Stalin-Bukharin policy led the leadership of the French party to salute Chang Kai-shek at the time of his entrance into Shanghai as the representative of the Chinese Commune. When Chang Kai-shek entered the city he was the Gallifet of the Chinese Commune, preparing its bloody repression. The policy of the Stalin-Bukharin group led the heads of the French party astray to the point of confusing Gallifet with the Commune, the hangman with the victim. A policy which brings such results carries in itself its own condemnation. . . .

"The policy of the Stalin-Bukharin group after the *coup d'état* of July was to withdraw from the government but remain in the Kuomintang, remain in spite of the campaign of exclusions; and also on the twenty-fifth of July to propagate the idea of soviets, which on the evening of the twenty-fourth had seemed premature. All that bears witness not only to a serious bureaucratic short-sightedness, but also to the most complete imbecility.

"In order to remain in the Kuomintang it was necessary to resist not only a campaign of exclu-

sions conducted by the Executive of the Kuomintang, but a military campaign conducted by the generals of the Kuomintang with the purpose of destroying the labor unions, the peasant leagues, the communist groups, as well as the organizations at the bottom of the Kuomintang, which were resisting the Executive and the generals. It was actually a question of destruction by force of arms.

“In order to be in a state to resist this with success, one would have had to follow not the advice of the Stalin-Bukharin group—that is, to hang on to the tail of the bourgeoisie, but verily to follow the advice of Lenin—in other words, place oneself clearly at the head of the mass movement of the workers and peasants, form soviets *at the right time*, which would have functioned at first as organs of the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants, would have armed the masses, would have directed the battle, and thus dragged the hesitating petty-bourgeoisie into the ranks of the revolution.

“What can one say of this latest invention of the Stalin-Bukharin group? It refused to issue the word of order to form the soviets when the revolutionary movement of the masses was at its culmination, when the trade-unions were themselves undertaking to stop the enemies of the revolution, when the peasants, in millions, were beginning to confiscate the estates of the great landholders. This movement of the masses, in obedience to the policy of Stalin-

Bukharin, was checked. It was then repressed by the bourgeoisie while the Stalin-Bukharin group maintained a silence of complicity. And now that all this has led to a shameful defeat, now that the workers are discouraged, are permitting themselves to be disarmed, now that the generals are seizing the houses of the labor unions, now that the peasant uprising is provisionally broken in many places—now, the Stalin-Bukharin group does not hesitate to launch *at the wrong time* the word of order to form soviets and to have this idea propagated, in spite of the complete depression of the movement of the masses, by a party which will never enjoy the slightest authority among them until it has recognized its mistakes. There is no better way to discredit the idea of the soviets in the eyes of the Chinese masses.

“It is necessary that the International and its parties receive immediate, precise, and complete information upon the problems of the Chinese revolution; it is necessary then that after a serious and perfectly free discussion in all the parties, the Russian party included, an extraordinary world congress be summoned. This is the sole way to arrive at a true policy. . . .

“The present danger is Stalinism, that is to say, the system of bureaucratic strangulation and administrative terror in the Russian party and the International, a system designed to prevent or to break

mechanically every protest against the existing opportunist policy and to mitigate the bankruptcy of that policy, which is becoming from day to day more complete and irremediable.

“Against this danger we must at once declare war without mercy.”

SUPPLEMENT IV

A COMMENT OF FRENCH COMMUNISTS ON THE SITUATION IN RUSSIA

[The United States is very far from Russia—and from revolution—and American Communists are, generally speaking, very little practiced in Marxian methods of critical thinking. In consequence hardly a word has been published in America, except in foreign-language papers such as the *New Yorker Volkszeitung*, as to the true economic significance of the political struggle in the Russian Communist party. In France there are already four revolutionary papers, published by expelled members of the Communist party, in which one can find the facts of this struggle honestly stated and a scientific effort made to understand their class causes. The *Bulletin Communiste* is published by Boris Souvarine, who was the secretary and organizer of the Committee of the Third International, which laid the foundation during the war for the French Communist party, a Marxian thinker with intellectual as well as moral courage. *La Révolution Proletarienne* is edited by Pierre Monatte, the leader and teacher of the syndicalists, who now calls his group Syndicalist-Communist. *Contre Le Courant* is published by the group

most recently expelled from the party, including the veteran revolutionist Lorient and also Madeleine Marx. Another publication is recently announced from a group of Communists in Lyons, and I understand that Albert Treint also founded a paper of his own. To encourage those American Communists and "radicals" who feel lonely in their efforts to think honestly and with a little scientific understanding about the events in Russia, I quote these paragraphs from a manifesto of the Lorient group in the first number of *Contre le Courant*.—*Tr.*]

"Since Lenin died the Russian party has passed from crisis to crisis and arrived finally at a split. That is where things stand; we cannot deceive ourselves. We are in the presence neither of measures taken against this or that undisciplined comrade nor of a personal quarrel, but of a decision to amputate from the party its entire left wing. What is happening now in Russia is an implacable struggle between the masked revisionism of the Stalin faction and Communism defended by the Opposition. The point at issue in this battle is the entire future of the revolution of October.

"At the present moment the struggle of the faction in power against its opponents knows no limits. They have introduced into the party the régime of the bludgeon, of secret diplomacy, of fear. The truth is concealed from the party about what is happening

in its very center. The sole nourishment offered to the party is the 'official' literature, 'official' theses, the 'official' point of view. Whoever adopts it is a 'Bolshevik,' whoever discusses it is a Menshevik, a counter-revolutionist, a White Guard. And because they know too well what an invincible power the Opposition would have if the membership could speak, they are employing the terror within the party. Workers belonging to the Opposition are dismissed from their jobs, reduced to hunger, turned over to the G.P.U. (State Police). They are searched and thrown into prison. The best Bolsheviks are expelled from the party by hundreds. Devoted party workers are exiled after being dishonored. The heads of the Opposition are removed from their government positions and driven from the party. Their lives are already in danger. . . .

"In an agrarian country like the U.S.S.R., under the New Economic Policy, it is inevitable that the rich peasantry, the Kulaks, will exercise their pressure on the power of the state and upon the instrument of power, the Communist party, the sole party permitted by law. This pressure can be diminished if you pursue a true policy in the country—that is to say, if the state, supporting itself solidly upon the poor peasant, succeeds in uniting him with the middle peasant *in a struggle against the Kulak*. If on the other hand, as is the case in the U.S.S.R., the state masks the differentiation of classes which under

the NEP is growing with an accelerated rhythm—if it masks this differentiation of classes, seeking to ally itself with ‘the peasants’ in general, then the close alliance with the poor peasant is loosened—for it can only be strengthened in a struggle against the Kulak—then also the alliance with the middle peasant is compromised—for it is the Kulak who is now going to drag after him this middle peasant.

“Thus the rich peasants and the well-off peasants exercise an increasing pressure upon the state power; they push with all their weight against the party; they seek to gain positions in the party which permit them to insure with their ‘pull’ the gains they have been able to make under the NEP. And naturally the first condition of assurance for these categories of the peasants consists in amputating from the party the left elements, those who denounce the slipping toward the Kulaks, those who defend a proletarian policy. In this they are assisted by the enormous army of the Soviet bureaucracy, which also has its vested interest to defend.

“The rich and well-off layers of the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, the bureaucracy, these are the social forces which, acting through the officialdom of the party, have waged a war without mercy against the Opposition.

“Thus for us, and for every worker who wants to untangle the essential elements of the conflict, it is not a question of deciding whether the Russian Op-

position is '100 per cent right.' It is a question of understanding that at this moment it is the Opposition which represents the right of Communists to express their opinion in their own party, the right of the working-class to determine its political course in its own class party. It is a question of seeing that the conquests of October are menaced, that if the Opposition is beaten it is because they defend these conquests, because they denounce the displacement of the political axis, which, instead of resting on the proletariat and the poor peasants, now rests upon the petty bourgeoisie, the experts, the bureaucrats, the Kulaks.

"With this struggle of the Russian Opposition we are at one without reserve. . . . One single thing would make it possible to react victoriously, and through normal channels, against the pressure of non-proletarian elements in the U.S.S.R.; that is the free play of class forces inside the party. . . .

"A Communist party in which an all-powerful officialdom imposes its dictatorship upon the party is one in which the proletariat has already suffered a grave defeat, a defeat which prepares and presages other defeats. . . . A bureaucratic régime in the party is but a preface to opportunism in politics, and that, no matter what may be the value of the men who put themselves in the place of the working-class membership. The policy of these men may coincide *for a certain time* with the proletarian interest, but

soon inevitably, ceasing to be the policy of a working-class, it will move in a wavering course, acting under the pressure of diverse social forces, towards opportunism. . . .

“To sum up the situation: In the first proletarian state the ruling faction is enacting a policy of sliding toward the right, both in act and theory. And in order to hide this policy, it strikes at the left, employing every means available to a sovereign power—press, police, terror.

“What is to be done in the face of such a situation? How act effectively before the imminent danger?

“The first thing to do is to put the proletariat in possession of the facts, to permit it to react against the enormous deviation to the right (so much the more dangerous because it conceals itself under the label of Leninism) in which the Communist movement is in danger of foundering. . . . We propose then in this organ to publish the documents which are concealed by the party officials from the working-class, to study the great questions of the proletarian struggle, to expose the facts, to oppose the Communist point of view to the opportunist or demagogic point of view expressed in the official organs; to create, in a word, a *center of proletarian redressement*. This is the sole means of struggling for the party and the International.

“We do not hide from ourselves any of the obstacles which we shall find in our road. We know in

advance all the accusations that will be directed against us. They will begin by launching against us the accusation of factionism. What value can this accusation have in the eyes of workers who reflect? They will understand that the only factionists are the directors of the party, those who monopolize the press of the party for the benefit of their faction; who scorn the party, deceive it, confuse it, who choke every voice coming from below and substitute *their* personal policy for that of the political organization of the working-class. . . .

"They will not fail also to accuse us of 'playing into the hands of the bourgeoisie.' Why? Because we reveal the exact character of the interior conflict in the party? But who is it that has deliberately transported the conflict from the interior of the party into the public square? Is it not *Pravda* which without respite for almost four years has announced that the party has in its bosom Mensheviks, allies of the bourgeoisie, accomplices of Chamberlain, good-for-nothings, renegades?

"Moreover to denounce an opportunist policy is never to play into the hands of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie can rejoice, momentarily, as it rejoices at everything which shows dissension in our ranks, but the benefit which the party will draw from an intervention designed to redress its class line will be infinitely greater than the inconvenience involved in revealing the faults of the party.

"The difficulties of the struggle, the tragic nature of the events, recall a turning point no less somber and no less dangerous, in the history of the working-class: the war. The analogy is singular. Today, as thirteen years ago, leaders unworthy of the task that has been confided to them, the masses bewildered and deceived: today, as then, confusion, lies, fanaticism. And today, also, a handful of men in struggle against all calumnies and all attacks, but resolute to confront the danger.

"Against the current! As stood the Bolsheviks in 1914! Against the current! With the same force as in 1914! As the Zimmerwaldists were denounced as 'Boches' they will denounce us as 'counter-revolutionists.' . . . What matter? We will await the moment when, unfailingly, the masses come to themselves."

SUPPLEMENT V

THE DEPORTATION OF TROTSKY

[The following account of the deportation of Trotsky and the other leaders of the Opposition is taken from a private letter written by a Russian Communist. I have confirmed and corrected it with information derived from the French Opposition press. Trotsky had locked himself in a room in Muralov's apartment where he was living, and the door was broken in by the agent of the G.P.U., Abram Bielinky, who came with soldiers to get him. The "salary" of 30 rubles paid to the exiles is little more than enough to cover the cost of living-quarters. Smilga, for instance, found all the boarding-places in his destination occupied by deported Nepmen and criminals, and with difficulty secured a room for 25 rubles. The stark fact is that the authentic leaders of the October Revolution are being kept alive in exile by private subscription among their friends.—*Tr.*]

"The Opposition leaders were exiled by administrative order of the G.P.U. (the secret police) exactly as in the czarist days, with a summons to get ready in twenty-four hours. In the first group thirty men were sent off, including Rakovsky, head of the Ukrainian Government and the Politburo of the

Ukrainian Party until Lenin died; Karl Radek, one of the organizers of the Communist International, a member of Lenin's party since 1902, a member of the Central Committee of the party and of the Communist International until Lenin died; I. N. Smirnov, head of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee and organizer of the Soviet Government of Siberia, known as "The Lenin of Siberia"; V. N. Smirnov, a member of the Moscow military revolutionary committee in the October days; Sapronov, one of the organizers of the October Revolution in Moscow; Preobrazhensky, member of the party since 1903, organizer of the October Revolution in the Urals and secretary of the party under Lenin; Serebriakov, secretary of the party in 1920 under Lenin; Smilga, leader and organizer of the October Revolution in Finland, member of the Central Committee of the Russian Party until Lenin's death; Sosnovsky, member of the party since 1903, one of the founders of *Pravda* and its chief feature writer until Lenin's death; Rafail, secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine under Lenin, and others equally well known.

"The places of exile are the same as under the old Czarist régime. Each was accompanied to the place of exile by agents of the G.P.U. Each one was sent separately with a 'salary' of 30 rubles (\$15.00) a month. They are given no work.

"At first there was an attempt to make a distinction in the method of exile. It was proposed to send the more prominent leaders merely by order of the Central Committee, while the rest were exiled by the G.P.U. When Radek with a group of comrades went to the Central Committee to protest against this distinction, demanding that all be sent in the same manner, the secretary of the Central Committee dismissed him with the words: 'What are you fooling around the Central Committee for? If you want equality you can all go in the hands of the G.P.U.'

"The last one to be exported was Trotsky. The circumstances of his departure were as follows: They ordered him to get ready to go to Vierny, near the Chinese border of Turkestan, the sixteenth of January. The Moscow workers, knowing of his departure, began to secure tickets to Perovo, the suburb from which he was to leave. At the hour of departure of the local train for Perovo the Moscow station was packed with workers.

"In the station at Perovo a crowd of workers assembled to the number of 10,000. When the G.P.U. found this out they revoked the order and postponed his departure to the eighteenth. The crowd would not believe that Trotsky was not on board and stood on the tracks for four hours to prevent the departure of the train. When they were finally convinced that Trotsky was not leaving that day they rushed to his

house to find out what had happened. The G.P.U. in the meanwhile laid an ambush in the vicinity of Trotsky's house and arrested forty-seven men.

"The next day, January 17, the day before the date set for his departure, agents of the G.P.U. appeared at Trotsky's house, with an order to depart immediately. Trotsky refused to go, declaring that the date set for him had been the eighteenth; for that reason he was not ready, he had not collected his books, etc.

"The police agents threatened to take him by force, but he was obdurate. They picked up his overcoat and began to force him into it. His wife tried to communicate with somebody by telephone, and they dragged her roughly from the instrument. Trotsky's son attempted to defend his father and was subdued in a fist fight by one of the agents.

"Finally they dragged Trotsky out of his house by main force, put him in an automobile and drove him at high speed to the Faustovo station, forty miles from Moscow.

"He was placed in a compartment with soldiers on guard. On the road he fell sick. At Samara they took him from the train in a serious condition and doctors were summoned. That is all we know. That is how it really happened.

"The comrades of the Opposition imprisoned in Moscow are in terrible circumstances. The women sit in jail in the same cells with criminals and prosti-

tutes, the men with peculators and thieves. They are not permitted to see anybody. They are badly fed, and they are not allowed to receive anything from outside. It is not impossible that there will be direct victims of this régime.

“As the Government gets deeper into the economic difficulties of which the Opposition forewarned them, they try to blame these difficulties upon the Opposition. Will it be long, at this rate, before they frame up a prosecution that will end in executions?”

SUPPLEMENT VI

APPEAL OF THE RUSSIAN OPPOSITION TO THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

“We, the undersigned, expelled from the ranks of the All-Union Communist party by a resolution of the Fifteenth Party Congress, decided to appeal to the Sixth Congress of the Communist International with a protest against this resolution. But at the order of the G.P.U. we, old Bolshevik party workers, are being exiled to the remotest parts of the Soviet Union, without the presentation of any accusation against us and with the sole purpose of breaking our connections with Moscow and other working-class centers, and likewise with the Sixth Congress. We consider it necessary, therefore, on the eve of our enforced departure to remote parts of our Union, to address the present explanation to the Praesidium of the Central Executive Committee of the International, and ask them to bring it to the attention of the Central Committees of all the Communist parties. This banishment, of old party workers by administrative order of the G.P.U., is only a new link in the whole chain of events which is now shaking the All-Union Communist party. These events will have immense historic significance for a period of years. The

present disagreements are of supreme importance in the history of the international revolutionary movement. It is a question of preserving the dictatorship of the proletariat, won in October 1917. The struggle in the Russian Communist party is going on, to all intents and purposes, behind the back of the International, without its participation, and even without its knowledge. The most important documents of the Opposition, dedicated to the fundamental problems of our epoch, are unknown to the International. On every critical occasion, the Communist parties are placed before a *fait accompli*. They put their signature to decisions already made. We maintain that such a situation grows out of a radically wrong régime within the Russian Communist party and the Communist International. In an announcement with the signatures of Comrades Smilga, Muralov, Rakovsky, and Radek, addressed to the Fifteenth Congress, we gave notice of our subordination to that congress and our readiness to cease factional work. In spite of this, we have been expelled and are being exiled because we do not renounce our opinions. We have already stated, and we repeat, that we cannot renounce our opinions, as expounded in our platform and theses, since the whole course of events is confirming their correctness. The Sixth Congress of the International should be prepared for as in the time of Lenin: publish all the most important documents touching the questions under

debate; put a stop to the persecution of Communists guilty only of acting upon their rights as members of the party; raise in its full dimensions, in the discussion preceding the congress, the question of the situation within the All-Union Communist party and the political course pursued by the party.

"The debated questions cannot be settled by re-enforcing the political terror. Terror can play a great affirmative rôle if it is based on a correct political line and promotes the dissolution of reactionary groups. As Bolsheviki we fully understand the rôle of the revolutionary terror. We applied it to the bourgeoisie and their agents, the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and not for one moment do we intend in the future to renounce the revolutionary terror as against enemies of the proletariat. We well remember, however, that the terror of the parties hostile to the Bolsheviki was powerless. The issue is decided, in the last analysis, by the correctness of the political line. The banishment of us, soldiers of the October Revolution and comrades in arms of Lenin, is a clear proof of the retrograde class movements taking place in the country and the resultant political deviation to the side of opportunism. In spite of all this, we remain firmly convinced that the wielder of the Soviet power is still the proletariat. It is still possible, by way of a decisive change of the political course, by way of a correction of the mistakes already made, and without new revolutionary

disturbances to put in order and reënforce the system of proletarian dictatorship. This possibility may become a reality, if the Communist International decisively interferes in the Russian Communist party. We appeal to all the Communist parties and to the Sixth Congress of the International, urgently demanding that they judge these questions in their present aspect with the real participation of the party mass. The Testament of Lenin never sounded more prophetic than at this moment. Nobody knows how much time will be demanded by the course of historic events to correct the mistakes already made. We are suffering violence and abandoning our posts in the party and the Soviet work, for a meaningless and futile exile. But in doing so we do not for one minute doubt that each one of us will, not only be useful to the party, but will again, in the great struggles to come, occupy his place in its ranks.

“We raise before the Sixth Congress of the Communist International the question of restoring us to our party.

“Signed by Trotsky, Rakovsky, Radek, Smilga, I. N. Smirnov, Valentinov, Serebriakov, Preobrazhensky, Maliota, Eltzin, Vaganian, Itzenko, Nevenson, and a number of other old Bolsheviki.”

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